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ABSTRACT
Social controversy is a sustained, mediated debate between at least two
oppositional parties which is more than just a difference of opinion; rather it is a
persistent conflict over the political and cultural implications that dominant forms of
communicative reasoning, practices, and norms have for a public. Simply put, during
social controversies the norms guiding public life can be negotiated, reaffirmed, negated,
and/or transformed. This can lead to progressive political, cultural, and/or social change
in some instances, while establishing or reifying conservative and even oppressive norms,
practices, and laws in others.
Building upon Olson and Goodnight‘s (1994) theoretical and methodological
framework of social controversy, this dissertation argues that scholars should analyze the
role affect plays in this type of conflict as a means to address the regulation of public
conduct as well as public discourse. The rhetorical and argumentative significance of the
affective dimensions of social controversy have been conceptualized and analyzed via an
examination of emotion-based claims and affective states that have become salient,
discernable and/or apprehendable during specific public disagreements. Such a
conceptualization demonstrates that critical insights regarding the norms that guide public
conduct, the role risk and vulnerability play in the regulation of individuals‘ public
behavior, and the relationship between affect and citizenship can be gained by focusing
on a controversy‘s affective dimensions.
ii

To highlight the importance of the study of affect in social controversy as well as
better understand the larger critical significance affect theory has for rhetorical and
argumentation studies, this dissertation has analyzed the affective dimensions of three
conflicts. They are: the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse social controversy, the International
Freedom Center social controversy, and the controversy over the 2004 French ban on
conspicuous religious attire in public schools. The findings from this dissertation have
specific and general implications for future work in the field of controversy as well as
rhetoric and argumentation, respectively.
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CHAPTER ONE
SOCIAL CONTROVERSY, AFFECT, AND THE SHAME OF ABU GHRAIB
Introduction
Controversial. The term has become ubiquitous in contemporary public discourse
and identifies its subject as the focus of ―intense cultural fascination‖ (Attwood and
Lockyer 2009). Whether it is used to describe the death of protesters in Libya, 2011
Wisconsin union laws, or the depiction of teenage life on MTV‘s Skins, the term
―controversial‖ identify each as presenting an immediate or potential risk. In other words,
each example is contentious; they arouse emotion, invite objection, and can instigate
debate cultivating the political, moral, affective, and cultural conditions for social
controversy. As Goodnight (1991) explains, ―There is great risk to [social] controversy,
for argument may deny the communication of an other as reasonable; but equally, such
engagements may make possible mindful opposition by confronting with argument
differences between interlocutors that have been covered over by rule governed routines,
formal niceties, or indifferent silences‖ (6). The controversial is risky because it can
provoke examination of dominant norms and practices that may reveal critical
discrepancies that result in oppressive acts and customs.
Ideally, this is what controversial acts, claims, and texts can do. They may be a
catalyst to sustained social controversy in the hopes of renovating democratic practices to
1

be more inclusive of differing views and more accountable to contemporary conditions of
radical plurality. As Olson and Goodnight (1994) explain social controversy, ―occupies
the pluralistic boundaries of a democracy and flourishes at those sites of struggle where
arguers criticize and invent alternatives to established social conventions and sanctioned
norms of communication‖ (249). Research on social controversies has traditionally
focused on the political, cultural, ideological and moral assumptions and implications of
the argumentative claims made during this type of conflict (Finnegan 2000; Goodnight
1991, 1999, 2003; Gross 2005; Miller 2005; Olson and Goodnight 1994; Ono and Sloop
1999; Phillips 1999; Wilson 1995). These dimensions have been emphasized due to the
immediate and long-term influence they have over the regulation of public discourse via
the creation and reform of dominant forms of communicative reasoning, practices, and
norms. Politics, culture, ideology, and morality are not, however, the sole aspects of
social controversy that wields this type of influence.
Affect is also an influential aspect of social controversy which is thoroughly
entwined with the ―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy, not simply indicative of
a separate type of ―disingenuous controversy‖ (Fritch et al, 2006). For instance, Greene
and Hicks (1993) assert that people need to feel ―affectively invested‖ in a controversial
context to rouse individuals to act. One‘s affective investment ―explains how and how
much people care about particular practices, meanings, rationalities, and pleasures‖ (177).
In other words, the political potential of ―the controversial‖ is reliant, to a certain extent,
on its ability to affectively impact individuals enough to provoke public objection to
something believed to be unjust, illegitimate, invalid, or improper. As affectively
2

invested individuals, our position on ―the controversial‖ is fleshed out as a relational
experience that has ―texture and coherence‖ (177). Thus, there are assumptions about and
implications for affect embedded within claims. The intensity of affective investments is
one such assumption that effects the regulation of discourse and conduct. The greater the
intensity of one‘s investment, the greater one‘s stake in the relations, norms, and practices
embedded within this controversial context.
Given the role affect can play in social controversy, there remains a dearth of
research, with some notable exceptions (Deem 2010; Fritch et al. 2006; Greene and Hicks
1993), which theorize its role and influence. Deem (2010) notes that theories of social
controversy, as a form of rational-critical discourse, have continually been called ―into
question for [their] neglect of affect, desire and the body‖ (61). Even though Olson and
Goodnight (1994) recognize the role and radical potential of nondiscursive (i.e. visual
and performative) argumentation within social controversies, they do not attribute this to
the affective dimensions of these claims. Rather, Olson and Goodnight focus on the text
that accompanies visual images or distill actions into rational-critical enactments
indicative of the ―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy. In her analysis of the
controversy surrounding Time magazine‘s intentionally darkened image of O.J.
Simpson‘s mug shot, Finnegan (2000) also does not take into consideration the affective
dimensions of images. Instead, she focuses on the implicit legal and ideological
―conventions of photographic representation‖ that influence the oppositional arguments
made about this controversial image within the public discourse (236).
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This study, on the other hand, will give the rhetorical and argumentative role of
affect in social controversies the scholarly attention it warrants. Affect is a constantly
emerging, dynamic relation between the sensate experience of the ‗context‘ and the
visceral reaction of the ‗self‘ that varies in degrees of intensity which influences an
individual‘s ―ability to affect and a susceptibility to be affected‖ (Massumi 2002, 61).
Since affect is a sensate-visceral relation that typically occurs nonconsciously, how we
cognitively recognize and communicate about affect differs from the experience itself.1
When an affect becomes salient, or sensually saturated to the point of consciousness
through sensate intensity or contrast, it is often linguistically limited to the terms
―feeling‖ and ―emotions‖. A feeling is the process of cognitive recognition of an affective
state, i.e. a pattern of visceral reactions to a given sensate context that we are familiar
with as a specific, significant sensation. Individuals do not ―feel‖ every affective state
they embody, rather a feeling is the moment when an affect is mentally recognized.
Emotions, on the other hand, are the concepts that we use to signify the known
constellation of sensations that we have felt. As intersubjective concepts, emotions such
as happiness, sadness, grief, shame, and indignation, are imbued with varying levels of
cultural meaning, ideological symbolism, and political privilege.
Within social controversy affect becomes salient in two distinct ways: emotionbased claims and affective states. During social controversy participants make discursive
and non-discursive claims concerning specific feelings and emotions in relation to the
topic. Also, the experience of social controversies is saturated with affects, some of
1

The term nonconscious is used instead of conscious or subconscious as a means to separate this
act from the cognitive processes associated with the recognition and intentionality typically attributed to
consciousness and the psychoanalytic meaning attributed to the subconscious.
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which become recognizable affective states (i.e., diffuse feelings or moods). This
proposal will address how the affective dimensions of social controversies can be
analyzed by focusing on the emotion-based claims made during the debate as well as the
salient affective states of the conflict. Incorporating affect into existing theories of social
controversy can give insight into the political significance of affect and its role in the
regulation of public discourse as well as public conduct. Throughout this project the ties
between affect and the communicative norms, reasoning, and practices used as regulatory
technologies will become increasing clear. Since social controversy has the potential to
provoke the reform of political practices to be more inclusive, and hopefully just,
theorizing the role affect plays in these conflicts will add to the provocative research on
the political ties between affect, social justice and citizenship.
To do so, this chapter will be organized as follows. First, the theory of social
controversy will be explained through an abbreviated analysis of the debate that arose
when the Abu Ghraib prison abuse photos were leaked. This analysis will focus on the
―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy criticism to emphasis what is left
unexamined when affect is not incorporated into this type of critique. Then, the affective
dimensions of social controversy will be further explicated followed by an extension of
the Abu Ghraib analysis focused on affective states and emotion-based claims. The
affective dimensions of social controversy deal will the affects, feelings, and emotions
that play a significant role in the conflict as part of the substance that people are arguing
about. Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the affective state of the images pulled
individuals in and norms regarding the legitimacy and propriety of affect become a
5

central concern in the public discourse. This analysis will include an examination of
Susan Sontag‘s article ―Regarding the Torture of Others‖ as an affective objection of
shame. An affective objection is a specific affective state and/or emotion-based claim that
exemplifying the salient affects that imbue an argument and/or stance during a social
controversy. After this, a discussion of the research questions driving this study will be
given which address the implications this project will have on current theories of the
discursive-based norms of citizenship. Lastly, a preview of chapters outlining the theory
and methodological framework for this project as well as the case studies being examined
will be briefly discussed.
Abu Ghraib and Traditional Social Controversy Criticism
In May 2003, The New York Times published reports of Iraqi detainee abuse and
torture at the hands of U.S. soldiers, these reports were the first public news accounts of
the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison (Lacey). The reports generated little public
response until the now infamous photos were published on April 28, 2004 by 60 Minutes
II and then on May 1, 2004 by The New Yorker. The photos, taken between October and
December 2003, featured Military Police [MP] and other soldiers assigned to night shift
duty on Abu Ghraib prison‘s tier 1A and 1B physically and mentally abusing their
detainees. Beatings, forced nudity, extreme stress conditions/positions, mocking of naked
and dead prisoners, simulated sex acts, and physical intimidation of detainees using guard
dogs were only a few of the actions depicted in the photos. The images were shocking,
the actions barbaric, and it seemed as if the whole world was strangely captivated by
them.
6

Shortly after photos‘ publication, two major political and legal inconsistencies
were revealed. First, the prisoners in tiers 1A and 1B were officially considered civilian
―troublemakers,‖ terrorist suspects, ―high-risk‖ detainees and ―anyone of intelligence
interest‖ who were held for interrogation (Schlesinger 2004, 371). Yet, according to U.S.
intelligence officers, seventy to ninety percent of the detainees at Abu Ghraib were
wrongfully arrested, including some of the tortured and abused prisoners (Associated
Press 2004). Secondly, the Bush Administration‘s official stance on the Abu Ghraib
photos was one of ―righteous indignation‖ (―Abu‖ 2004). The soldiers featured within the
images were considered a ―few rotten apples‖ that did not accurately reflect U.S. forces
in Iraqi. These were rogue soldiers—morally monstrous, sexually deviant, and viciously
depraved—whose corrupt actions were completely their own. As former President Bush
stated, these soldiers‘ cruel treatment of their detainees ―does not reflect the nature of the
American people‖ (Curl 2004).
Despite this characterization, ample evidence had been leaked to the press in two
of the military‘s own investigations, one by Major General [MG] Taguba which was
conducted in February 20042, and the other by MG Anthony Jones and MG George Fay,
indicting a chain of command leading all the way to then Department of Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the former President himself. In other words, the soldiers
2

By the time these photos leaked to the public, both the International Committee of the Red Cross
[ICRC] and the U.S. military itself had already conducted investigations into the allegations of detainee
torture and abuse. The military investigation, led by Major General [MG] Antonio Taguba, concluded that
soldiers on the night shift committed ―sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses,‖ and that the issue of
―illegal abuse‖ was both ―systemic‖ and ―intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military
police guard force‖ on the detainees in Tiers 1A and 1B of Abu Ghraib. These offenses included, but were
not limited to, beatings, forced nudity, simulated sex acts, rape, sodomy, and allowing guard dogs to bite
detainees. However, MG Taguba‘s findings remained classified until after the Abu Ghraib photos were
leaked.
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were simply treating their detainees in a manner U.S. government officials already
approved of. Regardless of these military report findings, only twelve soldiers were
court-martialed, eleven of whom were later convicted (Stockman 2004). The
overwhelming majority of the soldiers convicted were the low ranking officers featured
in the photos.3 Each soldier either pled guilty or was convicted of charges ranging from
dereliction of duty and failure to protect to cruelty and assault. All of these soldiers had at
various times stated they were simply following orders from Military Intelligence [MI]
and Other Government Agencies [OGA—code for the CIA], to ―loosen this guy up‖ and
―make sure he has a bad night‖ (Taguba 2004, 294). In the end, this did not matter for
these low ranking soldiers who immortalized their actions on film. No matter who give
implicit orders to these soldiers, the Abu Ghraib images seemed to capture actions so
abject the depicted soldiers had to be punished.
The creation and circulation of the Abu Ghraib images not only provoked
investigation into the political and legal inconsistencies uncovered by them, they
ultimately inspired a vast body of public and academic work in an attempt to make sense
of the torture and abuse that occurred there. This work included over 3,000 news articles
from major world publications in just one month of the photos‘ publication4, 117 books

3

These soldiers were: Staff Sergeant [SSG] Ivan ―Chip‖ Fredericks; Specialist [SPC] Charles
Graner; SPC Sabrina Harmon; Private First Class [PFC] Lynndie England; Sergeant [SGT] Javal Davis;
SPC Megan Ambuhl; and Private [PVT] Jeremy Sivits.
4

This number was calculated on February 22, 2011 by conducting a search on LexisNexis
Academic. This statistic represents the results from a keyword search using the term ―Abu Ghraib‖ and was
limited ―Major World Publications‖ from April 24, 2004 to May 24, 2004.
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and book chapters5, 286 scholarly journal articles6, and seemingly countless blog entries,
webpages, and on-line comments. Three prominent documentary films also delved into
the intricacies of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison: Ghost of Abu Ghraib (2007),
Standard Operating Procedure (2008), and Taxi to the Dark Side (2007). Some
journalistic investigation focused on revealing the ―truth‖ about the political and legal
context of the soldiers‘ actions (Danner 2004; Hersh 2004; Strasser 2004), while
numerous articles express informed positions on the legality and propriety of these acts
(Dowd 2004a, 2004b; Sontag 2004; Dershowitz 2004a).
Scholars analyzed the Abu Ghraib prisoner torture and abuse from a feminist
perspective (Gronnvoll 2007; Philipose 2007); postcolonial perspective (Rajiva 2005;
Tétreault 2006); social constructionist perspective (Bennett et al. 2006; Smith and
Dionisopoulos 2008); and postmodernism perspective (Baudrillard 2006; Žižek 2004).
Given the shocking nature of the images, many researchers performed a visual analysis of
them (Apel 2005; Eisenman 2007; Mirzoeff 2006; Philpott 2005), while others focused
on the political nature and implications of actions they depicted (Caton and Zacka 2010;
Luban 2006). As controversial images, the Abu Ghraib photos and the actions captured
within them were a ―focus of public fascination,‖ that ―mark[ed] key areas of dispute‖
(Attwood and Lockyer 2009, 1). The photos drew people in. Seizing global attention, the

5

The number of books and book chapters about the events at Abu Ghraib prison was retrieved
from the Library of Congress website. This statistic represents the results from a keyword search using the
term ―Abu Ghraib‖ and was limited the search to books written in English.
6

This number of journal articles about Abu Ghraib was generated via combined search of two
databases: Communication &Mass Media Complete and Academic Search Complete. This statistic
represents the results from a keyword search using the term ―Abu Ghraib‖ and was limited the peerreviewed scholarly journals as well as the timeframe April 2004 to present.
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images provoked conflict and instigated debate that played out in print, broadcast, and
on-line media as well as various academic outlets. The Abu Ghraib photos inspired this
bevy of investigation, research, and analysis and yet, in spite of all this, the debates
surrounding these images of prisoner abuse and torture have not been examined as a
social controversy.
―A social controversy,‖ according to Olson and Goodnight (1994), is an
―extended rhetorical engagement [within the public discourse] that critiques, resituates,
and develops communication practices‖ and norms (249). This engagement is a
sustained, mediated debate between at least two oppositional parties which is more than
just a difference of opinion, but rather a persistent conflict over the political and cultural
implications that dominant forms of communicative reasoning, practices, and norms have
for a public. Goodnight (1991) explains that social controversy ―is a creature of the
between‖ (2); an initial objection flourishes into an interplay of sustained critique and
frequent rejoinders that illuminates the ―engaged difference‖ between interlocutors (5).
During a social controversy, arguments not only deal with the issue being debated but
also the implicit forms of reasoning and dominant procedures that govern public
discourse. As a form of disagreement, social controversy is ―both an essential condition
of human existence and a potential good‖ given its ability to provoke debate about these
privileged forms of communicative regulation (Hicks and Langsdorf 1999, 142).
This does not assume that regulatory power is strictly repressive; regulating
norms can be a productive force focused on promoting fairer and more inclusive practices
as well as oppressive techniques used to normalize exclusionary practices (Hicks and
10

Langsdorf 1999). As Olson and Goodnight (1994) conceptualized it, objections are raised
in an attempt to shift regulatory power from repressive to more democratically productive
procedures in the hopes of influencing political and cultural change. However, Goodnight
(1999) later critiques this by asserting that, ―controversy cannot be valorized as resistance
leading to change causing reform‖ (520). In other words, social controversies not only
occur when individuals protest oppressive conditions. Individuals and groups may also
object to reasoning, practices and norms they feel are too progressive and wish to create
more conservative communicative conditions.
When leveling objections to communicative rules and norms, opponents typically
appeal to normative standards of legitimacy and propriety which regulate public
discourse. Olson and Goodnight (1994) explain objections are raised regarding the
―legitimacy of procedural rules or the fairness of grounds invoked in asserting a claim
and establishing the conditions of communicative reasoning‖ (251). Normative standards
of legitimacy are used as a criterion of judgment when concerns arise regarding whether a
claim or action is ―morally justifiable and rationally produced‖ (Hicks and Langsdorf
1999, 140). Objecting to the legitimacy of a practice, form of reasoning, or norm
implicates it as somehow unlawful, unjust, and/or unreasonable which necessitates
additional critique and, hopefully, reform. ―[An] objection,‖ Olson and Goodnight (1994)
continue, ―is more than an opposing statement, because the performance of an argument
always raises the relational question: Are the implied norms of understanding, testing,
and adjudicating appropriate for us‖ (251)? Critiquing the propriety of a communicative
norm problematizes how well the norm politically, morally, and ideologically fits with
11

the society that conforms to it. If a norm is indicative of whom we are as a society,
objections that question normative propriety ask if this norm is also indicative of who we
want to be.7
Either way, social controversies are ―rich moments of rhetorical invention‖ during
which attempts are made to (re)direct public discourse via the critique of reasoning and
regulatory practices (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 273). The regulatory practices that are
critiqued during social controversies include ―a culture‘s rules and presumptions on who
gets to talk, what counts as proof, whose language is authoritative, and what norms shall
govern decisions‖ (Wilson 1995, 204). Although addressing issues of deliberation, Hicks
and Langsdorf‘s (1999) conceptualization of identity, locution, substance, and forum as
the four procedural parameters which regulate disagreement can also be used to expand
upon the types of practices and norms critiqued during social controversy. Accordingly,
identity-based objections question what this issue says about a public‘s collective identity
as well as who can speak authoritatively about it. Locution-based objections focus on
how a public can speak about the issue and reveal the types of communication that are
privileged within the debate. Substance-based objections critique the dominant forms of
reasoning that undergird the practices and norms at the center of the conflict. Lastly,
within social controversies, forum-based objections raise concerns regarding the political
context of the debate and the implications this has on the progression of the conflict itself.

7

Ironically, objections are at risk of being overlooked or dismissed if they stray too far from the
norms they are critiquing and dominant rules of decorum. Thus, although social controversy can espouse a
radical potential for change within contemporary publics by giving voice to dissenting and dissatisfied
individuals and groups, a contemporary public‘s normative standards of legitimacy and propriety also can
limit that potential.
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During the Abu Ghraib social controversy, political, legal, ideological, and moral
questions regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the soldiers‘ actions were raised. As
mentioned earlier, initial investigations mainly focused on the extent to which photos
depicted soldiers employing U.S. sanctioned interrogation tactics or abusing and torturing
prisoners. The soldiers claimed they were following orders and ample evidence supported
this; the victims were alleged terrorists suspected of having Taliban and/or al-Qaeda
intelligence desperately needed during the U.S. War on Terror (Danner 2004; Hersh
2004; Tabuga 2004). The soldiers did what they were told they had to do as part of their
duty to keep America safe. Yet, the images seemed to capture actions that appeared far
more physically and mentally vicious than prisoner interrogation. This type of behavior is
illegal in prisons across the U.S., so why is it sanctioned on the battlefield? Had the U.S.
State Department‘s 2003 Human Rights Report not cited countries such as Burma,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran for the same ―harsh interrogation techniques‖ used at
Abu Ghraib (Malinowski 2005, 140)?
The Abu Ghraib social controversy revolved around these questions which
incorporated additional concerns about the political implications these photos would have
on America‘s faltering global standing and the U.S. War on Terror. People debated over
what the tipping point between U.S. sanctioned interrogation tactics and prisoner abuse,
or worse, torture was. Conflict ensued regarding the legitimacy and propriety of U.S.
soldiers employing tactics such as beating, stripping, humiliating, and extreme physical
and mental stressing of prisoners as a means to gather intelligence during wartime.
Individuals questioned whether or not the possibility of gaining political and military
13

intelligence, ideally used to thwart future terrorist attacks, legitimize causing prisoners
this type of bodily and psychological pain. Sustained opposition arose over the legal,
moral, political and ideological appropriateness of U.S. soldiers treating prisoners in this
manner. For some, these images depicted a different type of America—one in which
there was not a clear distinction between the U.S. military (including the citizens they
represent) and the terrorist forces we were (and still are) fighting. Whiles others felt the
situation was being blown out of proportion.
Within the public discourse, opposing perspectives on these questions were
framed as conflicting factions of the American public engaged in a prolonged battle over
the legitimacy and propriety of the actions vividly captured in the Abu Ghraib photos.
Objections to the abuse depicted in the photos were plentiful and clear; these soldiers
were illegitimately exploiting their power as captor. Meaning, the Abu Ghraib photos
depicted soldiers torturing, not simply abusing, their detainees which is not only illegal
but also politically indefensible and morally reprehensible regardless of the intelligence it
might generate. People publicly critiqued the U.S. government for being hypocritical.
How could we sanction this type of military behavior at Abu Ghraib when we have
publicly reprimanded other countries for similar behavior knowing that it violates the
Geneva Convention as well as our democratic ideals in prisoner and human rights? Still
others objected to the actions captured in the Abu Ghraib photos for fear that this type of
behavior would fuel further hate-filled acts of terrorism, ultimately putting Americans in
more, rather than less, danger.
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These hard-line objections were met with opposition by individuals and groups
that did not believe the actions portrayed in the Abu Ghraib photos were that bad or
unjustifiable. Some supporters argued that the photographed actions were harsh but that
what these U.S. soldiers did was not as horrific as what Saddam Hussein had done to his
own people when Abu Ghraib prison was under his rule. The rationale being that as long
as our enemies physically and psychologically treat their prisoners worse than our
soldiers did, our military‘s actions could be considered legitimate and appropriate within
this context. Others asserted that the pictures simply captured the raw, visceral conditions
of combat; laws and democratic ideals, although essential in civilian live are not always
plausible on the battlefield where soldiers are trying to survive. In war, a soldiers‘ need to
survive is enough justification for the legitimacy and propriety of the actions depicted in
the Abu Ghraib photos.
This combination of objections and rebuttals within the public discourse about
Abu Ghraib highlight what can be considered traditional dimensions of social
controversy. They address some of the political, cultural, and ideological issues and
implications surrounding U.S. policy on interrogation, abuse, and torture. Throughout the
conflict the dominant norms and practices regarding these policies and the reasoning
embedded within them become more visible, enabling critics to analyze how these
prevailing conventions influence and regulate public discourse. But what it left behind is
the salient and overt affective dimensions of the Abu Ghraib photos and the disagreement
this provoked.
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The Affective Dimensions of Social Controversy
The leaked photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison offer a salient example of how
affective states can permeate the context of social controversy as well as the types of
emotion-based claims that can be made during the conflict. Affect is a notoriously
difficult term to define partially due to the fluidity of the phenomenon. In many ways,
affect is a perpetual moment of potential becoming; a constantly emerging, dynamic
relation between the sensate experience of the ‗context‘ and the visceral reaction of the
‗self‘ that varies in degrees of intensity and ―force-relations‖ which can influence an
individual‘s ―ability to affect and a susceptibility to be affected‖ (Massumi 2002, 61).
Affect has a unique interstitial quality; within any given context, the ‗self‘ both unfolds
into the environment by emitting sensate messages (i.e., sounds, scents, pheromones, etc.)
while simultaneously infolding sensual information gleaned from the environment. This
immediate, synergistic interaction is the real-time process of affect which occurs at a
nonconscious level; the ―self‖ responds to sensate perceptions of a situation at the bodily,
chemical and neural level before these reactions are cognitively registered. However,
individuals can become conscious of patterns of affect (i.e., the sensations of the sensate
experience-visceral reaction relation) in the form of feelings.
A feeling is the cognitive acknowledgement of a pattern of sensate-visceral
relations and experienced sensations. Feelings, in this way, cognitively capture affects
within distinct states of relation; yet there is always an excess of affect that cannot be
captured in feelings. Individuals do not ―feel‖ every affect they experience rather a
feeling is the moment when an affect is cognitively recognized. As Brennan (2004)
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explains, ―Feelings can be sifted from affects, and better known to consciousness,
through the deployment of living attention‖ (139). Feelings are recognized through a
process of discernment; the significance and importance of a feeling is not solely based
on our immediate sensate-visceral relations but also our history of like encounters
(including their outcomes and detailed aspects) as well as the qualitative differences
between them. Therefore, the discernment of a feeling‘s meaning is aided by the memory
or (re)collection of past experiences that provoked like sensate-visceral relations and
embodied sensations. These (re)collection of affective experiences are imbued with
personal significance as well as cultural, ideological, and political importance given the
context during which they were felt.
―Feelings,‖ according to Brennan (2004), are ―sensations that have found the right
match in words‖ (5). People tend to express or convey how they feel through emotional
language and display. As Massumi (2002) explains, ―Emotion is the most intense (most
contracted) expression of that capture‖ of feeling (35). For example, if I sincerely state ―I
feel happy‖ this literally means the sensate experience of being in a certain environment
has triggered a pattern of visceral reactions the feeling of which I cognitively recognize
as happiness because it is a sensation of delight and pleasure. However, emotions are not
simply subjective states; they are intersubjective concepts representing widely recognized
feelings which are imbued with cultural meaning, ideological symbolism, and political
significance. As Massumi (2002) explains an emotion is ―the sociolinguistic fixing of the
quality of an experience which is…qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point
of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into
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narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning‖ (28). The
intersubjective nature of emotions also makes affect vulnerable to dominant reasoning,
practices, and norms as a means of regulation within the public sphere. There are socially
legitimate and appropriate ways to feel and emotionally act in response to any given
situation.
Affects, therefore, ―are integral to our ability to grasp the meaning of a situation
and to act appropriately in response to it‖ (Johnson 2007, 68). Focusing on the affective
dimensions of social controversy will highlight the norms regarding affects, feelings, and
emotions that have been deemed legitimate and appropriate which consequently regulate
how we address affect in the public discourse as well as how we embody affect and our
public conduct.8 Within social controversies, affects can be publically acknowledged as
specific feelings or emotions when they reach a point of saliency. Salience occurs when
the intensity of an affect becomes recognizable; often due to the use of sharp sensual
contrasts (i.e., loud/soft sounds, hot/cold surfaces, sweet/sour tastes, pungent/faint scents,
blurry/crisp images), feeling and emotional contrasts (i.e., pleasure/pain, happy/sad) or
the deep saturation or concentration of an affective state. Within social controversy affect
becomes salient in two distinct ways: affective states and emotion-based claims.
Social controversies are not simply an accumulation of tactically based
oppositional arguments; they are argumentative experiences during which numerous
8

The term affective encompasses the range of concepts that deal with the conscious and
nonconscious experience of affect. This includes but is not limited to: affect, sensate-visceral relations,
sensation, feeling, and emotion. As an adjective, the term affective is used to signify the specific affectfocus of a given object, act, event, individual, stance, etc. For instance, the term affective investment is
meant to address a person‘s investments that deal with affect, feelings, and emotions rather than political
and/or monetary concerns. This is not to say that affective, political, and monetary investments are not
related, just that each imagines investment differently.
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affective states unfold and are embodied. These states are diffuse feelings, or moods,
which can provoke and/or permeate the overall controversy. Generally speaking,
controversial acts, claims, and texts can create an affective state best described as unease;
there is a sense of physical and mental disquiet and general restlessness that results in
acts of public objection and rejoinders that culminated in sustained opposition. However,
these overarching affective states are not the only ones present during a social
controversy. Affective states function argumentatively in two ways. First, they can act as
experiential arguments; claims that are sensate-visceral enactments of the conditions of
one‘s affective experience. As experiential claims, affective states both attest to the
conditions that provoked this state and act as the grounds for the claim. Second, affective
states can be affective appeals; diffuse moods that infuse a claim or stance that invite
audiences to engage in this state either in a similar fashion that echoes it or in a
(re)actionary manner that implies an affective relation between then.
Technically speaking, affective states are not only accessible in immediate
experience. They can also be captured in various forms such as bodies, photos, video,
audio, music, art, and language. The capture is a representation of an affective state
caught in a distinct moment that does not, and cannot, fully encapsulate the affect. As
indicative of an affective state, in distinction from an emotion-based claim, this capture is
not necessarily limited to one specific emotion. Rather, each capture can convey a
sensation that does not have an exact emotion that it corresponds to. The capture enables
affective states to be circulated within the public discourse. Just as individuals discern
their own affective states as distinct feelings and emotions, we do the same to others—we
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exam their immediate or captured affective states to discern how they feel. When we
attempt to discern an others‘ affective state via a capture we also need to take into
consideration how the form of the capture can impact the discernment process.
During social controversies, affect also becomes salient via discursive and nondiscursive claims regarding specific emotions. For instance, opponents of the proposed
Wisconsin laws argue that people should feel outrage at the local government‘s attempts
to undermine public employee unions‘ collective bargaining power. Emotion-based
claims, like all arguments made during social controversies, are appeals to normative
standards of legitimacy and propriety regarding how the public should feel, and thus
behave, in relation to this conflict. As a form of oppositional argument, emotion-based
claims are used to block dominant enthymemes regarding specific emotions that establish
the affective dimensions of a controversy. By blocking dominant emotion-based
enthymemes implicit societal norms about these emotions can be revealed enabling the
contestation, reevaluation, and renovation of these normative practices.
Affective objections are specific affective states and/or emotion-based claims that
advance salient, specific states or emotions that are at issue in the controversy.
―Objections,‖ as Olson and Goodnight (1994) explicate them, ―are leveled against the
projection of consensus because all rules of reasoning and division of grounds are said to
be but rationalizations of oppressive power conditions‖ (251). Likewise, affective
objections reject the casual recognition and acceptance of an affective state and/or
dominant norms regarding affect, feelings, emotions, and conduct; instead the legitimacy
and propriety of a specific sensate-visceral experience and/or emotion-based norm within
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a specific historical, cultural, and political set of conditions is questioned. Affective
objections are often used in conjunction with critiques that propose alternative means of
envisioning that which is being objected to. Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy,
both of these affective dimensions are recognizable.
Affective State of Pleasure at Pain in Abu Ghraib
Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the intensity of the affective states
captured in the images as well as the evidentiary status granted to photography demanded
immediate attention in a manner that news reports alone simply could not provide. Taken
as a group, the Abu Ghraib photos created an affective state that does not have one
specific emotional counterpart; rather they oscillate between groups of juxtaposed
extreme sensations of pain/humiliation/fear and pleasure/delight/enjoyment. The intense
felt contrast between the detainees‘ pain and the soldiers‘ pleasure was so prominently
displayed in the Abu Ghraib photos that it became part of what Americans were arguing
over. In this way, their affective state of pleasure at pain acted as an affective appeal that
underwrites the Abu Ghraib social controversy.
The disturbing aesthetics of the Abu Ghraib images are emotionally and viscerally
jarring; the violence grotesque, the soldiers‘ dispositions crass and garish, the victims
hurt and humiliated. The over-exaggerated thumbs up further accentuated by latex
seafoam-colored gloves and the grandiose smiles stretched across U.S. soldiers‘ faces as
they stand next to battered, bound, hooded, naked and even some deceased detainees
visually capture a chaotic sensation of comedy in the face of tragedy. Soldiers‘ big toothy
―say cheese‖ smiles are strangely reminiscent of decades by advertisements in which
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models‘ wide smiles have become iconic of ―the idea of pleasure‖ of consuming a
company‘s products (Kotchemidova 2005, 10). The trace of this smile beckons a
sensation of consumer pleasure, transforming the photos into ads for U.S. involvement in
Iraqi with the soldiers‘ smiling promotion of the abusive power we wield there. The
soldiers‘ wide grins and embellished gestures exhibit no remorse or regret but rather
enjoyment and satisfaction; relishing the recognition of the prisoners‘ twisted bodies,
anguished expressions and/or hooded faces.
The composition of the images add to this affective experience; the slightly
blurred contents feel strangely nostalgic, reminiscent in tone and form of ordinary
snapshots captured by the point-and-shoot medium of digital photography documenting
daily life in a manner that can be uploaded, copied, burned, and forwarded to others for
their consumption and enjoyment. The digital lay photography of the Abu Ghraib soldiers
highlight ―a shift from photographing others for self-consumption to documentation of
self for consumption by others‖ (Schwarz 2010, 165). The photos from Abu Ghraib
prison feel like a type of mediated self-portraiture, taken and circulated by American
troops, which disclose an America where its citizens are no longer victims of the
seemingly irrational violence suffered on September 11th but rather the joyful perpetrators
of physical vengeance. As an affective appeal, the contradiction of affects in content,
display, and function made the affective state of the Abu Ghraib photos inherently
controversial. The affective state of pleasure at pain that is captured in the images invited
viewers to engage in this intensely conflicting mood and, for some people, evoked an
―unsteady state‖ in (re)action to them (Scott 1991, 20).
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Emotion-Based Claims and Sontag’s Affective Objection of Shame
Emotion-based claims raised during the Abu Ghraib social controversy
questioned U.S. norms regarding what the appropriate response to the soldiers‘ display of
seemingly cruel enjoyment of the prisoners‘ suffering should be. For some, the images
seemed to beg the question; should we not feel disgust at the soldiers‘ shamelessness and
apparent joy in causing pain? Critics argued that, at its core, the Abu Ghraib controversy
stemmed from the soldiers‘ exaggerated display of pleasure in causing the detainees‘
physical and mental suffering (Luban 2006; Sontag 2004; Žižek 2004), and that these
―literally ‗happy snaps‘ of torture‖ (Ulevich 2004) should result in feelings of disgust
(Bloom 2004) as well as a ―sort of national shame‖ (Gillespie 2004) due to the soldiers‘
violation of the public‘s trust (Wallis 2004).
During this controversy, Susan Sontag‘s New York Times Magazine article
―Regarding the Torture of Others‖ serves as an affective objection to the Abu Grhaib
photos. ―What is illustrated by these photographs‖ Sontag (2004) argues, ―is as much the
[US] culture of shamelessness as the reigning admiration for unapologetic brutality‖ (29).
Rather than feel shame at the pain caused by their own hands, these photos demonstrate
the soldiers‘ sense of pride in their own brutality towards those rendered powerless. The
complete effrontery to the pain and degradation of these prisoners is exacerbated as a
performance of ―fun‖ by the soldiers (Sontag 2004, 28). Sedgwick (2003) asserts that
―shame attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is . . . it is the place where the
question of identity arises most originarily and most relationally‖ (37).
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For Sontag, the grotesque nature of the photos should provoke a sense of shame
for Americans; a feeling of embarrassment or dishonor at what these soldiers‘ actions say
about who we are as a nation. However, she is not simply imploring individuals to
personally feel shame but rather to constitute a public based on a normative standard of
shame that would compel its members to judge these soldiers‘ actions as illegitimate and
inappropriate. As Ahmed (2004) explains, it is ―not so much how shame is ―felt‖ by
nations, but how declarations of shame can bring ‗the nation‘ into existence as a felt
community‖ (101). This felt community is established by a general acknowledgement of
―wrongdoing‖; Ahmed (2004) continues, ―the ‗we‘ is shamed by its recognition that it
has committed ‗acts and omissions,‘ which have caused pain, hurt and loss for indigenous
others‖ (Ahmed 2004, 101). By calling into question the U.S. ―culture of shamelessness,‖
Sontag is calling on the U.S. public to reject the dominant norms of shame that do not
code these soldiers‘ behavior as illegitimate or inappropriate but instead frame their
actions as acceptable and even necessary forms of interrogation during wartime. Sontag
asserts that the soldiers‘ actions are shameful because they are abusive to the point of
torture; yet that is not the only reason they should provoke shame.
Embedded within the simple act of taking these photos and circulating them to
other soldiers, family and friends, is the photographers‘ desire for recognition. In this
case, the same soldiers were the creators (i.e., photographers), perpetrators (i.e., abusers),
circulators (i.e. original distributors of the images), and partial subjects of the Abu Ghraib
photos.9 The photos, then, act as a request for acknowledge of the pleasure the soldiers
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The Abu Ghraib photos were primarily taken with SSG Ivan ―Chip‖ Fredericks, SPC Charles
Graner, and SPC Sabrina Harmon‘s cameras.
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took in displaying their power over these detainees as well as the detainees‘ physical,
mental, and affective submission to them. Thus, ―the horror of what is shown in the
photographs,‖ Sontag (2005) eloquently explains, ―cannot be separated from the horror
that the photographs were taken—with the perpetrators posing, gloating, over their
helpless captives‖ (26). For Sontag, the physical violence enacted against the detainees
was only part of what made the Abu Ghraib photos so disturbing. The other disconcerting
part is the voyeuristic nature in which they were constructed; the soldiers wanted others
to witness their joyful violence.10 Whether it was to share their pleasure, incited anger in
their enemies or cause further humiliation to their prisoners, the Abu Ghrab photos were
constructed in a manner that would surely invoke a visceral and emotional response from
viewers.
Simply put, the photographed soldiers‘ emotional display sparked a social
controversy that addressed the relationship between citizenship and affect; U.S. citizens
argued over what our democratic ideals of American citizenship are and whether or not
taking pleasure in prisoner torture and abuse fits within this civic framework. In other
words, democratic ideals of U.S. citizenship not only establish norms and conventions
regarding political and moral relations, but also relations based on affect (i.e., how we
10

Grusin (2010) argues that an additional affective component in the Abu Ghraib controversy was
the manner of photos creation and transmission (i.e. the mediality of digital photography). Grusin asserts
that taking and disseminating digital photographs is, at its core, an action based in the sensory-emotive
transmission of affect. In other words, people take, upload, and forward digital photos in order to elicit
emotional reactions from their recipients. The continual use of this digital media technology has created an
expected, or premediated, response in audiences—the reception of digital photos is nonconsciously
assumed to be an affective experience. Grusin argues that this sensory-emotive media-based premediation
coupled with the intense saliency of affect depicted in the photos was so overwhelming that it resulted in an
experience of shock at the images of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse. It was as if audiences were given a
double dose of affect via the sensory-emotive experience of the medium and the aesthetic depiction of the
Abu Ghraib photos.
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should experience our relationship to another at the sensate-visceral, felt, and emotional
level). Individuals are held accountable to these norms and conventions of affect should
politically, morally, and affective respond to controversial situations based on these
ideals. these ideals hold us accountable to. When a social controversy addresses issues of
affect, the implicit norms and conventions regarding affect are contested. Sontag and
others who offered affective objections to the Abu Ghraib photos argued that the soldiers‘
self-conscious display of joy was grotesque in the presence of such obvious suffering.
The photos reflected a gross subversion of the affects, feelings, and emotions that the
soldiers‘ ought to conduct their behavior according to as U.S. citizens. Consequently,
these image raised questions of just what we, as Americans, are doing in the name of
democracy during the War on Terror. Thus, affective objections to the Abu Ghraib abuse
are closely associated with political and moral questions regarding our collective national
identity.
During the Abu Ghraib social controversy, determining what affects, feelings, and
emotions are not only appropriate but, more importantly, legitimate for American citizens
to experience in relation to the Abu Ghraib images is a main concern. In other words, as
Americans, should we share in the soldiers‘ shameless pleasure as we witness our troops
cause incarcerated prisoners‘ physical and mental pain? Is it legitimate for Americans to
feel joy at brutalizing prisoners in the midst of war? Should we not as ―civilized,
democratic citizens‖ behave more humanely and, at the very least, feel remorse when
causing our enemies pain? As even President Bush stated, ―That‘s not the way we do
things in America,‖ and yet, as so many investigative reports have found, it is exactly
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how we did things in military detention facilities throughout Iraqi, Afghanistan, and Cuba
(Stockman 2004). But this time, American citizens felt it.
Research Questions
Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the political, moral, and cultural
significance of affect became an important aspect of the conflict. Even though Abu
Ghraib provides one of the most salient examples of the affective dimensions of social
controversy, it is not the only public debate that this occurs. This project will, therefore,
further conceptualize the affective dimensions of social controversy as affect-based
normative objection and critique which addresses the role affect plays in the regulation of
public discourse and conduct. To do so, this dissertation will be driven by the following
research questions. First, how does considering affect extend and contribute to our
understanding of the nature and significance of social controversy? Specifically, how do
the affective dimensions of social controversies emerge and what is their potential to
critically interrogate the presumptions underwriting dominant norms and conventions that
regulate public life and establish the cultural politics of affect, feelings, and emotions?
Second, what can the analysis of these dimensions tell us about relationship between
affect and citizenship; that is, how is citizenship increasingly being shaped by norms and
conventions of affect and what are the implications of doing so? Specifically, what
figures of the citizen are articulated in affective states and emotion-based claims and how
do these dimensions serve as sites of ethico-political pedagogy.
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Preview of Chapters
This dissertation follows an inductive, progressive format. Each chapter builds
upon the previous one leading to a discussion of the overall implications and conclusions
of the study. After explicating the overall theory of affect as it culminates in social
controversies in chapter two, I turn to the analysis of two specific conflicts. Rather than
repeatedly applying a formal methodological framework to each case, the analysis of the
affective dimensions of social controversy is presented separated in chapters three and
four to facilitate a more in-depth examination of how each can function in social
controversy. The fifth and final chapter includes a discussion of the overarching findings
of this project and the implications these conclusion have on theories of democratic
citizenship.
Chapter Two
Chapter two delves into the theoretical and methodological framework of this
project, beginning with a review of literature on social controversy. Olson and
Goodnight‘s (1994) work of social controversy is situated as the foundational work and,
utilizing a generative approach, this framework is expanded upon using four overarching
constructive critiques and extensions of their theory. These focus on: the separation
between discursive and nondiscursive claims; the limitations of opposition-based theories
of argumentation; the need for incommensurate discourses; and the potential for change.
To aid in the explication of these extensions and critiques, brief examples from the Abu
Ghraib social controversy are used to expand upon these areas.
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This generative approach leads to a discussion of the role affect plays in social
controversy and further theorizes its affective dimensions. The affective dimensions of
social controversy deal will the affects, feelings, and emotions that play a significant role
in the conflict as part of the argumentative substance at issue which have implications for
germane publics. Developed as a rhetorical and argumentative construct, the affective
dimensions of social controversy are conceptualized in three-parts. First, the theory of
affect is discussed addressing its movement as an orienting and galvanizing force.
Second, in order to operationalize affect for use within rhetorical theory, a number of
terms are conceptualized in a movement towards a rhetorical lexicon of affect. Finally, a
more thorough explication of emotion-based claims, affective states, and the relationship
between them is offered.
Chapter Three
The third chapter focuses on the social controversy surrounding the International
Freedom Center (IFC)—the proposed, but now defunct, museum that would have been
built at the World Trade Center (WTC) site. Conceived of as ―a living memorial‖ to
―freedom‘s power over tyranny, terror, and injustice,‖ the IFC would have told the story
of 9/11 as one of many struggles for freedom fought throughout the world (IFC 2005, 4).
Initially, the proposed museum was well received but just one year after the IFC was
granted a physical space at the WTC site, critics complained that its mission was
inappropriate for this ―hallowed‖ ground.
Analysis of the affective dimensions of this controversy focuses on the emotionbased claim of reverence posited by in the Take Back the Memorial (TBM) campaign and
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the IFC‘s proponents‘ rebuttal of this claim. The TBM campaign was led by a coalition of
9/11 families and first-responder (i.e., firefighter and police) associations who objected to
the IFC‘s creation at Ground Zero. They argued that the IFC would not be a legitimate or
appropriate way to memorialize 9/11 and its victims at this site because it would not
foster feelings of reverence about this tragedy or provoke acts of veneration out of respect
for the deceased. Members of the TBM feared that the proposed museum would be
nothing more than a thinly veiled, left-leaning history lesson that would admonish U.S.
American foreign policy provoking feelings of national shame, rather than reverence, as
well as promote the plight of other victims of tragedy eliciting empathy for individuals
other than the September 11th victims. On the contrary, IFC supporters generally assert
that the WTC site is the most fitting place for a museum honoring freedom. Because of
the site‘s political and cultural significance, supporters believe that the WTC site should
engage visitors in an experience of hope, inspiration, and analytic curiosity as a means to
galvanize them to become more civically engaged. IFC proponents did not put forth any
one salient emotion-based claim to counter the TBM‘s; rather, they focused on refuting
what was believed to be the TBM‘s blatant misinterpretation and (re)presentation of their
mission and goal. The eventual eviction of the IFC from the WTC site reaffirmed the
dominant norms of respect at sacred site and suggests that even the potential for critical
engagement of American politics and policies in these spaces is illegitimate and
inappropriate behavior for U.S. citizens to engage in.
To examine the affective dimensions of the IFC social controversy, New York
regional newspapers ranging in date from March 2005 to November 2005 were collected
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and analyzed. As Matthew Schuerman of the New York Observer noted, these regional
news outlets, as if drawing lines in the proverbial sand, offered passionate and biased
coverage of the conflict. The New York Times who, at first critiqued the IFC as a
possible ―front for a Republican White House,‖ later supported the proposed museum
(Schuerman 2005). The Daily News and Newsday also ―came down firmly in favor‖ of
the IFC (Schuerman 2005). Whereas the New York Post proclaim themselves to be "true
to the opposition,‖ by waging a relentless campaign against the IFC (Schuerman 2005).
This news discourse is supplemented with texts created by the Lower Manhattan
Development Corporation (LMDC), the IFC and the TBM campaign. Each of these
organizations were major stakeholders in the controversy and their documents offered
deeper insights into their stances as well as background information into the conflict.
Chapter Four
The fourth chapter focuses on the affective states that infused the social
controversy surrounding the 2004 French ban on conspicuous religious attire in public
schools. This controversial law prohibits public school students from wearing
ostentatious religious clothing and symbols including, but not limited to, Islamic veils or
hijab, Jewish kippa or skull caps, large Catholic crosses, and Sikh turbans. Although this
law bans all of these types of religious dress, hijab has been considered its main focus
since French-Islamic schoolgirls are the largest population effect by it. Thus, the
proposed law reignited a longstanding social controversy regarding the legitimacy and
propriety of veiling in public school.
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During the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, the affective dimension were
most salient in the affective states of fear and risk that infused the pro-law stance and the
mood of indignation that imbued the law‘s opponents stance with a type of passionate
anger. The analysis of these states focuses on how these states act as affective appeals
that underwrite the oppositional, pro/anti logic of the conflict. Pro-law supporters
considered hijab a sign of fundamentalism and, thus, argued that it posed a risk to French
students and national unity which citizens should be fearful of. They argued that banning
the veil within public school was for the ―greater good‖ as a means to contain Islamic
fundamentalism and reaffirm the ideal and norms of laïcité, roughly translated to
secularism, within young citizens. Not surprising, those who opposed the law believed it
was an unabashed act of Islamophobia that was an unjust infringement on French-Islamic
girls‘ rights which would worsen racial tensions in France. As an intentional violation on
its own citizens‘ liberty of conviction, opponents of the law were indignant about the
blatant injustice of this law as well as the disregard it showed for these schoolgirls‘
education. The approval of the law, in September 2004, signals the predominance of an
affective state of fear, justifying the strict regulations on students, specifically veiled
French-Islamic girls.
Analysis of this controversy also engages the affective response of one particular
student, Cennet Doǧanay, as offering an incommensurate claim which is irreducible to
the pro/anti logic of the conflict. As a veiled French-Islamic student, the law created an
oppressive set of conditions for Cennet in which she had to choose between hijab and
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public education. 11 Unwilling to decide either the law or her veil, Cennet made the
difficult decision to shave her head as a means to unveil (to stay at her school) but not
show her hair (which she believed was the spirit of hijab). At the moment of public
unveiling her shorn head, Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance acts as an
experiential claim, that testifies to the sensate-visceral impact this law has on the
everyday lives of young, veiled French-Islamic girls and raised questions regarding the
legitimacy and propriety of the law considering the harrowing experience it creates for
these girls.
The examination of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy is derived from the
substantial and insightful academic analysis this conflict has garnered (Bowen 2007;
Choudhury 2007; Croucher 2006, 2008, 2009; Joppke 2009; Keaton 2006; Volpp 2007;
Winter 2008). Although a thorough body of scholarship, none of these works explicitly
examine the affective dimensions of this controversy which this chapter does. On the
contrary, since Cennet‘s objection has not received any academic attention thus far,
analysis of her affective response is based on French, Turkish, and English newspaper,
newswire, and magazine articles that feature stories about her from October 1, 2004 to
October 1, 2005. Additionally, institutional reports about Cennet made by the Muslim
Writers Alliance, the Islamic Human Rights Commission, and AKDER Women‘s Rights
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My use of Cennet's Doǧanay‘s first name is an intentional attempt to create a more empathetic
engagement with her claim via the intimate usage of ―Cennet‖ rather than ―Doǧanay‖. My reference to her
as ―Cennet‖ is also an attempt for me to make my own affective state salient. In other words, the act of
examining her affective state of defiant compliance has has oriented me to her, turning me towards her
experience under the law and appreciating how difficult the decision to shave her head was for her. I mean
no disrespect by calling her "Cennet," quite the contrary I mean care, respect, and appreciation for her and
her actions.
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Association Against Discrimination are also analyzed as well as the website Islam Online
which featured extensive coverage and interviews with her.
Chapter Five
The fifth and final chapter offers a review of this project and draw out major
insights, findings, and implications of this research. From this research, there are three
substantial findings that have implications for the field of communication. First, the
affective dimensions of social controversy deal with the regulation of public conduct
rather than public discourse. Emotion-based claims and affective states pose arguments
regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the experience of affects, feelings, and
emotions in given scenarios as well as the types of conduct this experience should
produce. Thus, these claims address the regulation of conduct – how one should feel
given the conditions of his/her experience and how one should behave in response to
these felt conditions. One implication of this is the connection between the affective
dimensions of social controversy and Foucault‘s theory of governmentality and can
enable scholars to analyze how controversies can be moments when the public governs
its own behavior and beckons the state to engage in disciplinary acts.
Second, the regulation of public conduct was rationalized via the possibility of
potential risk to national unity and, in the case of the French law, national security. In
both case studies, when norms or laws restricting the citizenry‘s conduct were proposed,
they were asserted as a means to create national unity and civility by foreclosing on the
sensate-visceral experiences that create feelings of vulnerability. Thus, the ties between
risk and vulnerability are discussed in relation to the regulation of public conduct. This
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discussion addresses what experiences of risk are seemingly too intense to be publicly
allowed without jeopardizing a nation‘s cohesion and safety.
Third, analysis of the affective dimensions of social controversy has two salient
implications for theories of citizenship. First, given that the affective dimensions of social
controversy deal with the regulation of public conduct, the outcomes of these conflicts
illuminate the normative parameters of citizen conduct. These parameters imply that there
are affective dimensions to citizenship that addresses how a nation‘s citizens should feel
and conduct themselves in any given situation. Second, emotion-based claims and
affective states invite individuals to empathetically engage in these arguments which can
establish a civic relationship of based on recognition as a first step towards civic support
and action. This project will conclude with a discussion of recent scholarship on
―affective citizenship‖ and its ties to the affective dimensions of social controversy.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL CONTROVERSY AND ITS AFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS
Introduction
Olson and Goodnight‘s (1994) groundbreaking article ―Entanglements of
Consumption, Cruelty, Privacy, and Fashion: The Social Controversy over Fur‖ lays out
both a theory and methodological framework of social controversy for analyzing
oppositional conflicts. Although this essay has enjoyed great notoriety and influence in
the rhetorical field, it only prompted a small number of published projects that directly
address or, at least partially, utilize social controversy as a methodological approach
(Boyd 2002; Dascal 1995, 1998; Deem 2010; Finnegan 2000; Fritch et al. 2006;
Goodnight 1999, 2003, 2005; Gross 2005; Lyne 2005; Miller 2005; Ono and Sloop 1999;
Phillips 1999; Wilson 1995).12 Consequently, social controversy research remains a rich
area to expand on as a rhetorical theory and methodological approach. As a case in point,
this project takes as its starting point Olson and Goodnight‘s theory and methodological
framework of social controversy as a tactical, argument-focused approach to oppositional
disagreement that unfolds within public discourse. Using a generative approach to the
literature on social controversy, four extensions and/or friendly critiques of Olson and
Goodnight‘s work will be addressed to create a more in-depth methodological framework
12

According to a preliminary search on Google Scholar since its 1994 publication in the Quarterly
Journal of Speech, Olson and Goodnight‘s article has been cited in sixty-seven articles and books.
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for this project. These extensions and critiques deal with: the separation between
discursive and nondiscursive claims; the limitations of opposition-based theories of
argumentation; the need for incommensurate discourses; and the potential for change. To
help explicate this critical evolution of social controversy theory and methodological
approach, brief examples from the Abu Ghraib social controversy will be used.
Collectively, these critiques will lead to a discussion of the role affect plays in
social controversy. Considering how integral affect can be to the provocation and
perpetuation of social controversy, it has only been explicitly theorized by Greene and
Hicks (1993) and implicitly addressed by Fritch et al. (2006), and DeLuca (1999b). Since
affect has been undertheorized in this literature, this chapter will include a theory of the
affective dimensions of social controversy. The affective dimensions of social
controversy deal will the affects, feelings, and emotions that play a significant role in the
conflict as part of the argumentative substance that people are arguing about. Just as the
―traditional‖ dimensions of social controversy address some of the political, cultural, and
ideological issues and implications of the conflict, the affective dimensions deal with the
affects, feelings, and emotions that are also at issue and have implications for germane
publics. The relationship between affect and social controversy will be explicated in three
parts. First, the concept of affect will be explained in detail. Second, a lexicon of terms
will be offered to aid in the operationalization of affect for use in rhetorical theory,
specifically social controversy research. Third, a more in-depth explication of emotionbased claims, affective states and the relationship between then will be given.
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Olson and Goodnight’s Theory of and Methodology Framework for Social
Controversy
The Theoretical Underpinnings
Social controversies permeate everyday life. They are common, even at times
banal, yet significant to the creation, perpetuation, and reform of the dominant
conventions and norms we collectively live by. As a form of rhetorical criticism, Olson
and Goodnight‘s (1994) theory of social controversy focuses on the tactical movement of
oppositional argumentation to determine how claims function in relation to each other
and dominant communicative norms, practices, and reasoning. By highlighting
opponents‘ argumentation strategy, Olson and Goodnight were able to analyze the
implicit and explicit regulation of public discourse that occurs during these types of
conflicts which, they believe, is a constitutive feature of the contemporary public sphere.
More than staged critical discussion or publicized differences of opinion, social
controversy makes the implicit parameters of public discourse discernible and, hence,
vulnerable to critique.
The interplay of risk and controversy is valuable, as Wilson (1995) explains, for
―[o]ne can understand more fully traditional values, procedures, and norms when they are
at risk‖ (204). This risk makes social controversies replete with potential—arguments are
raised not simply to garner agreement but instead influence social, cultural, and political
change. Consequently, these conflicts can have implications for the performance of
citizenship and the normative standards that guide it. As Fritch et al. (2006) assert
―[Social] Controversy, then, is not a sign of a sick society or a demos incapable of action

38

but, instead, often is a sign of a public capable of evolution, changing in response to
shifting beliefs, norms, and conditions‖ (192).13 Thus, social controversies address
overarching civic topics and issues such as: democratic participation and inclusion;
economic dispensation and consumerism; identity politics and grievances; civil and
human rights; and, lastly, socially just policies and practices.
Not surprisingly, social controversies can produce ―rich moments of rhetorical
invention‖ during which opponents may creatively stretch the limits of conventional
argumentation in an attempt to influence the direction of the conflict and move the public
in a given social, cultural, and/or legal direction (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 273). Like
Olson and Goodnight, Dascal (2001) highlights the strategic nature of controversies
which, he argues, creates a context in which argumentative imagination, creativity and
innovation are desirable skills since they can bring novelty to longstanding, and possibly
stagnant, conflicts. For both, the process of rhetorical invention begins with a critical
objection to taken-for-granted norms, beliefs, and practices that ―spreads quickly to other
problems and reveals profound divergences‖ between the opponents‘ argumentative
mentalities, methods, and values (Dascal 2001, 315).14 Goodnight (2003) asserts that

13

This evolutionary possibility was also noted by Dascal (1995, 1996) who asserted that
controversy is a catalyzing force in the advancement of mathematical and scientific theory as well as
disciplinary epistemic growth and change. Considered the ―the grand man of the study of controversy‖
within philosophy, Marcelo Dascal built a typography of controversy in response to the dichotomy within
dialogue literature between discussion and dispute (van Eemeren & Garssen 2008, 1). Dascal‘s research
deals with determining what provoked transformations in the history of scientific and philosophical
knowledge. In his more recent work, this focus has evolved to include ongoing political controversies in
hopes of aiding their needed resolution. See Dascal‘s (2007) Traditions of Controversy, for his analysis of
the Palestinian/Israeli conflict for his foray into politicals.
14

Dascal (1995) identifies six main characteristics of controversies: the problematic evolves over
time; presuppositions are continually questioned; opponents enjoy ―hermeneutic freedom‖ when
interpreting and misinterpreting each others‘ claims; outcomes, interpretations, contextual boundaries, and
topics remain largely open; systemic frameworks are sufficient yet basic and flexible but absolutely not
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critical stances are based within an ―argumentative predicament‖ that is driven by
competing claims that demand examination, discussion, and debate (121).
Enacting an objection to a particular norm raises questions regarding its
legitimacy and appropriateness for a given public since its constituency is held
accountable to this standard. ―In [these] predicaments,‖ Goodnight (2003) continues,
―multidirectional, recursive vectors driving the ―force of the better argument‖ emerge; for
instance, validity conditions that simultaneously invite reflection, yet demand resolution
among interlocutors‖ (121). During social controversies each opponent asserts his/her
claims as valid within a given context. As the conflict unfolds, a public‘s constituents
judge the validity of competing claims in accordance to the normative standards of
legitimacy and propriety they collectively want to live by.
Olson and Goodnight’s Methodological Framework
Olsen and Goodnight (1994) lay out a specific methodological framework that
rhetorical critics can apply to social controversies in order to analyze opponents‘ tactical
arguments and how these claims affect the regulation of public discourse surrounding this
conflict and similar issues. First, critics need to identify ―the central assumptions put at
risk in the debate‖ (253). What social conventions and norms are being contested? Who
is questioning their legitimacy and propriety? What dominant practices, performances,
and reasons are sanctioned by these conventions and norms? As mentioned in the
arbitrary; and controversies can be productive even if unresolved (Dascal 1995, 17-21). Of these, perhaps
the most important to communication research is Dascal‘s recognition of the hermeneutic play that occurs
within controversies. There is a strategic nature to misinterpretations which is used to push an opponent‘s
agenda and is rationalized via a contextual reframing. Thus, content and context are understood as
bidirectional; interpretation of one effect what is considered relevant aspects of the other. Dascal (1995)
concludes that ―[s]uch a bi-directional interaction between context and content is essentially open (rather
than pre-determined), and constitutes one of the essential conditions for understanding the recurrence of
interpretative or hermeneutic issues in controversies‖ (Dascal 1995, 24).
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previous chapter, the Abu Ghraib social controversy dealt with ―traditional‖ issues
regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the soldiers‘ actions depicted in the leaked
photos as well as affect-based issues about how Americans should feel in relation to these
graphic images.
Discussion of these assumptions should then lead to an examination of the
contextual factors that make a specific action, claim, or text a ―site of struggle at this
historical juncture‖ (253).15 Olsen and Goodnight are not necessarily suggesting that
critics do a historical contextualization of the debate itself but rather a deconstruction of
the factors that contributed to the political conditions for this social controversy.16 For
instance, an analysis of the Abu Ghraib social controversy need not include a detailed
historical timelines of the events leading up to the photos being taken and publically
disseminated. Rather, the contextualization of this conflict would focus on the political
measures taken legally to rationalize the abusive treatment of these prisoners, the cultural
normalization of American Islamophobia and hatred, and lastly, the mediated, social
character of contemporary American military life that enabled the digital capture of these
actions for easy distribution and circulation.17

15

Since their analysis of the fur controversy is not based on any one particular event, action, or
text, Olsen and Goodnight focus on the overall social, economic, cultural, and legal factors that allowed for
the implicit norms regarding the consumption of fur to be recognized and challenged.
16

More recently, Goodnight (2005) has asserted that sustained controversies can mutate over time.
As he explains, ―The focal issues of a period may shift, but once initiated controversies do not so much die
out as become dormant, only to reappear in more virulent form later…The study of controversy, then,
require historical scope combined with comparative analysis of progressive or mutative iterations‖ (27).
17

Explication of the political factors that cultivated the Abu Ghraib controversy would focus on
the two most infamous ―torture‖ memos drafted by former White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez and
former Assistant Attorney General, Jay S. Bybee that offer legal rationales for the use of harsher
interrogation tactics by characterizing the prisoners as enemy ―combatants‖ rather than enemy ―soldiers‖,
and narrowly redefining the U.N.‘s definition of torture, respectfully. The cultural factors would address
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Lastly, ―the general shape‖ of the oppositional arguments within social
controversies should be analyzed (253). Within this framework, discursive and
nondiscursive forms of argument are ascribed different functions and perform distinct
tasks that work in conjunction with one another. Discursive oppositional arguments
contest claims, block enthymemes and dispute implied norms. For Olsen and Goodnight
(1994), dominant communicative conventions and norms retain their political influence
via enthymetic power; meaning their legitimacy and propriety is assumed and remains
unquestioned. Discursive arguments attempt to obstruct enthymetic associations through
critique and refutation of specific claims, actions, or texts that perpetuate the implicit
normative standards and relations being objected to. As an attempt at delegitimation,
discursive claims challenge the ―acceptability of the communicative context within which
the [claim, action, or text] is offered as secured‖ (251). When discursive claims lead to
normative delegitimation, this cultivates the political and cultural conditions for dominant
standards to be expanded, renegotiated, and, ideally, reassociated to new, more inclusive
practices, principles, and forms of reasoning.
Non-discursive argument, specifically visual images and performance, can be
used in novel ways to facilitate normative reassociation. ―As the discursive side of social
controversy may expand opposition, sometimes radically, by questioning the imputed
grounds of reasonable argumentation,‖ Olson and Goodnight (1994) explain, ―the

the rise in violent acts against Muslims following September 11 th as well as a discussion on how Muslims
were racially profiled by federal, state, and local American authorities due to the heightened affective state
of fear within the U.S. Finally, the social factors would deal with the increase in the media technology that
soldiers carry with them on the field which has enabled more candid, private glimpses into soldiers‘ daily
experiences in the U.S. War on Terror.
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nondiscursive side works to reconstitute grounds by display of radically recontextualized
appearances that provoke reexamination of the norms of personal conduct and challenge
the range of publicly acceptable means of communication‖ (252). Deem (2010) notes that
the ―radical potentialities‖ Olson and Goodnight assign non-discursive claims are made
possible through the arguments‘ form, not solely their substance (61). In other words,
both the performed critique and subversive or ironic imagery make relations of power
and their cultural, legal, and economic circulatory systems more easily discernable
bringing the privilege embedded in dominant conventions and norms into sharp relief to
nondiscursive forms of argument. Within social controversies, embodied and visual
claims help engage a public‘s political imagination in order to envision communicative
practices and principles of reasoning guided by a different set of normative standards.
When faced with the combination of normative deconstruction and reassociation, a public
is given the opportunity to ―bolster, alter, or abandon the social and communication
practices in question‖ (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 252). A brief example from the Abu
Ghraib social controversy can help explicate how Olson and Goodnight apply discursive
delegitimation and nondiscursive reassociation to argumentative claims.
It’s Not as Bad as Beheading
Maureen Dowd‘s claim contesting the stance that the abuses at Abu Ghraib are
acceptable because they are not as bad as the tactics terrorists employ is a keen example
of a discursive attempt at normative delegitimation. Simply put, Dowd (2004a) asks,
―Should we really be reduced to defending ourselves by saying at least we don‘t behead
people?‖ By posing this question, she problematizes the legitimacy and propriety of a
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logical framework that approves of any U.S. military action as long as it is slightly less
barbaric than decapitation. This claim raises that question, in being not quite as violent as
the ―terrorists‖ have we have vilified and declared war upon the best standard Americans
should hold their military to? A common, and poignant, nondiscursive argument that
functions in conjunction with Dowd‘s claim has been made by individuals who,
mimicking the iconic photo, have stood in public places on boxes, donning black hoods
and shrouds with wires dangling from their fingers. One such example is Joseph
Previtera‘s silent demonstration.
Previtera quietly stood next to the entrance of a U.S. Armed Forces recruitment
office in Boston—an eerie homage to the Iraqi prisoner forced to endure this position and
a subversive protest of military use of this practice (Dodero, 2004). Explaining that he
felt ―street theater [would] be more effective in conveying a message than a flier,‖
Previtera chose the location because he ―wanted to make people think about what they
might be called or forced to do if they enlist in the military‖ (Dodero, 2004). As a
nondiscursive claim, Previtera‘s performance makes viewers literally face the abusive
actions U.S. soldiers may, under orders, be required to perform. By positing his hooded
and shrouded body within this public space he meant to attract potential recruits by
beckoning them to ―be all they can be.‖ Previtera challenges individuals to reassociate
normative standards of legitimate and appropriate U.S. military action to a higher and
more ethical standard of conduct. When U.S. military personnel is acting in a manner
indicative of ―all they can be‖ should not that conduct be more just than simply not
beheading people.
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The Critical Evolution of Social Controversy
Scholarly response to Olson and Goodnight‘s theory and methodological
framework of social controversy has been mostly positive, expanding upon their work
rather than challenging it. Along these lines, a generative approach is taken to address
four key extensions and constructive criticism of Olson and Goodnight‘s work. This
generative approach the literature on social controversy enables a critical evolution of the
Olson and Goodnight‘s theory and methodological framework in order to create a richer,
more diverse and nuanced understanding of this type of conflict. To do so, this section
will address issues regarding discursive and nondiscursive arguments; the limitations of
―opposition‖; the inclusion of incommensurate discourses; and the potential for change.
Discursivity and Non-Discursivity
The distinction between discursive and non-discursive arguments has been
critiqued by some scholars as a problematic and unnecessary separation (Finnegan, 2000;
Fritch et al. 2006; Deem 2010). On the positive side, ascribing discursive and nondiscursive claims separate, albeit complimentary, argumentative functions establishes a
clear typography of social controversy for critics to employ. However, as Fritch et al.
(2006) argues, these types of ―clean distinctions may obscure the [additional] ways in
which discursive and nondiscursive arguments may intersect‖ in both productive and
unproductive ways (193). Interestingly, when Olson and Goodnight theorize social
controversy they acknowledge how deeply interconnected discursive and nondiscursive
claims are. They even state that ―[d]iscursive argument has its nondiscursive side,‖
implying that discursivity and nondiscursivity are different aspects, rather than
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completely separate forms, of claims. Yet, when they apply this theory to the fur
controversy, the separation between discursive and nondiscursive arguments is
exacerbated (DeLuca 1999a).18 The oppositional arguments over fur are analyzed and
explicated within a three-tier linear, progressive framework; an initial objection evolves
into a discursive process of unrelenting normative delegitimation that enabled the
nondiscursive reassociation of the conventions and norms surrounding the use of fur to
occur. Olson and Goodnight‘s formal application of socontroversy supports Fritch et al.‘s
critique by inadvertently establishing a formal methodology that privileges discursive
arguments as the catalyst and precursor to nondiscursive claims as well as imply social
controversies will lead to progressive political change (DeLuca 1999a; Deem 2010).
Both Finnegan (2000) and Delicath and DeLuca (2003) assert that nondiscursive
arguments, such as photographs and image events, are not simply univocal statements or
secondary claims made to assist discursive claims; they are polysemic texts that can
incite social controversy. Finnegan (2000) argues that an image can cause social
controversy due to differing ideological interpretations of its‘ rhetorical symbolism,
differences in how participants argumentatively use the image, and disparities in how the
image functions within society. The controversial images from Abu Ghraib prison
exemplify this; when leaked, they prompted a cacophony of contradicting interpretations

18

The oppositional arguments made during this controversy become a stance of sustained
objection that incrementally elevates discursive questions regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the
―local‖ communicative context to discursive indictments of ―global‖ procedural injustice and, finally, assert
new, alternative nondiscursive forms of communicative norms, practices, and reasoning that embody this
position. So, even though Olson and Goodnight‘s theory of social controversy is fairly radical in its
conceptualization of the argumentative interconnection between discursivity and nondiscursivity, the
methodological application reinforces a strict division between them as different types of arguments that
have separate functions.
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causing a maelstrom of disagreement. For some, these images symbolized anything from
U.S. Islamophobia driving the War in Iraq, to the brutal nature of war that enables
prisoner abuse, to America‘s liberal ideology of torture, and even to the soldiers‘ need to
blow off some steam.19 During this controversy, the images were used as evidence of: the
need for a change in U.S. interrogation policy, the soldiers‘ debauched misconduct, the
hypocrisy of American democracy, the weakness of Iraqi forces, Americans‘ desire for
vengeance, and the intense level of stress U.S. military personnel face in the field. There
are also discrepancies in how the Abu Ghraib photos are believed to function in society.
For instance, they can act as: a soldier‘s trophy, an interrogation tool, motivation for Arab
retaliation, and a reminder of U.S. fallibility.
Delicath and DeLuca (2003) maintain that within society‘s heavily mediated
environment, image events, or ―staged acts of protest intended for media dissemination,‖
are fragmented nondiscursive arguments that dramatically publicize the objections
individuals have to dominant norms and can instigate social controversy (317). As
―critique performed through spectacle,‖ multiple image events were staged in objection to
the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib (321). Between May 2004 and June 2005, individuals—
like Joseph Previtera—dressed as the prisoners depicted in the photos and demonstrated
at New York‘s Hunter College, Chicago‘s Water Tower on the Miracle Mile, Pittsburgh‘s
East Liberty Park, the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, and San
Francisco‘s Davies Symphony Hall during a speech by then U.S. Secretary of State
19

See Jacob (2004) for a discussion of some of the immediate public response to the leaked Abu
Ghraib photos. Also see Luban (2006) for an insightful analysis of the ―liberal ideology of torture‖ that
underwrites both the Gonzalez and Bybee memos that rational using harsher interrogation tactics during the
U.S. War on Terror.
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Condoleezza Rice. When protesters intentionally donned the guise of Abu Ghraib
prisoner and publicly enacted the abuse and torture captured in the photos, these
spectacular displays highlighted these citizens‘ disapproval of the U.S. policies that
underwrite the abuse and torture. The striking character of these protests can provoke
candid discussion of implicit and explicit norms guiding the U.S. military‘s interrogation
tactics and overall conduct during the War on Terror. Since image events can act as
argumentative fodder, not just definitive claims, they risk being appropriated and
reframed in ways that modify their interpretation in order to support either side of a
controversy, which can drastically alter the protestors‘ intended meaning. By expanding
upon the theory of nondiscursive oppositional arguments, Finnegan (2000) as well as
Delicath and DeLuca‘s (2003) work exemplifies how social controversy analysis can
benefit from a less rigid, more critical methodological approach that problematizes the
binary argumentative division of opposition.
The Limitations of “Opposition”
Olson and Goodnight‘s (1994) theory of oppositional arguments assumes that
claims made during social controversies should be analyzed as part of only two
dichotomous ―sides.‖ Surprisingly, rather than make the opposing sides within social
controversy more recalcitrant, they assert that sustained controversy does not necessarily
result in polemic ―incommensurate positions‖ (252). Instead, the persistent argumentative
pressure of sustained controversy is simply believed to lead to more creative and
inventive ―resistance through the transformations and reiterations of discursive and
nondiscursive arguments contesting definitions of acceptable and unacceptable social
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conventions and norms of communicative reasoning‖ (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 252).
Although controversies can lead to innovative, unconventional, and, at times, radical
arguments, the contest-driven nature of Olson and Goodnight‘s theory does support a
dualistic mentality that imagines opposition as either acquiescing to or overt resistance of
dominant norms (Kaufman 1991).
Kaufman (1991) asserts that stressing adversarial tactics over critical, contextual
subtlety ―fosters a narrow view of controversy as a zero-sum contest of wits‖ (18). By
overemphasizing dichotomous opposing positions, Olson and Goodnight‘s method risks
overlooking the nuance and uniqueness of claims that may, on their surface, appear as
simple acceptance or resistance (Deem 2010; Ono and Sloop 1999; Phillips 1999; Wilson
1995).20 Deem (2010) calls this the ―compulsion toward reducibility‖ that is provoked by
a desire to translate what we witness ―to common needs, desires, and even bodies [which]
leaves remainders that cannot be accounted for within dominant reading structures‖ (60).
This slippage occurs when Olson and Goodnight ultimately return to traditional norms of
argumentative effectiveness when analyzing social controversy. Traditional norms of
effectiveness are problematic when assessing arguments that are difficult to translate or
often reduced to sentiments that severely alter or simplify their meaning. Irreducible,
distinctive claims may not receive the critical attention they need for their contextual

20

Wilson (1995) argues that claims made during a social controversy are, oftentimes, part of
overarching argument formations. As he explains, ―the term argument may refer to a single assertion or to
the interaction between individuals, [whereas] an argument formation is a larger linguistic form that
presents a coherent set of beliefs, perspectives, and normative approaches to human existence‖ (204). This
may add to the perception of a polemic controversy because although claims can be made from an infinite
number of perspectives, differing claims may still belong to the same overarching argument formation.
However, the nuances of each claim should not be overlooked simply because an argument is similar in
inference and substance to a specific formation.
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intricacies to be understood and/or appreciated. Judgments of efficacy, which are
influenced by normative standards of legitimacy and propriety, typically succumb to the
―sovereignty of [common] meaning‖ (62). Norms of effectiveness that cannot ―account
for the possibilities of this irreducibility beyond failure‖ do not aptly take into account the
conditions of radical plurality that characterize contemporary public spheres (Deem 2010,
61).
Within the public discourse, the Abu Ghraib social controversy was framed as a
conflict between those who supported and those who opposed the actions depicted in the
infamous photos. However, many citizens voiced opinions that did not expressly fit on
one side or the other; instead, their stances displayed characteristics of both. For example,
when Dallas resident, Pat Neil, was asked what he thought of the soldiers‘ actions, he
explained, ―This is war. It‘s not right, but war‘s not right…Given the circumstances, I
don‘t see how they would not do something—after seeing their buddies dragged through
the streets. They‘re over there to give the Iraqis freedom, and they‘re getting killed every
day‖ (Jacobs 2004). Neil disagrees with the ethics of the soldiers‘ actions but he also
expresses a rational consideration of the extenuating circumstances that may have
provoked their behavior. Not clearly support for or opposition to prisoner abuse, Neil‘s
claim risks being reduced to a position of support even though he states ―war‘s not right,‖
or possibly being overlooked because it does not clearly articulate or support either
―side.‖
To account for the limits of opposition-based theory, Phillips (1999) uses
postmodern theory to address the ―fluidity, multiplicity, and mobility‖ of contemporary
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public spheres (488).21 His concern is that the intricate detail and unique texture of
controversy will be lost when it is assessed in terms of the normalizing ideals of ―genuine
public presence, genuine deliberation, [and] the force of the better argument‖ that Olson
and Goodnight attribute to both the contemporary and traditional public sphere (491).
The combination of these normalizing ideals and the formal application of social
controversy theory suggest that participants‘ have singular identities, and claims have
definitive meanings, ―which belies the social polysemy and contestation which give rise
to social disruption and controversy‖ (491). Phillips, therefore, advocates a postmodern
approach to social controversy that does not separate dissensus into two opposing sides
but rather, keep the polysemic character of controversy intact.
Incommensurable Discourses
Even though Ono and Sloop (1999) agree with Phillips‘ theory, they argue that
Phillips‘ analysis of the controversy surrounding the colonial African American burial
ground accidently excavated in New York City inadvertently contradicts his theory by
restricting the conflict to oppositional arguments within commensurable discourses.
Commensurable controversy assume that regardless of how opposite stances are,
differing positions have a basic level of agreement regarding the issues, individuals, and
norms that are germane to the conflict. When opponents‘ claims are based in
commensurate discourses, they typically ―disagree on the outcome of a shared question

21

Phillips (1999) makes a distinction between what he defines discursive and rhetorical
controversy. Discursive controversy leaves the communicative norms that undergird the disagreement
intact whereas rhetorical controversy disables them. In other words, analysis of discursive controversy only
deals with the topic of the conflict whereas rhetorical also deals with the regulation of discourse as well as
the power relations underlying it.
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(e.g., How should this burial ground be treated?)‖ (529; emphasis added). The
commonalities do not stop here; conflicting positions within commensurable discourses
can agree upon the argumentative logic that frames the conflict, the dominant parameters
of normative standards from which claims are judged, and the governing institutions that
hold some power and/or authority over these matters. Collectively, these similarities can
facilitate the resolve of social controversy. This does not, however, take into
consideration positions that are incommensurate with these shared issues, logics,
normative standards, and institutions.
When claims are raised from incommensurable discourses, the proponents of
these stances may not agree with what the driving question of the conflict is, or base their
arguments within the same logics, normative standards, or institutions as other exponents
that hold more dominant positions. As examples of incommensurable discourses, out-law
(Ono and Sloop 1997, 1999), subaltern (Ahmed 1992, 2005b), and minor rhetorics (Deem
2002, 2010) are irreducible public forms created in relation to dominant discourses,
without necessarily countering them. These rhetorical forms problematize normative
standards of legitimacy and propriety not through opposition, but rather deep-seated
divergence which reveals how and why proponents of these rhetorics have
disproportionate access to and inclusion in public discourse regarding this issue.
Ono and Sloop (1999) as well as Deem (2010), therefore, implore scholars to
include these rhetorics in social controversy analysis. Incorporating out-law, subaltern,
and/or minor rhetorics in controversy criticism necessitates ―new reading strategies‖ to
account for incommensurate claims and stances that risk being reduced to dominant
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positions or worse, being completely overlooked (Deem 2010, 65). Since critics of social
controversy analyze how these conflict affect the regulation of public discourse, also
examining these rhetorics can enable scholars to understand the factors that contribute to
the marginalization and oppression of incommensurate stances and/or their proponents.
However, highlighting out-law, subaltern, and minor rhetorics within social controversy
does put exponents of these discourses at risk of ―further marginalization‖ and the
―potential for a backlash‖ (Ono and Sloop 1999, 535).
It may seem strange to identify Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz as a
proponent of an out-law rhetoric, but one need not be in a position of marginalization to
hold an incommensurate stance. Incommensurate discourses, specifically out-law
rhetorics, are not inherently liberal or progressive; they are simply outside the dominant
argumentative logics that uphold the controversy (Ono and Sloop 1997). Thus, Ono and
Sloop (1997) explain, ―Critics must remain open to the possibility that the logics of
judgment they find within out-law [rhetorics] might counter the forms of judgment that
they would like to see invoked within a given community‖ (62). Proponents of
incommensurate discourses pose different question, live by different norms, adhere to
different standards, and/or endorse different institutions than exponents of commensurate
ones. Within the Abu Ghraib social controversy, Dershowitz does just this when he
advocates for the use of torture warrants.
For Dershowitz, the actions at Abu Ghraib prison do not rouse the question what
interrogation tactics are legitimate or appropriate for U.S. soldiers to employ; this is a
mute point since, he believes, American government and military officials will always
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approve some acts of torture to obtain intelligence about terrorist activity. Dershowitz
(2004b) explains,
I took no normative position on whether non-lethal torture should be justified
under such extreme circumstances [i.e., ticking time-bomb scenario], but I did
assert that I believed that any democracy would employ non-lethal torture as a last
resort (if all other inducements and techniques short of torture had failed). I then
argued that if torture were to be employed, it would be better (or, more precisely,
less bad) for there to be a warrant requirement as a prerequisite for any use of
such an abhorrent tactic. (n.p.)
If employed, Dershowitz asserts that torture warrants would make the interrogation
process more transparent; the use of abusive tactics could be regulated and documented
enabling a clear chain of command to be held accountable for its use. Torture warrants
could then end the gross misuse of these tactics by making the practice explicit rather
than hidden by a shroud of secrecy.
Dershowitz does not judge the events at Abu Ghraib by normative standards of
legitimacy or propriety, nor does he adhere to an absolute logic of support for or
opposition to the use of non-lethal torture interrogation tactics to this controversy. Instead
he assesses the situation by standards of prudence and the logic of situational necessity.
Dershowitz asks how the inevitable use of these tactics can be utilized in the most
democratic manner—being effective tools for gathering intelligence and being employed
as ethically as possible within these ―extreme circumstances.‖ This argument for torture
warrants is an out-law rhetoric within the Abu Ghraib social controversy that renders the
legitimacy and propriety of the common questions, normative standards, and argument
logics of this conflict uneasy. This (dis)ease was so intense that Dershowitz‘ stance on
torture warrants stirred its own conflict amongst political theorists, human rights
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advocates, lay citizens, lawyers, politicians, and journalists. It seems being prudent about
issues of torture and abuse is incommensurate with both the Abu Ghraib social
controversy and the general public.
The Potential for Change
Even though these extensions and friendly critiques of social controversy are
vastly different, most do share one common theme—the belief that these types of
conflicts are critical moments because of their inherent potential to incite social, cultural,
and political change (Dascal 1995, 1996; Deem 2010; Fritch et al. 2006; Ono and Sloop
1999; Phillips 1999; Wilson 1995).22 Even the most scathing critique, which is posited by
Phillips (1999), shares this focus; he grounds this critique in a postmodern theory of the
public sphere. Phillips argues that within transient, fragmented contemporary public
spheres contradictory articulations are considered disruptive to the ―regularized strategies
for maintaining discursive and material coherence‖ among this group (495).23 Once
disoriented, a public may enter into a process of meaning and subject position
displacement and redefinition to address what some members argue are equalities and
deficiencies amongst the group. ―The process of controversy elaborated here,‖ Phillips
(1999) explains, ―provides[s] momentary opportunities to resist, change, and reform the
local practices of those involved‖ (495).
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The works listed all speak explicitly about the transformative potential of social controversy.
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Contemporary publics, Phillips (1999) argues, are temporarily composed of fragmented groups
of individuals; consequently, the meanings of an action, text, or claim as well as the standards of legitimacy
and propriety from which they are judged are only provisionally situated amongst them. When controversy
occurs within these publics, members are disoriented by the articulation of contradictory, not necessarily
oppositional, interpretations of an action, text, or claim.
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Phillips‘ theory of disorientation with its disruptive tactics of displacement and
redefinition is strikingly similar to the process of delegitimacy and reassociation that
Olson and Goodnight (1994) attribute to oppositional arguments. Both are two-step,
deconstructive methods that first, cast doubt on implicit conventions and norms and
second, propose alternatives to them. Zulick and Laffoon (1991) note that this
combination of ―critique and invention‖ is common among ―emancipatory discourse‖
which represses dominant enthymematic premises and introduces ―variant understandings
that reconfigure a current idiom in a preferred direction‖ to incite social, cultural, and/or
political change (251-252). Despite these similarities, there are three main distinctions
between Olson and Goodnight and Phillips‘ theories: the ―public‖ context of the
controversy (i.e., situated/neo-traditional or transient/fragmented); the number of
conflicting stances (i.e., two or several); and lastly, the consistency of normative
standards (i.e., enduring or contingent). Regardless of these differences, Phillips as well
as Olson and Goodnight position political resistance and transform as the aim of these
analogous processes.
In other words, the type of public, the number of positions, nor the consistency of
normative standards does not necessarily influence the possibility of political change.
These aspects of social controversy do not account for the felt experience of political
resistance and transform which underwrites Olson and Goodnight‘s and Phillips‘
different, yet inherently similar, processes. Both of these theories establish the same
affective conditions that provoke moments of social controversy: the force and intensity
of a participant‘s claim can trigger an unsteady or destablizing sensation associated with
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feelings of delegitimacy and/or displacement followed by attempts relieve or soothe these
feelings via stabilizing acts of redefinition and reassociation. Simply put, if an objection
does not or cannot create sensations of destabilization and feelings of delegitimation it
has not instigated social controversy or opened the possibility for political change and
transformation. As Grossberg (1997) explains, ―Affect defines, then, a condition of
possibility for any political intervention‖ (161). Even the generative methodological
framework offered here, which takes into account all of the constructive critiques and
extensions of the theory of social controversy proffered still does not offer a means to
examine the underlying felt conditions of the experience of social controversy which can
provoke change and transformation. Thus, a better indicator of the potential for political
transformation within the ―emancipatory discourses‖ of social controversy is affect.
Ruddick (2010) asserts, ―The centrality of affect to a process of collaborative
emancipation cannot be overstated… [it] is central to understanding the ethico-political
dimensions‖ of public life (27). Yet, even though feelings of delegitimacy/displacement
can be attributed to a loss of balance that is experienced due to the sensation of friction
that occurs during social controversy, the role affect plays in this type of conflict has been
relatively ignored, or worse, vilified.
Fritch et al. (2006) expanded on Olson and Goodnight‘s theory of social
controversy by conceptualizing disingenuous, or false, controversy. Disingenuous
controversy occurs when arguments are used to suppress ―dissent and re-center an
orthodox form of communication‖ that thwarts ―genuine‖ deliberation (201).24 During
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I believe that conceptualizing a type of controversy that doesn‘t lead to social, cultural, or
political change and labeling it ―disingenuous‖ does a disservice to deep-seated quality of risk that Olson
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disingenuous controversies specific opposing positions, and the individuals that advocate
them, are jettisoned from the conflict which leads to the calcification of dominant
communicative norms and conventions. In these cases, excluding critical stances and
their proponents from the public discourse is deemed legitimate and appropriate which,
therefore, appears justified. An ―overripe‖ context can cultivate disingenuous controversy
because debate about a problematic situation has been so delayed it is difficult (if not
impossible) to discuss the matter in a rational, critical manner. When a context is
overripe, Fritch et al. (2006) explains, ―controversy may focus more on an argument‘s
emotional affects than on its substance‖ that can ―forcefully collapse the discursive and
nondiscursive components of oppositional argument‖ limiting the possibility for social,
cultural, or political change (202).
The concept of ―overripe‖ context, therefore, implies that when the focus of a
controversy is emotionally (rather than rationally) driven, the conflict itself becomes
suspect and its outcome is considered ―false,‖ ―disingenuous,‖ or ―insidious‖ rather than
―genuine.‖ By vilifying emotion as lacking substance and causing disingenuous
controversy, Fritch et al. (2006) perpetuate the modernist dichotomy between reason and
emotion. Even though this dichotomy has long been demystified, the binary between
reason and emotion continues to haunt argumentation and rhetorical research (Deem
and Goodnight attribute to their theory of social controversy. Stating an objection publicly is a two-step
gamble; first, will this oppositional claim be taken up, circulated, and debated within the public discourse
and then, will this critique have a strong enough impact to provoke the social, cultural, and/or political
change the rhetor is advocating? If one of these ―gambles‖ does not payout, does that mean the controversy
is false? Perhaps it does not lead to change but it is a historical moment when dominant norms, practices,
and reasoning are contested. Rather than label a controversy false, why not recognize how normative
standards of propriety create a requisite level of decorum that impose a form of disciplinary power that
regulates all types of social controversy. All critical objections are held to certain standard of decorum to be
circulated and thoroughly addressed. This will be addressed in more detail in chapter three.
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2010; Hyde 1982; Micheli 2008). This reason/emotion dichotomy aligns reason within
the mind deeming it legitimate because it assumes action is the product of a rational,
critical thought process that is compelled by practical and/or indifferent logic. Whereas
emotion is aligned with the body deeming it illegitimate because it assumes action is the
product of base instinct or motivated by concentrated desire that is not rationally assessed
beforehand. These dichotomous designations establish a typography of social controversy
enabling scholars to categorize claims but it also drastically limits the conceptual nuance
needed to flesh out how affect (in this case felt emotions) functions argumentatively and
rhetorically within controversy.
For instance, Fritch et al.‘s theory of disingenuous controversy implies that affect
does not play a role in social controversy until it somehow overpowers rationality. When
a proponent‘s emotions become salient within a controversy, it is assumed that the logic
of his/her actions has been compromised by the intensity of his/her affective state. This
assumption attributes a cancerous quality to affect as something that can maliciously
―infect‖ reason and ―incapacitate‖ the transformational potential of controversy. Framing
affect as either nonexistent or solely as the enemy of reason, overlooks the role affect can
play in the provocation and perpetuation of social controversy as well as the positive
feelings and emotions that compel change such as hope and optimism. Affect is a
constant dimension of social controversy. Whether it acts as the backing, warrant, or
ground of an argument or even the claim itself, affect occurs in conjunction with reason,
not in lieu of it. Within social controversy, affect is a multifaceted phenomenon whose
manifestation, use, function, and impact is contextually driven and can range from the
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affective state of a rhetor, to an emotion-based claim made as an objection, to a
disciplinary force in the regulation of public discourse as well as public conduct, and
even to a basis for the creation of civic relations. The explication of affect role in social
controversy is a glaring omission in the theory and methodological framework of this
type of research that this project aims to correct.
The Relationship between Affect and Social Controversy
The Movement of Affect
Affect is intricately intertwined throughout the argumentative process of social
controversy. In short, affect is always a part of controversy yet it varies in force and
intensity making it more or less salient or evident to researchers. As mentioned in the first
chapter, affect is an emergent yet transitory relation between sensate environments and
one‘s visceral (re)actions to them which culminate in the experience of embodied
sensations. It is a multi-directional relational phenomenon; a perpetual unfolding and
infolding between the self and its sensual, and inherently social, surroundings that has
ephemeral physical and mental effects that continually changes and adapts. The
sensations of affect act as involuntary waves of physiological, biological, neurological,
and hormonal surges that reverberate throughout one‘s body and mind in conscious and
nonconscious ways. Massumi (2002) argues that mental registration of corporeal
sensations is a form of depth perception called mesoperception. Specifically, Massumi
(2001) claim, ―Mesoperceptive flesh functions as a corporeal transformer where one
sense shades into another over the failure of each, their input translated into movement
and [a new wave of] affect‖ (62).
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In short, affect is experienced as both sensate-visceral relationships that differ in
force and sensations which vary in intensities compelling, suspending, and/or completely
impeding movement. Embedded within the force-relations and corporeal intensities of
affect lays its capacity (i.e., ability and possibility) and power (i.e., strength and
influence) to propel one into action (Massumi 2002). Affect, therefore, exists ―as
potential: a body‘s capacity to affect and to be affected‖ is an architectonic element of
change (Seigworth and Gregg 2010, 2). It is this potential for change that makes the
affective dimensions of social controversy significant areas to analyze and understand as
openings for social, cultural, and political change. In other words, within a social
controversy, affect can cultivate opportunities for transformation by orienting and
galvanizing publics to alter, renovate, and/or reform the communicative norms and
conventions that guide public discourse.
But, how does an individual ―come to shift its affections (its being-affected) into
action (capacity to affect)‖ (Seigworth and Gregg 2010, 2)? When individuals are
―affected‖ by the sensate-visceral experience of their surroundings, it can compel a type
of orienting movement—a turning towards or away—which adjusts one‘s relational
position to his/her environment and, more specifically, a particular claim, text, and/or
event. This orienting movement has a dispositional quality. Brennan (2004) explains, ―By
disposition, I mean the direction of negative affects such as aggression. The questions
should be: To whom [or what] is the affect directed‖ and what effect can and/or does it
have (15)? Affect directs us towards a course of thought and action, mentally and
physically shifting us in our relation to all aspects of our implicitly social, cultural, and
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political lives. Over the course of time, consistent patterns of affects prime individuals.
Affective priming occurs when one‘s history of affective experiences nonconsciously
―activate[s] associated responses in the brain‖ with only limited sensory exposure and in
some cases only the imagined experience of them (Fockenberg 2008, 137). In this way, a
person‘s general attitudes towards and judgment of an experience is oriented by a
combination of immediate affects (regardless of how limited) as well as one‘s corporeal
history of them since, as Probyn (2005) explains, ―the past is carried somatically, that is,
in the body‖ (47).
Rhetorically speaking, affect‘s orienting capacity is best captured in Aristotle‘s
conceptualization of pathos, which Hill (1983) explains, ―literally means a state of being
acted upon, that is, experiencing‖ (45). When individuals employ pathos as an artistic
proof, they attempt to evoke a specific affective state within the audience that would
orient listeners to the rhetors‘ claims in a manner intended to elicit a favorable judgment
from them (Micheli 2008). Interestingly, recent studies in cognitive psychology support
this ancient rhetorical technique. As Clore and Colcombe (2003) found, ―mood [i.e.,
affective states] influences evaluative judgments‖ but only when this mood is oriented
towards the object of judgment not when it is simply a general state of affectivity (p.
346).25 By recognizing these ties between affect, persuasion, and judgment, critics can
―comprehend how a speaker interacts with listeners to bring them to a state of mind
compatible with his/her aims while at the same time transforming them into a more
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Another fascinating finding by Clore and Colcombe (2003) is that blatant attempts at affective
priming result in contrasting effects, meaning if one is trying to overtly prime someone to have positive
feelings towards an object, it will result in negative evaluations of that thing.
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cohesive group‖ (Smith and Hyde 1991, 451). This cohesion is achieved not solely
through the commonality of shared experience but also the shared judgments that arises
from it.
Affect not only has the capacity and power to orient individuals, it can also
galvanize them. Simply put, the force and intensity of affect can, quite literally, move
people to action. As Massumi (2002) explains, ―Intensity is incipience…the beginning of
a selection: the incipience of mutually exclusive pathways of action and expression, all
but one of which will be inhibited‖ (30). Affect opens up a space of limitless possibility
because there are seemingly endless avenues of movement that can be taken in (re)action
to sensations and once even the slightest movement occurs, a whole other array of
seemingly endless potential movements open up. As a galvanizing experience, affect acts
as a sensate-visceral current that triggers both corporeal and cognitive processes which
initiates individual‘s emergent actions, expressions, and judgments.
Affect does not only mentally and physically orient individuals to controversial
claims, texts, and/or events—it can also galvanize them to publicly engage in the conflict.
For instance, Greene and Hicks (1993) assert that individuals‘ participation in social
controversy is driven, in part, by their ―affective investment‖—the force and intensity of
the care they feel about the people, events, relationships, issues, and
social/cultural/political conditions that are germane to the conflict. ―Controversies‖ they
explain, then ―become those places in which the structure of our affective
investments…are reproduced, deployed, articulated and re-articulated in order to create,
maintain, and/or transform‖ the norms and conventions the guide public discourse, and
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more importantly, establish standards of public conduct (177-178). Since the
phenomenon of affect implies these two forms of movement, the affective dimensions of
social controversy will address both the regulation of discourse as well as behavior within
the public sphere.
My Orientation to and Galvanization about Abu Ghraib
I do not remember the exact day or time I was when I first saw the Abu Ghraib
prison photos, but what I do remember is how I felt. I was reading when I heard the
words ―abuse,‖ ―soldiers,‖ and ―prisoners‖ from a distant television a friend, Kate, was
watching. My concentration had been broken, the words rumbled in my head as I read the
same sentence over and over again. I shifted my position in the chair, moved the book,
stretched my arms and shoulders and looked down at the page again. As I stared at the
page, the only words I heard in my head were: What abuse? What’s going on?
Galvanized by my curiosity, I walked over to the television and just stood there. An
intense sensation of shock took over paralyzing my body—mouth was agape, eyes
narrowed, brow furrowed, my right hand strewn over my lips, my left arm stretched
across my stomach hugging my waist, and my feet inches apart planted on the ground
pointing towards the screen. I did not move—I could feel my heart beating in my chest,
my breathing quickened and yet time seemed to stop. It felt as if I was this sensation of
shock was literally forcing me to cease all activity so that I could stand there intensely
focused on and completely oriented to the gruesome image from Abu Ghraib in concert
with the reporters‘ words. I could feel my mind frantically trying to make sense of the
affect-laden information I was taking in.
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As the shock began to dissipate, I experienced waves of jumbled sensations. ―This
is bad,‖ were the first words I remember Kate saying. I turned my head towards her and
simply nodded in agreement before sitting down. Staring at the floor, my stomach began
churning. I felt confused as I mentally ran over the story. Slouched over, hands clasped,
elbows leaning on knees as I puzzled over the pain and hyper-sexualized humiliation
captured in those first leaked images in conjunction with the lack of any clear explanation
as to why these soldiers would do that to their prisoners. But they are in prison . . . They
could not have been hurting the soldiers . . . It could not be self defense . . . Why were the
soldiers smiling? Why are they so smug? How could they be enjoying this? Flashes of the
images involuntarily popped up in my mind as my shoulders tensed and a huge surge of
heat pulsed through my body. The thought got louder, as if echoing through my mind and
ricocheting through my body. How Could They Be ENJOYING That? I got up and started
pacing. I had to move as the sensations of frustration felt like jolts of energy coursing
throughout my limbs in search of an outlet. Talking aloud to no one in particular, my
hands violently punctuating my words—I was mad. This should not happen. Soldiers
should not do that. What is going on in this country, in my country? What have we come
to? What have we become? I had to do something, say something—I was galvanized. My
research on Abu Ghraib began at that moment, I read everything I could find and wrote
my first paper about it just a few months later. This is just a small (re)creation of how my
affect relations to Abu Ghraib moved me—orienting me to the situation and galvanizing
me to research it. My relationship to Abu Ghraib has evolved greatly over the years. Now
as I look at those images my breathing becomes shallow, my shoulder and back sink—
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my body wilts from the heaviness of sadness and remorse. To further understand how
affect is mobilized in social controversies, a more in-depth discussion of some key terms
in affective theory will be given to address their rhetorical and argumentative
significance.
Towards a Lexicon of Affect for Rhetoric and Argumentation Studies
Affect is both continuous and punctual, meaning individuals are continuously
engaged in affective experiences but they typically do not concentrate on this sensate data
until powerful sensations hit them all at one—this can spark the process of feeling. The
term feeling signifies both a pattern of embodied affects that is experienced as a distinct
and meaningful set of sensate-visceral relations and sensations as well as the cognitive,
reflexive process that discerns the significance and importance of said patterns. Simply
put, a ―feeling is a recognized affect, an identified [and identifiable] intensity‖ (Massumi
2002, 61). While feelings do not capture the full range of affects an individual embodies,
they do yield insight into how one makes sense from what s/he affectively experiences as
well as how one evaluates, or judges, it. For instance, when I first witnessed the images
and news story about Abu Ghraib the jumble of sensations I had eventually evolved into
a pattern that was clearly identifiable to me—anger. This feeling of anger included with it
a basic evaluative judgment—soldiers should not enjoy causing their prisoner‘s pain and
humiliation. As Brennan (2004) explains, ―Feelings are meant to be information about
whether a state is pleasurable or painful, whether one is attracted to something or averse
to it. This is the classic and only basis for distinguishing feelings and affects‖ (116). This
basic form of judgment begins with the act of discernment; the cognitive process that
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actively works to distinguish significant patterns of feeling out of the seeming chaos of
affective experience.
During the process of discernment, there is a shift from the simple mental
registration of affects to a complex cognitive practice that assigns significance,
importance, and value to this felt experience (Brennan 2004). Discernment, as a cognitive
act, can be honed and refined to make one more attuned to his/her affective state. The act
of discerning patterns of feeling entails four steps. First, one reflects on the sensatevisceral relations and sensations s/he has or is embodying. Next, one discriminates (i.e.,
makes fine distinctions) between which affects to focus on when considering all that are
experienced. Then, one assesses these discriminate affective patterns in relation to his/her
history of like encounters in order, lastly, to appraise the significance, importance, and
value of this feeling. In other word, ―feelings are tracing a logic in the flesh
simultaneously with a logic in history‖ (Brennan 2004, 116). In my case, discerning my
anger was as seemingly instantaneous process.
The surge of heat, the need to pace, the rapid talking, the loud focused thoughts,
and the overemphasized gestures is a pattern of sensate-visceral relations and embodied
sensations I have experiences countless times throughout my life. Separately each of
these affects could be synecdoches for other feelings (i.e., the rapid talking = anxiety; the
need to pace = worry). However, when discriminating between these instances of talking
and pacing in conjunction with the heat, thoughts, and gestures, the pattern can be
assessed as anger rather than anxiety or worry given my history of these sensations. As
my past has taught me, when I feel angry, it is typically because I appraise a situation as
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unfair or unjust. Feelings would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern without the aid
of one‘s memory of past affective experiences—a matrix of sedimented patterns of affect
that are created from the day in, day out sensate-visceral relationships and sensations an
individual experiences which are saturated with personal as well as cultural significance,
importance, and value.
When a feeling attains a level of collective, not solely personal, significance it is
better known as an emotion. Emotions, therefore, are qualified types of embodied
feelings (i.e., discernable patterns of affect) that have communicative currency as
subjective experiences and intersubjective concepts. As intersubjective concepts,
emotions are ―limited and contained expressions of affects‖ that have been linguistically
and symbolically fixed within discursive formations and thoroughly imbued with
cultural, political, ideological, and moral significance and importance (Grusin 2010, 81).
Although emotions are ―common biological occurrence[s]‖ with shared denotative
meanings, Probyn (2005) explains that they ―differentiate in their causes and expressions
at an individual level and within social groups‖ (29). For example, smiling is a universal
expression of happiness that signifies individuals‘ sense of joy but the reasons why
people feel happy (i.e., the causes of their happiness) vary greatly.
Emotions, then, are affects that have intersubjective, denotative meaning and
collective significance but also retain their subjective, connotative meaning and personal
importance. As such, they ―reveal information about value, either value as an agent take
things or value in the world‖ that makes them ―signs of or sources of vitally important
evaluative information‖ (Stocker and Hegeman 1996, 82-83). My anger about the Abu
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Ghraib photos, for example, has collective as well as personal significance. As an
intersubjective concept, anger has a common definition—a feeling of ―displeasure or
antagonism, excited by a real or supposed injury or insult to one‘s self or others, or by the
intent to do such injury‖ (Kassinove and Tafrate 2006, 3). Roused by a perception of
being wronged, Solomon (1993) explains that anger elicits a ―judgment of personal
offence‖ that ―often has a moral edge‖ (227). In other words, experiencing anger can be
understood as an embodied ―accusation or value judgment following from the belief that
another ―could and should have done otherwise‖‖ (Weiner 2006, 35). However, anger is
considered a negative emotion since it can provoke individuals to commit acts of
violence, instigate chaos, and cause others pain. As ―an affective state,‖ Kennedy (1992)
states that anger is ―experience[d] as a motivation to act in ways that warn, intimidate, or
attack those who are perceived as challenging or threatening‖ (150). Due to this orienting
and galvanizing potential for violence, public displays of anger or conducting oneself in
an angry manner is often deemed illegitimate and inappropriate behavior regardless of the
perceived slight or injustice.
The collective use of and value attributed to emotions makes affect susceptible to
processes of normativity and regulation. Proveti (2009) argues these norms and
conventions create ―emotion scripts,‖ which ―indicate culturally specific forms of
acceptable performances of emotions‖ that are used in socializing and disciplining
practices (25). In other words, norms and conventions are established regarding
legitimate and appropriate uses, expressions, and displays of emotion. Individuals learn
what are the appropriate emotions to embody for specific events (i.e., joy during one‘s
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wedding), in response to given actions (i.e., remorse when hurting a friend), and towards
particular individuals (i.e., reverence to fallen heroes). Adhering to the norms and
conventions of emotion then becomes ―a marker of being human, biologically and
socially‖ (Probyn 2005, 33). For example, I have been socialized to know that while it is
legitimate and appropriate for me to enact my anger over the Abu Ghraib photos by
researching and writing about it, that writing could not be too emotionally charged with
anger-related wording or it would not be accepted in academia due to explicit biased.
Consequently, the parameters of legitimate and appropriate emotional enactment and
display are implicitly and explicitly policed within the public spheres to ensure people
conduct themselves ―properly‖ within any given context.
Actively policing behavior assumes that one‘s affects, feelings, and emotions can
be mentally registered or cognitively discerned or apprehended. Affective traces (i.e.,
sensate signs of affects, feelings, and emotions) can be consistently found on the surface
of the skin and are also emitted into our surrounding via pheromones and other
secretions, sounds, scents, and vibrations from even the slightest movements. When
affective traces reach a point of salience, or sensual saturation via force, intensity, or
contrast, they can be nonconsciously registered or cognitively discerned. For instance,
―looming‖ sounds, or sounds that move towards an individual, are more salient to that
person than receding sounds (Hall and Moore 2003). A loud bang in an otherwise quiet
environment, a bright white cloud in the middle of a pale blue sky, the taste of cool, crisp
water after two cups of coffee, the scent of gas in one‘s home, and the feel of laying
down in freshly washed sheets after a long day are all examples of salient sensory
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information that can provoke affective responses—surprise at the sound, whimsy at the
sky, refreshed by the water, alarmed at the scent, and relaxed when lying in the sheets.
Salience, as Levine and Parkinson (1994) explain, also ―implies an increased level
of attention‖—the more salient an affect is, the more it rouses our attention; in some
cases an extremely salient affect can galvanize individuals to narrow and sharpen their
focus to the origins of the sensate information (343). A case in point is Carskadon and
Herz‘s (2004) finding that pungent and noxious scents can be salient enough to rouse
some individuals from even the deepest stages of sleep. Additionally, Turnbull and
Matisoo-Smith (2002) found that the salience of bitter tastes in vegetables, such as
spinach, is an underlying cause of children‘s aversion to eating them. Language use can
also make certain affect, feelings, and emotions salient. For example, although it might
be affectively accurate to say that the Abu Ghraib photos are disgust-ridden images
signify the vileness of American Islamophobia from which our former, imperialistic
interrogation policy were grounded in, I should not say this in a formal research project.
Considering the emotional scripts that guide both anger and academic research, it is
inappropriate for me to use this language because my choice of wording not only makes
my anger about this situation clearly salient, it draws readers attention to my emotional
state which may cause them to overlook the legitimacy of the claim. In other words, my
anger makes my claim seem unreasonable to others.
When theorizing affect for use within rhetorical and argumentation theory, the
distinctions between one‘s ability to discern affective states as feelings and/or emotions
and the process of apprehending (an)others‘ affects, feelings, and emotions needs to be
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addressed. When discerning one‘s own feelings and emotions, a person reflects upon,
discriminates, assesses, and appraises his/her immediate affective state in comparison to
his/her history with like experiences. Discernment assumes recognition; through the
process of discernment individuals will come to recognize what they are feeling due to
the intricate, and typically intimate, somatic knowledge they have collected about affects,
feelings, and emotions throughout the course of their lives. Butler (2010) asserts that
overarching ―norms of recognition‖ limit what affective state are publicly discernable (5).
Norms of recognition adhere closely to socio-cultural emotional scripts making either
clear embodiments of or obvious subversions to these scripts the most easily recognized
forms of affective states.
Apprehension, on the other hand, is a form of sensory perception that does not
assume recognition. ―It is a form of knowing,‖ Butler (2010) explains, that is ―bound up
with sensing and perceiving, but in ways that are not always—or not yet—conceptual
forms of knowledge‖ (5). In other words, apprehension is one‘s ability to understand
(an)other‘s affective state even if it does not resemble a specific emotional concept or
script that would be considered ―appropriate‖ given the context. Norms of recognition
can factor into the process of apprehension, however apprehension is just not completely
limited to them; apprehending (an)other‘s affective state implies understanding that is not
confined by dominant conventions (Butler 2010). Apprehension requires a level of
affective attunement with another—bringing oneself into physical and mental accord with
the sensate-visceral relations and embodied sensations of (an)other. Affective attunement

72

is akin to an embodied appreciation for what someone else could be somatically
experiencing that enables individuals to imagine the conditions that one is living in.
The conceptualizations of affect and apprehension lend themselves to a
(re)thinking of context as a rich and textured sensual, embodied experience that occurs in
the co-presence of others. Butler (2010) even shifts from discussing the context of a
claim to addressing conditions of a life. Speaking to the conditions that one lives in
assumes a fully embodied, affective experience rather than a strictly rhetorical situation.
―The key here,‖ according to Proveti (2009), ―is to appreciate the ecosocial
embeddedness of affect. Affect indicates that living bodies…do not negotiate their worlds
solely—or even for the most part—by representing to themselves the feature of the
world, but by feeling what they can and cannot do in a particular situation‖ (48; emphasis
added). It is from within these affect-laden conditions that individuals are oriented
towards claims, texts, events, and each other, and are also galvanized to think, act, and
express themselves. By being affectively attuned to the conditions in which (an)other
lives, individuals can apprehend other peoples‘ experiences without relegating their
affective states to common emotional scripts in order to be recognized and/or discerned.
When one apprehends the conditions of (an)other‘s life, s/he can appreciate the radical
distinctiveness of the affective states the other person experiences.
My anger as a (re)action to the Abu Ghraib images was cultivated both by my
discernment of the soldiers self-conscious enjoyment and pride as well as my
apprehension of the prisoners‘ pain and humiliation. For instance, in the image of SPC
Charles Graner and PVT Lynndie England standing in front of a backward pyramid of
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naked and hooded Iraqi prisoners, Graner and England‘s wide smiles, thumbs up, and
direct stare at the camera are easily discernable expressions of joy and pride. The
prisoners‘ affective states are a bit more difficult to recognize partially due to my naïveté
about abuse and torture but also because their faces are both hidden and turned away
from the camera. Visually, the pyramid of prisoners looks like a ramshackle jumble of
pieces of men that have blurred together rather than whole and distinct individuals. Pain
is not clearly displayed in any one prisoner‘s body but being attuned to their conditions
tells another story. These men have been jailed in a filthy prison, forcibly made to
publicly strip down, don a hood limiting their sense of sight, sound, smell, and taste,
climb atop other naked prisoners and stay there as their captors stand behind them to
photograph the moment for all posterity. Just from this image, I could appreciate the
severity of these prisoner‘s conditions and apprehend the pain and humiliation they must
have felt that provoked my feelings of anger. As Ahmed (2004) explains, ―anger‖ can be
―[felt] when faced with the other‘s pain‖ that allows individuals to ―enter into a
relationship with the other, premised on generosity rather than indifference‖ (21).
The acts of apprehension and discernment cultivate different types of
appreciation. Since apprehension is based on an assumption of alterity rather than
recognition, it cultivates an appreciation of difference as a basic condition of life. On the
other hand, discernment (i.e., the recognition of one‘s own or (an)other‘s feelings and
emotions) fosters a form of appreciation that is based on familiarity. When reflecting
upon and discriminating among affective experience, one can discern what s/he already
knows which makes it identifiable. This identification draws on the norms of recognition
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that are collective established and followed that aids in the provocation of sensations of
stability. Discernment, therefore, creates a corresponding sensation of stability—or a
calmness that is based in the sensual and mental experience of consistency. The question
is how do ―such norms operate to produce certain subjects as ―recognizable‖ persons and
to make others decidedly more difficult to recognize‖ (Butler 2010, 6). Analyzing the
affective dimensions of social controversy can enable critics to examine the norms of
recognition that guide the conflict and assess how they can lend credence to or
completely impede the affective objections made by individuals or groups.
The Affective Dimensions of Social Controversy
Strongly based in the rhetorical and argumentative traditions, this chapter‘s
conceptualization of the affective dimensions of social controversy addresses both the
persuasive and normative elements of affects, feelings, and emotions as they relate to
issues of transmission (i.e. circulation) and judgment. Drawing on scholarship about
affect, pathos, and emotion, the theories of emotion-based claims, affective states, and the
bi-directional relationship between them will be further developed to attend to the range
of ways affect functions in and through to social controversy. The force and intensity of
participants‘ sensate-visceral relations and sensations not only inform their claims, they
also infuse the conflict with a variety of affects that can become be the argumentative
substance of objections and rejoinders either in the form of a rational-critical claim or
salient affective states. In this way, affects, feelings, and emotions play a role in
normative critique and reinvention as well as the overall regulation of public discourse
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and conduct. Addressing the affective dimensions of this type of conflict will ultimately
lead to a more textured, experience-driven theory of social controversy.
Emotion-Based Claims
Drawing on both the collective and personal significance of distinct emotions,
emotion-based claims assert stances on how members of germane publics could and
should feel and act in relation to a particular set of conditions. As discursive and/or
nondiscursive arguments, these types of claims address the norms and conventions (i.e.
emotional scripts) that guide affective conduct (i.e., behaviors that make given affects,
feelings, or emotions discernable or apprehendable) amongst members of specific
publics. As a form of oppositional argument, emotion-based claims are objections to and
arguments about the normative standards of legitimacy and propriety that are used to
justify dominant emotional scripts which deal directly with distinct feelings and emotions
as the substance of proponents‘ stances. Consequently, emotion-based claims focus on
the regulation of public behavior while still providing insight into parameters of public
discourse especially in relation to arguments about affect within the public spheres.
When emotion-based claims act as affective objections, they are used to block
dominant enthymemes regarding the legitimacy and propriety of specific emotional
behaviors within the conditions of a given context. For example, Sontag‘s objection to
Abu Ghaib posits that Americans should feel shame over both what is depicted in the
images as well as the U.S. culture of shamelessness underpinning the social and political
conditions that made these photographs possible. By blocking the enthymemes that
concurrently shroud and justified dominant emotional scripts, emotion-based claims can
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make the norms and conventions guiding affect salient enabling the contestation,
reevaluation, and renovation of these normative behavioral and discursive practices.
Sontag‘s objection is an example of what Gilbert (2001) calls ―open emotion,‖ or
a ―straightforward‖ claim in which emotions themselves are ―the topic of discussion,
or…consistent with the topic of discussion‖ (241). Although a seemingly simple idea,
analyzing how one makes rational-critical claims regarding a feeling or emotion is a
fairly novel concept in argumentation. Within this discipline, Micheli (2008) explains,
―emotions are [traditionally] seen as the objects of appeals,‖ or attempts to trigger
specific affective responses, which ―function as external adjuvants to [claims],‖ not the
arguments themselves (2). Emotions, therefore, are used to arouse affective states as a
means to enhance a claim; however, the claim itself had nothing, inherently, to do with
the emotion. This posits emotional appeals, or more specifically pathos, as a supportive
element of argumentation that is not attributable to the rationale, or logos, of a
proponent‘s stance. As an ―alternative‖ to this, Micheli (2008) asserts that in some cases,
―speakers do not so much ‗appeal‘ to emotions as they formulate the reasons why they
feel (or do not feel) a particular emotion and why this particular emotion should (or
should not) legitimately be felt‖ (2).
Emotion-based claims are clearly examples of what Micheli terms as
―alternative,‖ yet there is no need for such a definitive distinction to be made between
these types of emotional arguments. When controversies openly deal with the normative
aspects of affects, feelings, and emotions, it is assumed that the conflict will stimulate
affective responses in form of both rejoining emotion-based claims and provoking
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(re)active affective states within participants. Since affect is a relational phenomenon, the
affective dimensions of social controversy share this characteristic. They feed off of and
into each other. Emotion-based claims are grounded in and, more importantly, spring
from corresponding affective states. In other words, there would be no emotion-based
claims without an originating affective state. When asserted, emotion-based claims not
only posit rational-critical arguments, they can also orient audience members by
provoking the same or reactionary affective states within them. In some cases, these
corresponding states will have enough force and intensity to galvanize certain individuals
to publicly support, oppose, or add their perspective to the controversy.
Since feelings and emotions are both discernable forms of affects, emotion-based
claims can be fairly easy to recognize. These types of arguments are made salient through
their use of emotional language as well as easily discernable non-verbal emotional
expressions and displays. The salience of emotion-based claims is also due, in part, to
their use of the ―traditional‖ argumentation style of rational-critical debate; claims are
publicly made that attend to dominant norms and conventions as well as the prevailing
standards that are used to rationalize them. This conventional process of objection and
rebuttal is easily recognizable via its adherence to norms of ―reasonable‖ discourse and
formal argumentation. In this way, emotions are made familiar via a rational and
intellectual process (Nussbaum 1996). As Fortenbaugh (1975) asserts,
When men are angered, they are not victims of some totally irrational force.
Rather they are responding in accordance with the thought of unjust insult . . .
their behavior is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that it is grounded upon a
belief which may be criticized and even altered by argumentation. (17)
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Although there is a cognitive component to the process of feeling and emotions (i.e.
discernment), the embodied aspects of the affects, feelings, and emotions that are
addressed in emotion-based claims should not be overlooked when analyzing these
rational-critical arguments.
Rush Limbaugh’s Emotion-Based Claim of Levity
Rush Limbaugh‘s (re)action and response to public expressions of ―outrage‖ at
the acts and images of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison is best described as an
emotion-based claim of levity. For Limbaugh, the force and intensity of public outrage
about the events at Abu Ghraib is incompatible with the gravity of the situation. As he
asserts,
I'm sorry, folks. I'm sorry. Somebody has to provide a little levity here. This is not
as serious as everybody is making it out to be…we‘re all wringing our hands here.
We act like, ‗Okay let's just die,‘ you know? ‗Let's just give up. What can we do
to make these people feel better? Let‘s just pull out of there, and let‘s just go.
Let's just become a neutral country. Let's just do that.‘ I mean, it‘s ridiculous. It‘s
outrageous what‘s happening here, and it‘s not—and it‘s not because I‘m out of
touch; it's because I am in touch, folks, that I can understand. (Meyer 2004, n.p,)
He refutes objections of shame, a la Sontag, by asserting the need for levity, or a
reduction or lightening of the political importance and significance placed on the
soldiers‘ actions. In other words, Limbaugh does not believe that Americans should feel
shame and outrage as a legitimate and appropriate response to the events at Abu Ghraib.
Even though the term ―levity‖ can mean frivolity, as an emotional state it is best
described as a feeling of ―buoyancy‖ and ―lightness‖ that can occur after being released
from a great weight or burden which can cause a corresponding sensation of relief.
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American‘s shame and outrage, according to Limbaugh‘s stance, are too great of an
emotional burden for the abuse at Abu Ghraib.
Scott (1999) explains that levity can ―suggest [making] something easily
endurable…to lighten something can also mean to make it clear‖ (217). Limbaugh‘s
emotion-based claim to levity, therefore, can be understood as an attempt to clarify the
situation at Abu Ghraib, by reframing it within a different context to release Americans
from the burden of feeling shame and outrage about the soldiers‘ actions. He does this in
two ways: by comparison and by suggesting a change of attunement. First, the soldiers‘
abuse of their prisoners ―is no different,‖ according to Limbaugh, ―than what happens at
the Skull and Bones initiation‖ (Meyer 2004, n.p.). In both situations, there are
individuals in positions of power hurting and humiliating the people under their control
as a form of induction or hazing for entertainment‘s sake. The initial images did not
indicate that any prisoners were severely physically injured, so why are we ―going to ruin
people‘s lives over it, and…hamper our military effort,‖ because these soldiers ―had a
good time‖ (Meyer 2004, n.p.)? Limbaugh is arguing that feeling shame and outrage over
something as seemingly banal as the pain and humiliation captured in the Abu Ghraib
photos is simply not a legitimate or appropriate emotion response for Americans to have.
Second, Limbaugh is suggesting a change in our affective attunement so that
American can instead appreciate the conditions our soldiers must endure just to keep us
safe. As he argues, ―You know, these [soldiers] are being fired at every day…I don‘t
understand what we‘re so worried about. These are the people that are trying to kill us.
What do we care what is the most humiliating thing in the world for them‖ (Meyer
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2004)? Rather than ground judgments about Abu Ghraib on individual‘s apprehension of
the abused prisoners‘ conditions, Americans should shift our focus to the collective
conditions of our U.S. soldiers to apprehend, or understand in an embodied sense, what
our military has to live through day in and day out. Instead of simply judging the events
at Abu Ghraib on discernments of the emotions of a few individual soldiers and the
apprehension of a few prisoners‘ conditions, the American public should appreciate what
our own soldiers experience before evaluating the prisoner abuse so gravely.
Furthermore, Limbaugh does not want the American people to overlook the fact
that the prisoners in these photos are the same as the ―people that are trying to kill us.‖
Instead of experiencing shame and outrage, Limbaugh is suggest that indifference or even
indignation would be more legitimate and appropriate emotional responses to feel. In
other words, our soldiers have a right to act this way—they are shot at daily while
protecting Americans from the dangerous individuals that, he believes, intend to harm all
of us. Limbaugh‘s emotion-based claims about levity shed some light into the
relationality of emotion-based claims. His argument for levity becomes clearer when
taken in conjunction with the force and intensity of the public expressions of outrage and
appeals to feel shame (e.g., Sontag) over the events at Abu Ghraib. Limbaugh implores us
to, quite literally, lighten our affective load with regard to the soldiers‘ abuse of their
prisoners and look at it from a different perspective. His emotion-based claim of levity
are a rationale and affective appeal to refute the legitimacy and propriety of feeling of
shame and outrage in relation to the soldiers actions and, instead, arouse sensations of
relief.
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Affective States
Affective states are best described as diffuse moods, or collections of sensatevisceral relations and sensations that can become salient and gain significance during
social controversies. Diffuse moods infuse an individual‘s actions, claims, and
performances, as well as material spaces, texts, events, images, music, and art with a
diverse range of affects. Because affective states are ubiquitous in everyday life, they are
not limited to only specific locations, occasions, texts, or individuals. Thus, it is not a
question of whether or not affective states are present during social controversy but rather
what affective states become salient during these conflicts and how these states function
argumentatively.26
In social controversies, the argumentative significance of affective states is twofold: they can functions as experiential arguments and affective appeals. First, when an
affective state acts as an experiential argument it testifies to a given set of conditions that
has provoked this felt experience as well as operates as the grounds of this claim. One‘s
judgment of an affective state as an experiential argument questions the legitimacy and
propriety of that which created the conditions of this state, not necessarily the state itself.
Second, affective states also act as affective appeals which infuse a claim and/or stance
with diffuse moods that underwrite the logic of a social controversy within a politics of
specific affects, feelings, and/or emotions. In either capacity, affective states are
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During critical analysis, naming salient affective states does pose a risk of creating normative
moods attributed to specific social controversies as well as establish obstacles to the discernment and/or
apprehension of other diffuse moods present in the conflict. However, not engaging in this type of criticism
is also a risk; by not engaging in this type of critical analysis, the affective dimensions of social controversy
may continue to be overlooked in these conflict and the insights into the conditions that provoke these
mood will not be gained.
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invitations to empathetically engage in this mood which can orient and galvanize
audience to respond by either echoing the state or being (re)actionary to it.
Conceptualizing affective states as experiential arguments takes the emergent
quality of affect as the basis of its claim. In other words, the argumentative significance
of an affective state is grounded in its testimony to the emergence of a specific mood
given a particular set of felt conditions. This sensate-visceral testament raises questions
about the legitimacy and propriety of that which created these felt conditions, provoking
this affective emergence. Affective states, then, function as both affective objections to
and critiques of the dominant norms and conventions that enabled the condition‘s
creation as well as open up the possibility of alternatives to this experience.
Take, for instance, the Abu Ghraib image depicting Graner and England behind
the pyramid of naked inmates. The prisoners‘ affective states of pain, fear, and
humiliation are testaments to the conditions that provoked these feelings (i.e., being
imprisoned, forced to strip, hooded, made to crawl on top of other inmates and be
photographed like this). Judgment of this state questions the legitimacy and propriety of
that which created these conditions (i.e., the U.S. soldiers and the American
government‘s policy on interrogation and torture). In other words, are these soldiers‘
actions and America‘s interrogation policy legitimate and appropriate given the
conditions it creates for Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib? These questions can engage
audiences‘ ―imaginative capacity‖ to envision a situation in which American
interrogation policies does not justify this type of behavior by its soldiers, as a means to
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create an alternative to the prisoners‘ current conditions of abuse and torture provoking
pain, humiliation, and fear (Sci 2009, 49).
When analyzing affective states as experiential arguments, the ―form‖ that the
affective state culminates in will impact how an individual discerns and/or apprehends
the significance and importance of the felt experience of this state. The form affective
states can manifest in include, but are not limited to, bodies, material spaces, images,
discourse, art, music, film, etc. Thus, analysis of affective states also necessitates a
consideration of the possibilities and limitations the ―form‖ of this state generate. For
instance, when analyzing the affective states that are salient within a film, critics should
examine how the conventions of film help create the mood but also establish parameters
regarding how that state can be apprehended and/or discerned.
Within social controversies affective states often culminate and become salient as
a proponent‘s embodied actions, claims, and performances. However, rather than ―overtly
privilege the body‘s cultural meaning,‖ focusing on affective states can allow critics to
―tell the psychosomatic body‘s stories‖ (Probyn 2005, 41). In this way, Probyn explains,
affect theory ―provides a different kind of gestalt for theories of embodiment‖ (28). The
extent to which a proponent‘s affective state(s) can be discerned and/or apprehended
implies an ethical relationship between the participants of a conflict and the individuals
and/or audiences that bear witness to them. This relationship is not only based on the
belief that they have ―feelings and interests in common,‖ Garver (1994) explain, ―but
together agree [to] the appropriateness of those emotions to the events and to themselves‖
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which means collectively they have the power to change these norms if they deem it
necessary (132).
Within social controversies, affective states also act as affective appeals which
infuse verbal, visual, embodied, and experiential claims with explicit and implicit moods
that underwrite the rhetor‘s stance. This conceptualization of affective states is inspired
by Aristotle‘s theory of pathos, or the rhetorical creation of appropriate states of reception
for audiences to embody and judge a claim from within. Affective states, as a form of
pathetic appeal, can be understood as invitations and/or provocations to be moved by the
diffuse moods that undergird a claim or overall argumentative stance. Analysis of these
appeals focuses on the affective and emotional logic that grounds the argument and/or
stance put forth during a social controversy to examine how the participants wants to
orient their audiences and what these orientation are attuned to and appreciate.
Examining the combination of affective states offered by opposing sides can offer insight
into the overall logic of a conflict which highlights how certain groups of affects,
feelings, and emotions function in relation to create, what Ahmed (2004) calls a cultural
politics of emotion, in which certain individual‘s and group‘s affective states are more
valued than others as indicative of the outcome.
Individuals can be moved by affective states via the transmission of affect which
has a physiological component. The transmission of affect, according to Brennan (2004),
is ―a process that is social in origin but biological and physical in effect‖ (3). It occurs
when the affective state of one person or the mood of a material space are infolded and
taken up by another. The transmission of affect can happen physiologically via the
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entrainment of the senses. Immediate audience members consciously and nonconsciously
soak in the sensory information (secretions, scents, sounds, vibrations, images, etc.) that a
speaker emits into her/his surroundings that can trigger the same affective states in these
onlookers. Additionally, when we enter a material space we embody the mood or sensate
information of that area. When I walk into my local coffee shop, I am bombarded with
the sensual particulars of this space—the smell of freshly ground coffee, the fast-paced
Latino music playing in the background, the sunshine that floods the shop with a warm
golden glow. As soon as I walk in, I experience a sense of comfort.
In today‘s mediated society, the transmission of affect is a fairly limiting concept
due to its dependence on immediacy. For instance, there is no ―immediate audience‖ of
social controversies since these are wide reaching conflicts that typically address whole
populations and, even at times, the entire international/global community. However, the
influence of affective states is not restricted to the transmission of affect. When
individuals are unable to entrain the affective states of another or physically embody the
mood of a space, they can still bear witness to rhetorical (re)presentations, or captures, of
affective states. Captures are types of mediated representations—photos, video, audio,
music, art, and texts—that portray an affective state; catching this affect within a distinct
moment or moments.
A capture does not, nor cannot, fully encapsulate the original state it (re)creates.
For instance, a photo of someone sobbing, or a video of an early morning sunrise can
capture the affective states of an individual‘s sadness or the mood of awe, respectfully.
Neither the image nor the video can fully communicate the immediate force or intensity
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of the affective states they (re)present. Yet, in some instances a capture can be even more
moving that an immediate experience. Since captures narrow one‘s focus on a specific
moment of an entire experience, these (re)presentations can make an affect, feeling,
and/or emotion, incredibly salient and, consequently, increases its affective intensity. The
iconic image of Mohammed Ali standing over Sonny Liston after he knocked Liston out
in the first round is good example of the power of a capture. As Liston lay on the ground,
Ali only stood over him for a few seconds as Ali paced the ring taunting Liston to ―get
up!‖ Ali‘s frustration and anger is more than just palpable, it is jarring in its force and
intensity. As a mediated (re)presentation, captures can be shared, downloaded,
forwarded, and circulated throughout publics which makes affective states more widely
accessible but also makes them susceptible to forces of commodification, reduction, and
misrepresentation.
Affective states may be discernable as specific feelings and/or emotions or
apprehendable as distinct experiences of affect. In other words, even though there may be
intersubjective concepts, or emotions, that can describe a given affective state, not all
affective states have specific emotions that can be ascribed to them. Apprehending the
affective character of a diffuse mood necessitates a level of attunement to the particular
sensate-visceral relations and sensations that are or could be experienced when
embodying it. Consequently, analysis of affective states as argument experiences should
include a discussion of the different types of attunement and appreciation that are
inherent within possible apprehension of these claims.
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When a person discerns, apprehends, or entrains an affective state, this experience
can consciously and nonconsciously inspire corresponding moods within this individual
which has an imaginative aspect. Corresponding moods can be brought about by being in
the presence of an affective state, remembering a past one, or imagining a scenario that
could trigger it. Being around a happy person, watching a funny film, or visiting a candy
factory can provoke feelings of happiness within us. Reminiscing about a good time with
a past love can arouse a sense of melancholy. Imagining how the families in Joplin,
Missouri, must feel having lost everything in a tornado, can incite feelings of
compassion. There are two basic ways that corresponding moods manifest, either in a
similar fashion or echo of the originating state, or in a relational manner or (re)action to
it. Echoing an affective state can be brought about via transmission of affect or feelings
of empathy (i.e., understanding cultivated by vicarious experience). When a person or
environment‘s given mood triggers a (re)actionary state in another, this (re)action is
typically a response to an initial judgment of this mood. For instance, the force and
intensity of public sentiments of shame and moral outrage evoked in Rush Limbaugh a
negative (re)actionary state of frustration and indignation, as he exclaimed ―it‘s
ridiculous!‖ (Meyer 2004, n.p.). When analyzing affective states within social
controversies, critics need to take into consideration the influence these mood can have as
provocation of echoing or (re)actionary states. Reframing DeLuca‘s theory of body
rhetoric to highlight the affective states of the advocates he analyzes reveals the
differences between our conceptualizations as well as briefly showcase the types of
insights this form of criticism can offer.
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DeLuca’ Theory of Body Rhetoric and Affective States
Although not explicitly theorized, DeLuca‘s (1999b) work on body rhetoric does
touch on affective states when he addresses the argumentative role vulnerability plays in
the embodied claims of EarthFirst!, Act Up, and Queer Nation advocates. As a form of
embodied argumentation, body rhetoric is performed to publicize a marginalized and/or
oppressed stance in hopes of influencing both the content and regulation of public
discourse and public conduct. For DeLuca, the use of the body as an argumentative
conduit is significant because it ―is less focused on an abstract, universalized reason and
more attuned to the feelings that accompany lived experience‖ (15-16, emphasis added).
In other words, body rhetoric can make affect more salient by demonstrating the felt
experience an argument is based within. When protesters utilized their bodies as the ―site
and substance of the argument itself,‖ DeLuca asserts that they are opposing dominant
norms ―not through good reasons but through vulnerable bodies‖ (10-11). Even though
DeLuca attributes the force of these advocates‘ embodied claims to the risk they are
willing to endure and the vulnerability they experience (similar to an experiential claim),
he does not theorize how this performance is an affective state that audiences are invited
to sensually and imaginatively embody. Rather, the protester‘s bodily display of risk and
vulnerability is solely analyzed as a symbolic text, the meaning of which is attributed to
the image of what this body is experiencing in this location and what symbolic
significance this action has in comparison to dominant norms and conventions.
By privileging argumentative medium (i.e., the body) as the rhetorically
significant element of the claim, DeLuca not only keeps intact the unnecessary distinction
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between discursive and nondiscursive argument, he also maintains the binary between
reason and affect, positing nondiscursive claims as unreasonable. Being unreasonable,
however, is not something to be avoided or rejected, but a way of highlighting the critical
force of objections to dominant framing. That is, DeLuca embraces the unreasonable as a
critical alternative; but, even as a form of critique, positing body rhetoric as indicative of
the unreasonable keeps the reason/affect binary in place. As he (1999b) states, ―to
understand the force of these groups‘ protests,‖ a critic should analyze how they used
their bodies to ―[challenge] and [change] the meanings of the world not through good
reasons but through vulnerable bodies, not through rational arguments but through bodies
at risk‖ (p. 10). Which is why, in the end, DeLuca seem resigned to the ultimate futility
of body rhetoric as a form of persuasive appeal, hoping only that some audience members
will come to the advocates position via identification.
An emphasis on affective states, on the contrary, would address how the
advocates‘ intentional experience of risk, in order to publicize their ideological objection,
cultivates a sensation of righteous vulnerability—the physical and mental state of being
open to injury and subsequent pain out of a firm belief in the morality of one‘s stance.
When witnessing or imagining this state of righteous vulnerability, viewers may be
seized by a sensation of bodily tension and foreboding best described as feelings of worry
and anxiety, driven by the emotion of empathy—understanding cultivated by the
vicarious experience of another. Ideally, it is from within this affective state of vicarious
vulnerability brought about by the emotion of empathy, that onlookers understand and
consequently judge protesters‘ body rhetoric. An analysis that focuses on the combination
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of body and affect could analyze how the sensate-visceral experience of symbolic critical
performances is judged according to norms of recognizability, such as risk, oppression,
and blame, to which individuals should adhere in order for their embodied claim to be
deemed legitimate and appropriate, and therefore seem reasonable and be considered
justifiable. This will be addressed in more detail in chapter four.
Joseph Previtera’s Body Rhetoric and the Affective State of Shame
Using Joseph Previtera‘s silent protest outside the Boston recruitment office as an
example of body rhetoric, the public display of his hooded, cloaked, and wired frame can
be understood as a challenge to the U.S. military‘s employment of harsh interrogation
tactics. When Previtera uses his young, white, American male body to voluntarily mimic
the stress positions Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh was forced to physically and mentally
endure, he highlights the brutal and barbaric nature of the interrogation tactics that has
been approved by the American government.
As a symbolic text, Previtera‘s protest subverts the liberal ideology of torture that
underwrites the U.S. military‘s employment of these tactics by publicizing the lived
experience of pain Faleh, and other prisoners like him, suffer through as a justifiable form
of questioning. Luban (2006) explains, ―The liberal ideology of torture insists that the
sole purpose of torture must be intelligence gathering to prevent a catastrophe…torture in
such circumstances is, in fact, little more than self-defense; and that, because of the
associations of torture with the horrors of yesteryear, perhaps one shouldn‘t even call
harsh interrogations ‗torture‘‖ (p. 43-4). Previtera places himself in a vulnerable position,
both by embodying this ―acceptable‖ tactic as well as performing in this way at this
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location. He puts himself at risk of public scrutiny and retaliation to stress the cruelty
embedded in ―harsh‖ interrogation and the ideological rationale used to justify the U.S.
military‘s use of this blatant form of abuse and torture. Within a few hours of his protest,
Joseph Previtera was ―charged with three crimes: disturbing the peace, possession of a
hoax device and making a false bomb threat‖ (Dodero 2004). Outraged by his arrest, a
secondary protest was staged at the same recruitment office by a group called ―Baghdad
to Boston‖ to object to both U.S. approved interrogation tactics as well as the
infringement on Previtera‘s right to assembly. Shortly after this demonstration, all
charges against Previtera were dropped, citing them as unconstitutional (Peaceworks
2004).
As insightful as an analysis of Previtera‘s protest as body rhetoric like this can
be, it only offers a symbolic understanding of his critical performance without addressing
the affective state of his embodied claims. He is not simply claiming the U.S. approval of
harsh interrogation tactics is wrong, Previtera‘s embodied critique of the events at Abu
Ghraib is underwritten by and creates an affective appeal based within his state of shame;
a painful sensation caused by the conscious recognition of the inappropriateness and/or
immorality of an action you believe you are, in some way, culpable for. Standing atop a
milk crate, Previtera‘s body was draped in a black cloak in the hot May sun and hoisted
inches above passersby like a real life scarecrow with arm lazily extended, white wires
dangling from his outstretched fingers. He stood this way for over an hour. The hood
Previtera wore was so heavy and thick he did not see or hear the police as they taped off
the sidewalk he was standing on prior to his arrest. This protest was not a simple, easy, or
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pleasant experience; this was the intentional self-subjection to risk, discomfort, and pain
out of a sense of intense disapproval provoked by feelings of shame at what U.S. soldiers
are told to do in our name, and for our protection.
The experience of shame washes over one‘s body as a wave of physical heaviness
that cannot be gotten out from under—like wearing a weighty black cloak and hood in
the warm spring sun. This heaviness is accompanied by a psychological anguish brought
about by mental flashes of the mortifying deed repeated over and over again. Previtera‘s
body stands in for Faleh‘s and acts as a memory trigger, mentally (re)collecting the
images from Abu Ghraib and reconsidering their significance as the provocation of his
shame. By creating an argumentative experience that cultivates an affective state of
shame, Previtera is inviting people to empathize with this experience and vicariously feel
his shame. The feeling of shame via empathy can compel onlookers to avert one‘s eyes,
lower one‘s head, feel a panging sensation in one‘s chest, and involuntarily recall mental
images of Abu Ghraib resulting in the tightening of one‘s throat making both the
(re)collection and Previter‘s display of this acceptable form of interrogation literally hard
to swallow. As an attempt to engage onlookers in his experience of shame, Previtera
enacts the belief that Americans should feel shame in response to the actions depicted in
the Abu Ghraib photos. Ideally, it is from within this feeling of vicarious shame that
onlookers, specifically potential recruits, would (re)think what being a U.S. soldier
should entail and judge Previtera‘s critical performance as a reasonable enactment of
shame at the U.S. military‘s approval of this abusive interrogation tactic.
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Conclusion
Social controversies are fascinating rhetorical and argumentative phenomena.
Inherent within this type of conflict is the possibility of social, cultural, and political
change. Simply put, social controversies are moments of potential. Consequently, affect
plays an important role in social controversy as an orienting and galvanizing force that
can shift individual in relation to the conflict and incite them to engage in it.
Analysis of the affective dimensions of social controversy—emotion-based claims
and affective states—should be based on the generative methodological framework that
has been derived from the combination of Olson and Goodnight‘s original article in
conjunction with the friendly critiques and extensions it inspired. In other words, critics
should analyze the tactical movements of the emotion-based claims that are asserted
and/or the specific affective states that become salient enough to be apprehended or
discerned. When describing these movements, each claim and/or state needs to be
thoroughly explicated with consideration to the unique aspects of these types of affect
driven arguments.
This examination should include a discussion of the discursive and non-discursive
elements of each which needs to be firmly grounded in this sensate-visceral relations and
embodied sensations of the affects, feelings, and emotions addressed. Additionally,
criticism of the affective dimensions of social controversy should assess the ways that the
controversy is framed as dichotomous opposition and how this construction glosses over
some of the nuance participants‘ emotion-based claims and affective states. Lastly,
incommensurable discourses, which somehow pertain to these dimensions, need to be
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taken into consideration to offer further critical perspective into the controversy. All in
all, analyzing the affective dimensions of a social controversy will offer critics insight
into how affect impacted individuals‘ relation to and engagement in the conflict.
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CHAPTER 3
THE INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM CENTER SOCIAL CONTROVERSY AND
TAKE BACK THE MEMORIAL‘S EMOTION-BASED CLAIM OF REVERENCE
“Affects are…not only indicative of the subjective mood of certain places; they also
frame the array of activities and practices potentially enactable within that place” (Duff
2010, 884)
“What has happened to the value of critique as a democratic value?” (Butler2004, 42)
Introduction
As a communicative process of (re)creating our shared, multi-faceted, and
frequently conflicted past, public memory and the texts that represent it has inspired an
impressive range of scholarship over the past twenty years.27 This academic fascination is
driven, in part, by the ―partiality and contestedness‖ of a public form of memory (Blair et
al. 2010, 18).28 National commemorative practices, specifically the creation of public
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Although not a comprehensive list, some notable works are: Armada 1998; Balthrop, Blair, &
Michel 2010; Biesecker 2002, 2007; Blair 1999; Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci 1991; Blair & Michel 1999,
2007; Bodnar 1992, 1994; Browne 1999; Dickinson 1997, 2006; Dickinson, Blair, & Ott 2010; Dwyer
2000; Gallagher 2004; Gillis 1994; Hariman & Lucaites 2003; Hasian 2002, 2005; Huyssen 2003; IrwinZareck 1994; Jorgensen-Earp & Lanzilotti 1998; Kammen 1993; Linenthal 1993; 1995, 2001; Mandziuk
2003; Marback 1998; Nora 1989; Olick 2007; Pezzullo 2003; Phillips 2004; Prosise 1998, 2003; Reyes
2006; Rosenfield 1989; Sci 2009; Simpson 2006; Sturken 1997, 2007; Vivian 2010; Wright 2005; Young
1990, 1993, 2003; Zagacki & Gallagher 2009; Zelizer 1995, 2002.
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This form of memory is public in four distinct ways. First, public memory is conceptualized as a
collective‘s (re)collections of its shared past. There is no singular proprietor of public memories which can
provoke social controversy when different factions of a public feel a strong sense of ownership to the
memory of specific events, individuals, and/or groups (Mandziuk 2003). Second, as (re)creations of a
collective‘s past, public memories are expected to satisfactorily represent the germane, and often
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museums and memorials, are among the most contested public memory texts given their
prominent status as permanent parts of a country‘s landscape and their role as material
encapsulations of civic lessons.
Collectively, official sites of public memory establish a nation‘s explicit and
implicit parameters of commemorative legitimacy and propriety through their material
and aesthetic elements. These sites argue not only that some events are more legitimate
and, hence, worthy of commemoration than others, but also that there are appropriate and
inappropriate ways to (re)collect these memories while here. The normative parameters
of commemorative sites apply to both the symbolic (re)presentations of public memories
and the experiences individuals engage in while visiting them. In other words,
individuals‘ memorial experiences are bound by standards of legitimacy and propriety
that establish dominant emotional scripts regarding how individuals should feel and
conduct themselves when embodying these (re)creations of the past. This aspect of public
memory, the affective experiences visitors should have at commemorative sites, has been
a major issue during the redevelopment of the World Trade Center (WTC) site.
Given the significance of the WTC site—nearly 3,000 people died there in the
worst terror attack on American soil—the public memorializing process regarding the
conflicting, perspectives members have on this past; yet, memorial texts always retain some form of
partiality. When ―one past out of many possible constructions is represented as the past,‖ the bias and
prejudice of memorial texts, performances, and sites that are intended to be indicative of a collective‘s
history often incite social controversy (Miles 1997, 60). These conflicts ensue because, third,
commemorative texts are intended for public circulation which not only (re)present a public‘s shared past
but also function as (re)presentations of this group‘s current perspectives on this past, including what
members‘ perspectives are valued as part of this public. Disagreement can then ensue over what are
legitimate interpretations, and thus appropriate (re)presentations, of the past in relation to the present
norms, conventions, and needs of a public. Therefore, fourth, public memory texts are embedded with the
dominant norms and standards the group has deemed legitimate and appropriate ways to interpret,
understand, and feel about their shared past.
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legitimate and appropriate way(s) to commemorate this tragic event at this infamous
place has been, not surprisingly, vitriolic. September 11th was a profoundly traumatic and
moving experience in American history. Intense affective states of sadness, grief, anger,
fear, hysteria, and melancholy were captured in the stories and images of individual‘s
experiences who were there — in the towers, on the flights, in the Pentagon, and on the
accompanying streets. As people from around the world bore witness to these affective
captures, the global outpouring of sympathy was staggering. Interestingly, the force and
intensity of the immediate as well as the mediated experience of 9/11, has posed a
challenge when commemorating these events at the main site of the tragedy. Can we only
collectively remember such a traumatic event by (re)collecting the mortal and material
loss experienced and witnessed there? Understandably, social controversy has ensued
regarding not only how to commemorate these events for all posterity at the devastated
WTC site but also how individuals should feel and conduct themselves when
experiencing the public memory texts there.
The relationship between the public memory of September 11th and affect theory
has garnered some academic interest (Grusin 2010, Simpson 2006). Yet, as Blair et al.
(2010) argue, affect remains an ―underdeveloped‖ although ―central‖ aspect of public
memory that influences individuals‘ judgments regarding what is ―worthy of
preservation‖ (7). In response to Blair et al.‘s (2010) claim, this chapter offers an analysis
of the affective dimensions of the social controversy that arose over the International
Freedom Center (IFC)—a proposed, but now defunct, museum honoring the concept of
freedom, which was supposed to be built at the WTC site. The IFC‘s co-creators, Tom
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Bernstein and Peter Kunhardt, envisioned the IFC as an educational museum offering
exhibits and programs that would have portrayed ―the story of freedom [as] a narrative of
hope,‖ framing 9/11 as part of a larger network of global struggles to ―powerfully
illustrat[e] that new challenges to freedom will always arise, that freedom‘s work remains
unfinished, and that there is a place for all of us in this work‖ (IFC 2005, 2). Initially, this
proposed museum was well received but in less than a year, critics complained that the
IFC was not worthy of this ―hallowed‖ ground.
Objections to and critiques of this proposed museum were championed by the
Take Back the Memorial [TBM] campaign, a coalition of 9/11 families and first
responder (i.e. firefighter and police) associations that eventually garnered support by
over forty thousand U.S. citizens. TBM members opposed the IFC‘s mission and
educational programming, which they believed could potentially provoke critique and
debate about U.S. policy and politics at a site they considered sacred. For them, engaging
in a commemorative experience that could even possibly result in the denigration of
America here was akin to sacrilege. Rather, TBM supporters asserted that visitors to the
WTC site should naturally and solely feel reverence—a deep sense of awe and profound
respect—when experiencing this hallowed ground and conduct themselves in manner
respectful of the deceased by venerating—enacting reverence via sincere admiration and
honor—both the victims and America while there.
IFC supporters disagreed and asserted that the WTC site need not be strictly
bound to feelings of reverence and acts of veneration. They believed that paying tribute
to freedom at Ground Zero is both a legitimate and appropriate way to commemorate
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9/11 since it is a founding principle of American life. Furthermore, honoring freedom
means engaging visitors in experiences that would provoke sensations of hope and
inspiration as well as analytical curiosity about the social, cultural, and political
conditions that lead to acts of terrorism, tyranny, and injustice. Bernstein and Kunhardt
believed this experience would not lead to the denigration of America; rather it would
galvanize visitors to be more civically engaged against acts of social injustice and help
prevent the intolerance and hatred that underwrite terrorism. From June to September
2005, the social controversy between the TBM campaign and IFC supporters raged on
until former NY Governor George Pataki heeded the TBM‘s request to ―be a true leader
and remove the IFC from sacred ground‖ (TBM 2005c). The building pressure from the
force and intensity of the TBM‘s continued opposition galvanized Pataki to evict the IFC
from the WTC site on September 28, 2005. He explained, ―Freedom should unify us.
This center has not‖ (Dunlap 2005b, A1).
This analysis of the IFC social controversy asserts that the affective dimensions of
this conflict are most salient and discernable in the emotion-based claim of reverence
advanced by the TBM campaign. This claim purports that the experience of being at
Ground Zero naturally provokes feeling of reverence which ascribes a certain type of
venerable conduct that visitors should enact while there. Functioning as an overarching
oppositional argument, the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of reverence is both an affective
objection to and the ground for their critique of the IFC. The IFC supporters did not have
a singular overarching emotion-based claim to counter the TBM, instead these
proponents focused on refuting the veracity and validity of the TBM‘s stance.
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For this analysis, 215 articles from the New York Times, New York Post, and
Daily News that were published between May 1 and November 1, 2005 were examined to
determine the overall structure and affective dimensions of the IFC social controversy.
Since the WTC site is in New York City, only regional NY newspapers were used due to
their extensive coverage of this conflict. Press releases, reports, websites, and other
documents created by the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), the IFC
and the TBM campaign were also analyzed. To explicate the critical findings of this
examination, this chapter will be laid out as follows. First, two ―conditions‖ of the IFC
social controversy are addressed—the mortal and material devastation incurred at the
WTC site and the LMDC‘s role in the IFC‘s placement there. Then, the initial objection
to the IFC, as posited by Debra Burlingame, is discussed as the inspiration for the TBM
campaign and foreshadowed its stance. This leads to an analysis of the TBM‘s emotionbased claim of reverence which is explicated as both an affective objection and critique,
followed by an examination of the IFC‘s rebuttal of it. A discussion of the TBM‘s
framing of the LMCD‘s deliberative democratic process as incommensurate with their
stance will be offered next, leading to a discussion of Pataki‘s decision before, finally
offering some general conclusions about and implications of this critique.
Conditions of the Controversy: The Site and the Plan
Shortly after 9/11, Trimarco and Depret (2005) explained, ―Most newspapers and
television stations labeled the event a national trauma,‖ with the WTC site as the
epicenter of this tragic ordeal (30). The devastation at Ground Zero was staggering. As
American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the World Trade
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Center‘s North and South towers, respectively, the severity of these attacks quickly
became clear. Of the 2,995 people (including the 19 hijackers)29 who died in the attacks
on September 11th, 2,762 individuals (includes 10 hijackers) met their demise at the WTC
site (NSMM 2011).30 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, although hundreds of
people were ―killed instantly by the [planes‘] impact,‖ literally hundreds more were
trapped unable to escape prior to the collapse of the towers less than two hours later
(NCTAUS 2004, 285). In the densely packed streets of lower downtown Manhattan, four
buildings were completely destroyed, and seven additional buildings as well as two
pedestrian bridges were damaged, some severely so. Yet, the ruins left by these buildings
are only the material remains.
After the initial 2002 cleanup of ―1.5 million tons of debris‖ from the WTC site,
approximately ―20,000 pieces‖ of human remains were excavated (Associated Press
2006). These human remains were strewn across the devastated site, mingled throughout
the rubble. As Colwell-Chanthaphonh (2011) explains:
Given the horrifying violence of the World Trade Center‘s destruction, it is all too
easy to imagine that people simply vaporized, turned incorporeal in a flash. In
truth, thousands of fragments of human bodies descended with the grey ash of the
World Trade Center that rained over the city. The human detritus ended up on
rooftops and in sewers and intermixed with the steel and concrete of the
skyscrapers. (5)
29

Perhaps one of the most bizarre aspects of my research has been how difficult it was to pinpoint
a specific ―tally‖ of the deceased. Of the major U.S. news outlets, I found discrepancies in the numbers at
The New York Times, CNN, Fox News, CBS News, and the White House‘s website. I decided to use the
tally given by the 9/11 memorial website because it was both the most organized and the names listed here
need to be accurate since it is considered the official roster of the deceased to be engraved on the memorial.
30

The breakdown of victims by location is as follows: 1,470 at WTC North, 694 at WTC South,
87 on American Flight 11 (which hit WTC North), 60 on United Flight 175 (which hit WTC South), 416 on
duty and 25 off duty First Responders at the WTC site, 125 at the Pentagon, 59 on United Flight 77 (which
hit the Pentagon), 40 on United Flight 93(which crashed near Shanksville, PA), and 19 hijackers.

102

The excavation of human remains at the WTC site has been less than stellar. Of all the
people who died at there, ―Only 292 ‗whole‘ bodies [meaning anywhere from 75% to
100% of the corpse]…have been recovered‖ (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2011, 5). According
to a January 2010 report by the New York City Medical Examiner‘s Office, ―1,626
Ground Zero victims‖ have been identified, a total of ―21,744 remains had been
recovered and 12,768, or 59 percent, had been identified‖ (Esposito 2010, n.p.). Since
close to 2,000 additional fragments of human remains have been unearthed since the
initial excavation, many wonder what other remains may have been left behind at Ground
Zero. Sadly, after almost 10 years, the remains of 1,126 victims still have not been
recovered while almost 9,000 fragments of victims‘ remains linger at the Medical
Examiner‘s Office unidentified. Once construction is completed, all remains that are still
unidentified will be returned to the WTC site where they will be housed at the memorial
complex. Up until the summer of 2006, the development and construction of the
memorial complex at Ground Zero was completely under the auspice of the Lower
Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC).
The LMDC’s Plan for the IFC
In the wake of September 11th, former NY Governor George Pataki and Mayor
Michael Bloomberg created the LMDC ―to help plan and coordinate the rebuilding and
revitalization of Lower Manhattan‖ with special attention on the reconstruction of the
WTC site (LMDC 2007). Since 2002, the LMDC has overseen the development, design,
and continued implementation of the general plans to rebuild the entire 16 acres of this
site. This plot is made up of four quadrants, one of which is the 6.5 acre spot where the
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WTC towers once stood which is often referred to as memorial quadrant. Over the years
the LMDC‘s role, and significance, has diminished greatly, however it was their
deliberation-based initiatives (i.e., town meetings in NY, on-line dialogues, mass
mailings to victims‘ families, the creation of eight advisory councils representing the
major stakeholder groups, etc.) that resulted in the initial reconstruction plans for Ground
Zero.31 From this process, the LMDC found there was an overwhelming consensus—the
public not only wanted a moving memorial at the site, they also wanted an increased
cultural presence in lower Manhattan. Specific requests were made to include cultural
and art institutions to the WTC site in order to revitalize the lower downtown area.
In response to this request, the LMDC held an international competition to select
four institutions to be housed at Ground Zero—two at a cultural complex on memorial
quadrant and two at a performing arts complex on the northwest quadrant. The LMDC
offered numerous suggestions for applicants regarding potential uses for the site such as
―creat[ing] humanities programs and conduct[ing] forums drawing from cultural and
academic resources‖ to create ―a place of inquiry and discussion‖ (Dunlap 2005d, B8).
The LMDC also suggested that applicants offer ―international programming…[to]
31

This process included seven main initiatives. Two town hall meetings were held at the Jacob
Javits Convention Center on 7/20/02 and 7/22/02. The first meeting was the largest public dialogue in New
York history with approximately 4,300 in attendance. On-line dialogues on the LMDC website,
www.renewnyc.org, were conducted from 7/29/02 to 9/12/02. Multiple public meetings were organized in
New York City from 8/20/02 to 9/5/02 and one was held in New Jersey on 9/25/02. Eight advisory councils
were created to represent the interests of the major stakeholders with regard to the redevelopment of lower
Manhattan. These councils are: The General Advisory Council; Arts, Education and Tourism Advisory
Council; Development Advisory Council; Families Advisory Council; Financial Services Council;
Professional Firms Council; Residents Council; Restaurants, Retailers and Small Business Advisory
Council; and the Transportation and Commuters Advisory Council. Private meetings were held with
―Community Boards, civic groups, planning and not-for-profit organizations, federal, state and local
elected officials and government agencies‖. Mass mailings were sent to the families of all victims
soliciting their input. Lastly, the LMDC welcomed open correspondence with the general public via email
and postal service.

104

highlight the values of tolerance, diversity and understanding among nations‖ (Dunlap
2005d, B8). A total of 113 applicants were received and reviewed 32 and in July 2004, the
IFC was announced as one of the four winners.33
Envisioned as a non-partisan educational museum, the IFC would foster
―conversations on freedom‖ as a world movement, which the U.S. is a leading part of
(Pogrebin 2005b, E27). To do so, Bernstein and Kunhardt proposed the IFC as a
celebration of the ideals of freedom and tolerance by featuring installation on leaders
such as George Washington, Nelson Mandela, Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, and
Martin Luther King Jr., as well as national founding documents like the Declaration of
Independence and the South African Constitution. Initial plans for the IFC also featured
an exhibit about historic freedom struggles including: the resistance against the gulag in
the former USSR, the caste system in India, slavery in America, fascism during World
War II, and apartheid in South Africa. A tribute to all of the countries that lost citizens in
the 9/11 attacks, was be displayed in the ―Gallery of Nations,‖ which would also feature
an exhibit about the international outpouring of sympathy following that tragic day
(Pogrebin 2005b, E27). Lastly, the IFC planned to host an evening educational series;
―the Aspen Institute helped organize a consortium of universities that [would] each be
allotted 5 to 10 evenings [per year] for lectures, conferences and other programs‖ at the
museum (Pogrebin 2005b, E27).
32

Applicants were an evaluative committee consisting of members of the LMDC, the State
Council on the Arts, and the NYC Department of Cultural Affairs. During this process, the LMDC
sponsored a public forum and seven community workshops, and also elicited feedback from all of their
advisory councils for the evaluative committee to take into consideration when making their decisions.
33

All four of the original cultural and performing art institutions that won the design competition
will no longer be housed at the WTC site.
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Initially, the IFC was hailed by all NY elected officials as reflective of the pride
and courage shown in the face of the terrorist attacks on 9/11. When announcing the IFC
as one of the four winners, Pataki stated, ―The Freedom Center has formed a committee
of outstanding individuals to create vibrant content on the global quest for what our own
Declaration of Independence deems the inalienable rights of humanity‖ (Dunlap 2005d,
B8). However, this original support gave way to harsh criticism beginning in June of
2005.
Objections to the IFC
Debra Burlingame‘s (2005) Wall Street Journal opinion piece, ―The Great
Ground Zero Heist,‖ was a strong objection to and harsh critique of the legitimacy and
propriety of the IFC at the WTC site and can be credited as the impetus of the Take Back
the Memorial campaign. Burlingame, a member of the WTC Memorial Foundation and
sister of Charles F. Burlingame III the pilot of American Airlines Flight 77 which struck
the Pentagon, argued that ―Ground Zero has been stolen, right from under our noses‖ by
the creators of the IFC and urged the public to ―get it back‖ (A14). In this article, she
establishes the emotional tone and oppositional structure of the IFC social controversy;
however, she did not advance any single salient or discernible emotion-based claim.
Foreshadowing the TBM
Foreshadowing the TBM‘s stance, Burlingame asserted that the IFC would not
capture the experience of 9/11 making it disrespectful to those who died there. She also
launched an ad hominem attack on the IFC supporters, questioning their intentions for
wanting to build the museum at this sacred site. This claim laid out the dynamic between
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those who (correctly) believe the IFC is an illegitimate and inappropriate way to
commemorate the events of 9/11 and those who (mistakenly) believe otherwise.
For Burlingame, the IFC would act as an obstacle to the personal connection
people want to this tragedy by ―stubbornly refus[ing]‖ to let visitors relive the trauma of
9/11 when they come to Ground Zero ―yearning to return to that day‖ (A14). She argued
that from the moment the attacks occurred, people have been drawn to ―the empty pit of
Ground Zero‖ which beckons people to come and (re)collect their experience of that day
as well as pay their respects to the deceased (A14). As Burlingame explained:
[Visitors] will come because they want to remember what they saw that day,
because they want a personal connection, to touch the place that touched them,
the place that rallied the nation and changed their lives forever. (A14)
Since visitors want to relive the trauma of 9/11 while at the WTC site, creating anything
that would compromise this experience is simply unacceptable. Burlingame argued that if
the IFC was created there, ―[t]he public will be confused at first, and then feel
hoodwinked and betrayed‖ (A14).
Burlingame also insinuated that the IFC creators and board members were amoral
and anti-American since they proposed building a ―critical‖ museum here. As she
asserted, the IFC founders and board members are radical liberal ―activists and academics
[that] are salivating at the prospect of holding forth on the ‗perfect platform‘ where the
domestic and foreign policy they despise was born‖ (A14). These men and women make
up a virtual ―Who's Who of the human rights, Guantanamo-obsessed world‖ and are
associated with such ―radical-left‖ organizations as Human Rights First, the ACLU,
Columbia University, and the Open Society Institute (A14). The IFC founders and board
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are opportunist ―ideologues‖ who are trying to ―force-[feed]‖ Americans ―the so-called
lessons of September 11‖ (A14). ―Rather than a respectful tribute to our individual and
collective loss,‖ Burlingame asserts, these people want to give visitors ―a slanted history
lesson, a didactic lecture on the meaning of liberty in a post-9/11 world‖ (A14). As she
warned, ―do not be fooled into thinking that their idea of freedom is the same as‖ ours.
(A14; emphasis added).
The TBM’s Emotion-Based Claim of Reverence
Inspired by Burlingame‘s article, Robert D. Shurbet along with a coalition of 9/11
families groups, created the Take Back the Memorial campaign.34 Similar to Burlingame,
the TBM campaign asserted that the IFC did not have a natural connection to the WTC
site and, thus, would engage visitors in inappropriate conduct there. Thus, they took up
Burlingame‘s argument regarding the ―the disturbing and disrespectful plans the IFC has
for this very sacred site‖—polished and condensed it—transforming it into a clear,
articulate, and easily accessible emotion-based claim of reverence (Shurbert 2005, n.p.).
This claim maintained that the legitimate and appropriate affective atmosphere at the
WTC site naturally is, and should be, one of reverence, which would engage visitors in
acts of veneration. As Duff (2010) explains, ―Affective atmospheres capture the
emotional feel of place, as well as the store of action-potential, the dispositions and
agencies, potentially enactable in that place‖ (881).
34

Following the publication of Burlingame‘s article, in June 2005, the TBM campaign was created
by a small assembly of 9/11 victims‘ family groups. But by late September 2005, the campaign had grown
exponentially and was supported by fifteen 9/11 family groups (making up a decisive majority of victim
family members), the Uniformed Firefighters Association (22,000 members), the Firemen‘s Association of
the State of New York (110, 000 members), the Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Association (106,000 members),
NY Congressman Peter King, former NY Congressmen Vito Fossella and John Sweeney, former NY
Senator Hillary Clinton, and over 47,000 citizens who signed TBM‘s on-line petition.
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The TBM‘s emotion-based claim of reverence functions as both an affective
objection and the grounds for their critique which appealed to the norms of respect in an
attempt to regulate the public‘s conduct that the WTC site. Their objection to the IFC
―throw[s] open the question‖ of what the legitimate and appropriate felt experience
provoked by the WTC site is, while the TBM‘s critique of it attempts to ―free up
exploration and experimentation with alterior‖ ways to commemorate September 11th
here (Olson and Goodnight 1994, 252). James Slevin, the Vice President of the
Uniformed Firefighters‘ Association, stated TBM‘s most salient emotion-based claim of
reverence during a rally at Ground Zero on September 10, 2005. As Slevin asserted:
All of those who were killed on September 11th need to be remembered at a place
that will pay homage to their story and show reverence to their memory. We owe
it to all of the lives lost and to future generations, who will seek to learn of the
day‘s events, to have a memorial that conveys homage, without the revisionist
history that cultural institutions like the IFC will attempt to portray. (TBM 2005c)
This claim suggests an affective attunement to and appreciation of the conditions of the
victims‘ death (i.e., the pain and suffering they must have endured during this shocking,
violent, and illogical trauma) and their families and friends (i.e., the grief of losing a
loved one in this horrific manner). For TBM supporters, feeling reverence for the 9/11
deceased at Ground Zero is the legitimate and appropriate thing to do, in fact, we ―owe
it‖ to the victims and our fellow citizens. Being reverent at the WTC site implies that
visitors should conduct themselves in a respectful manner that, in this case, means
commemorating the victims‘ stories and the events of 9/11 in a strictly positive manner
without extraneous historical or international framing. In other words, visitors should
venerate both the victims and America.
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As an intersubjective concept representative of a discernable affective state of
feeling, reverence is the experience of sensations of awe combined with fear, melancholy,
and/or elation in conjunction with the cognitive recognition of one‘s human limitations
which results in an orientation of profound respect and humbleness. Since one can feel
reverence in relation to something that frightens, saddens, and/or elates him/her,
sensations of reverence combine awe with these other feelings that are dependence upon
the conditions of the experience. Reverence, according to Woodruff (2001), is a virtue, or
―habit of feeling,‖ that culminates in a ―well-developed capacity to have the feelings of
awe, respect, and shame when these are the right feelings to have‖ (6-8). Knowing when
it is ―right‖ to feel reverence is driven, Woodruff (2001) continues, by communal politics,
not religion, since being reverent ―lies behind civility and all of the graces that make life
in society bearable and pleasant‖ (5).
Experiencing reverence implies that individuals know the dominant norms and
conventions of respect that guide a collective‘s public conduct in order for them to
behave legitimately and appropriately in relation to that which they revere. As a virtuous
affective habit, reverence assumes a level of ethical righteousness; when individuals feel
reverent they are inclined to do what they believe is ―the right thing‖ (Woodruff 2001,
62). With regard to the WTC site, conducting oneself in a reverent manner assumes that a
visitor will venerate the events and victims of 9/11. As the behavioral correlate of
reverence, veneration is enacted as a heartfelt admiration of someone or thing considered
superior to oneself; intense sensations and expressions of veneration are similar to
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worship and idolatry. Performing veneration at Ground Zero suggests paying homage to
the events of 9/11 in a strictly positive, almost devote, manner.
Affective Objection—Natural Feelings of Reverence at Ground Zero
The TBM campaign believed the WTC site is a sanctified space because the very
soil there had been consecrated by the blood and ash of all those who died. Eschebach
(2011) explains, ―Soil from graves or from sites of death is often imagined as a substance
that carries the spirits of the dead and is thus endowed with an aura of sanctity . . .
transforming it into a holy site‖ (139). When one visits Ground Zero, this experience
should naturally be influenced by the sensate-visceral relation of stepping on the same
soil consecrated by the remains of the 9/11 victims in conjunction of with one‘s personal
(re)collections of the attacks. This combined sensual and cognitive experience should
result in sensations of melancholy over this mortal loss and awe at the devastation that
happened that day. The WTC site is also considered sacrosanct because it is ―the last
resting place for loved ones whose bodies were not recovered and whose remains are still
within that hallowed ground‖ (Giuliani 2002, 67). As Rachael O‘Brien, a 9/11 widow and
TBM member stated, ―I have no remains of my husband, and to me that‘s sacred ground.
That's the last place he was‖ (Lovett 2005, 8).
People will come to the WTC site simply to (re)collect what happened on
9/11because the site itself, which Pataki likened to ―the beaches of Normandy or Pearl
Harbor,‖ is diffused with the felt memory of that day (Healy et al. 2005, B1). As a site of
material and mortal trauma, Ground Zero has an ―emotional geography of place‖ akin to
modern day ruins (Duff 2010, 881). Due to the historical significance and sanctity of
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Ground Zero, there is a stipulation in the site‘s redevelopment plans stating that nothing
can be built over the footprints of the WTC towers. The massive outlines of the collapsed
towers must remain empty for perpetuity symbolizing the site‘s sanctification; an eternal
reminder of the devastation that occurred there (Foote 1997). ―An environment of ruins,‖
Navaro-Yashin (2009) explains, ―discharges an affect of melancholy . . . [and] those who
inhabit this space of ruins feel melancholic‖ (14). The intentional absence of the towers‘
footprints becomes a permanent embodiment of tragic loss, literally mapping the WTC
site with an affective state, or diffuse mood, of melancholy by ensuring that part of the
material remains of 9/11 is left behind, built in the ―redeveloped‖ landscape. Infused with
the melancholy of loss and sensations of awe at the enormity of this physical absence,
TBM proponents believed that visitors‘ experience at the WTC site would naturally, and
undeniably, provoke feelings of reverence.
TBM supporters do not assert that creating a museum to the concept of freedom is
inherently wrong; rather, they argue that creating it at Ground Zero and framing 9/11 as
one of many freedom struggles fought around the world is inappropriate considering the
feelings of reverence individuals should naturally experience at this hallowed site. In
other words, the IFC simply does not belong here. At a rally on September 11, 2005, one
TBM member explained:
The organizers of the International Freedom Center say that in order to understand
9/11 we must see exhibits about slavery, segregation and genocide and its impact
around the world . . . This is history that all should know and learn, but not here—
not on sacred ground . . . Nobody is coming to this place to learn about Ukraine
democracy or to be inspired by the courage of Tibetan monks. They‘re coming for
Sept. 11. (Fisher 2005, B4)

112

The relationship between these historical events and September 11th is an ―artificial
connection;‖ the IFC‘s creators want to construct a revisionist global history and
―appropriate 9/11 . . . to promote a decidedly political agenda‖ (TBM 2005a). Stepping
on the ―sacred‖ ground where thousands died on 9/11 and being in the presence of the
―ruins‖ there will not make people curious about Ukrainian democracy, it will make them
feel reverent. Furthermore, feeling reverent here will create an expectation; visitors to
Ground Zero will expect to learn the historical details of 9/11, not these other freedom
struggles.
If the IFC is created at the WTC site, the TBM asserted, visitors will ―wonder by
what perverted logic is it appropriate to use this spot to dredge up shameful, painful
episodes in American [and global] history that have nothing to do with 9/11‖ (―Memo‖
2005, 28). Feeling shame, provoked by museum exhibits about America‘s past failures
(i.e., slavery and WWII internment camps) during which our fellow citizens‘ freedoms
were forcibly curtailed by our own government, is an inappropriate affective state for
visitors to Ground Zero to embody here. Feelings of shame at this sacred site can only be
experienced via an artificial connection to the events of 9/11. The TBM campaign
suggests, ―If visitors to New York want a lesson in world politics, they can take a taxi
ride over to the United Nations‖ (TBM 2005a).
Affective Critique—Enacting Reverence at Ground Zero
Even though melancholia may infuse the ruined space of the WTC site, the
sanctification of Ground Zero assumes that the events that occurred there ―hold some
lasting positive meaning that people wish to remember—a lesson in heroism or perhaps a
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sacrifice for community‖ (Foote 1997, 7). Since the sanctity of the WTC site limits what
visitors can learn from 9/11 to solely positive lessons and the natural experience of
reverence creates an expectation to only learn about September 11th there, visitor‘s
conduct is narrowly constricted to acts of veneration. Being respectful at Ground Zero,
therefore, entails more than mournfully reflecting on the deceased, it also means enacting
one‘s heartfelt admiration of the moments of courage, kindness, and fortitude that
occurred in the midst of this tragedy and the days following it. Ground Zero, according to
the TBM campaign, is the place:
[W]here our children and grandchildren will go to learn not only about the tragic
events of that day—the loss of the bright, brilliant and beautiful people who had
so much to give to future generations—but also the stories of heroism, the
nation‘s resiliency, the world‘s response and the unprecedented outpouring of
goodness and humanity. (TBM 2005a)
When enacting veneration at the WTC site the pedagogical lessons of September 11th
take on the traditional ideals of heroism and more importantly, America‘s survival of this
tragedy. This survival is narrowly framed as immediate reactions to the trauma site and
initial expressions of sympathy and unity suggesting that 9/11 was a contained historical
moment in our collective past. September 11th happened; it was mortally, materially, and
affectively devastating but now it is over and we survived. An underlying assumption of
this lesson is that 9/11 has no ties to the present—it was a lone incident of which the
victims and America was the innocent victim.
Having ―survival‖ as the historical lesson of 9/11 suggests that there was nothing
Americans could have done in the past, or should do in the future, to prevent this type of
tragedy; the best we can hope for is to get through it with pride and dignity. ―Reverence,‖
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Dickinson et al. (2006) assert, ―exercises a double articulation, evoking both a profound
sense of respect and a distanced, observational‖ orientation (28). Feelings of reverence
foster an appreciation of and attunement to the conditions of the 9/11 victims‘ deaths and
orients one towards September 11th without questioning what has happened in the past or
internationally that may have contributed to the creation of these conditions. Since
reverence is a sensation of awe and, in this case, melancholy, with a concurrent
recognition of human limitation, people feel reverence when facing something larger than
themselves that they ―believe lies outside [their] control—God, truth, justice, nature, even
death‖ (Woodruff 2001, 3).
To assert that visitors to Ground Zero should feel reverence for and enact
veneration of the victims and America implies that Americans should believe the events
of 9/11 were simply out of human control; both the September 11th deceased and
American citizens are blameless victims of the attacks. Given this, it becomes
disrespectful to raise questions about, or worse, implicate American politics and policy in
the events of September 11th because it would compromise America‘s and, by
implication, the victims‘ innocence. ―Respect,‖ according to Deem (2010), is not an ―apriori condition‖ of public conduct and discourse; it ―must be demanded, negotiated, and
delivered in and through argumentative interaction‖ (62). In other words, the parameters
of ―respectful‖ behavior is challenged and negotiated via claims to the normative
standards of legitimate and appropriate conduct given the conditions of an experience.
Thus, the TBM‘s appeals to respectful behavior at the WTC site are attempts to regulate
public conduct in order to shield Americans and victims‘ families and friends from any
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additional pain the disrespectful behavior of ―blaming‖ may cause them regardless of the
veracity or plausibility of the critical claim.
TBM proponents believed that the IFC museum experience would jeopardize the
innocence of America and 9/11 victims by promoting analysis and debate that could
potentially lead to acts of blame and denigration. That is, the experience of analytical
curiosity and critical thinking that the IFC founders were proposing for the museum was
considered risky because it could lead to questions about how American policy and
politics may have contributed to the conditions leading to September 11th. As one
supporter explains, ―The center intends to create a multimillion-dollar show-and-tell
emporium allegedly meant to celebrate ―freedom‖—but with no guarantees it won‘t
quickly degenerate into just one more bash-America venue‖ (―Now‖ 2005, 38).
Defaming America at this sacred place of national tragedy is illegitimate and
inappropriate conduct at Ground Zero because it would detract from the solemnity of a
sanctified site.35 As one proponent explained, ―Just as we do not see political rallies at
Arlington National Cemetery . . . or performing arts at Oklahoma City National
Memorial or debate at the Pearl Harbor Memorial, we should not see those activities . . .
at this sacred site‖ (―Now‖ 2005, 38).
This critique of the IFC is an appeal to reaffirm the dominant norms of respect
that traditionally regulate the public‘s conduct at sacred sites. The dominant norms of
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According to the TBM, the evening lecture series that would have been offered at the IFC is
considered especially susceptible to this type of inappropriate blaming behavior because of its ties to
―world-class universities‖ which are really just ―Petri dishes for subversive theorizing—the sort of
corrosive nonsense that may have a place on campus, but which has no business whatsoever at Ground
Zero‖ (―Promises‖ 2005, 28).
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respectful behavior at sacred sites are so prominent that on June 26, 2005, Pataki
implicitly supported the TBM by stepping in and issuing a warning to the IFC founders
and board. He asserted:
I view that memorial site as sacred grounds, akin to the beaches of Normandy or
Pearl Harbor, and we will not tolerate anything on that site that denigrates
America, denigrates New York or freedom, or denigrates the sacrifice or courage
that the heroes showed on Sept. 11th. (Lovett 2005, 8)
This warning has a regulatory function; critique is rejected out of ―respect for the
deceased‖ and thus, aids in the disciplining of the past by deeming it illegitimate and
inappropriate to problematize 9/11 at the site of the tragedy where it should ―naturally‖
be (re)collected in a reverent manner.
Once Pataki asserted that Ground Zero is indeed ―sacred ground‖ that necessitates
respectful conduct, the terms of the social controversy changes because the TBM‘s
emotion-based of reverence is given political and normative leverage. Feeling reverent at
the WTC site is the legitimate and appropriate result of affectively experiencing Ground
Zero. The legitimate and appropriate way to act respectfully behave here is not
demeaning America, New York, freedom, or the sacrifice and courage of the 9/11victims.
The TBM no longer needed to assert the legitimacy and propriety of their stance; rather
the onus is on IFC supporters who now had to prove the proposed museum is worthy of
this sacrosanct place.
IFC Supporters’ Rebuttal
Proponents of the IFC had been put in a difficult position during this social
controversy. The IFC, one of the winning proposals of a year-long, public competition for
a place at the WTC site, now had to defend its right to be there given the strict norms of
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respect now imposed upon them. To do so, IFC proponents would have to prove this
proposed museum is not only worthy of a spot at ground zero, but that this sacred ground
is the most legitimate and appropriate place for it. Since the IFC was on the defensive,
there is no specific objection/critique format that structured its proponents‘ stance and,
more importantly, they did not assert any one salient, overarching emotion-based claim.
Rather, IFC supporters shared one common belief and mission that drove their opposition
to the TBM‘s plea to evict this museum from Ground Zero. IFC supporters generally
believed that in response to 9/11, Americans should (re)collect the ideal of freedom that
underwrites our way of life as fitting tribute to the events of September 11th. They
asserted that the reaffirmation of an ideal of freedom at the site of this tragedy was a
means to end the type of hatred and intolerance that affectively undergird terrorism in
hopes of preventing these types of attacks in the future.
Based mostly in claims of refutation, the IFC‘s stance was three-fold. First, the
IFC has a logical, not artificial, connection to the WTC site. Second, although feelings of
reverence may be a ―natural‖ response to being at the WTC site, visitors‘ experiences do
not have to be strictly limited to it. Third, ―survival‖ is not the only lesson to be learned at
Ground Zero, there are a myriad of lessons to take away from 9/11 and the most
respectful thing visitors can do is learn as much as possible. For these reasons, IFC
proponents believe that the proposed museum is both worthy and respectful of this sacred
place.
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The Logical Connection
The inspiration for the IFC arose from President Bush‘s initial reaction to the
terror attacks of September 11th when he stated that, ―freedom and democracy [were]
under attack‖ that day (Bush 2001). Bernstein and Kunhardt, the IFC co-founders,
believed there was no better place for a museum of freedom than ―at the place where
freedom was so brutally challenged‖ (Dunlap 2005b, A1). A New York Times editorial
astutely captured the connection the IFC has to this sacred site by explaining that TBM
proponents questioned:
‗Why here?‘ Why imagine creating an institution that would celebrate freedom
and foster discussion of its meaning, and the meaning of 9/11, within the
memorial quadrant of ground zero? Wouldn‘t that dishonor the dead? We have
never thought so. We believe that the site is sacred to more than death. It is sacred
to life and to the principles—as well as the people—attacked there on Sept. 11,
2001. (―Keeping‖ 2005, 20)
For the IFC creators and supporters, creating a museum to the concept of freedom at the
WTC site is a logical response to 9/11 since terrorists attacked this country and what it
stands for, not specific individuals. Thus, we should honor both the victims and the
values that were assaulted here. ―Throughout our history,‖ as stated in the IFC‘s Content
and Governance Report (2005), ―freedom has been the engine driving the American
experience‖ making it deserving of recognition at Ground Zero (4). IFC creators believed
that a fitting tribute to the U.S. would celebrate difficult but ultimately triumphant
moments when individuals‘ freedoms were stripped away, sometimes brutally, provoking
them to ban together and fight for positive political change.
Creating an International Freedom Center at the WTC site also seemed like a
logical response to 9/11 considering that nearly 500 victims were from over 80 other
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countries and the attacks had and continue to have worldwide effects. Positioning
September 11th within a global context, therefore, was not thought to be revisionist
history. These attacks impacted countries throughout the world; its reverberations are still
felt in a myriad of ways—military actions, citizen revolts, economic downfalls, security
precautions, changes in media coverage, etc. Creating the IFC at Ground Zero
acknowledges that the U.S. is not a nation alone in the world but rather that our actions
and inactions have global significance, consequences, and implications. As Paula Grant
Berry, 9/11 widow and member of the IFC board, explained, the proposed museum ―will
look at 9/11 in the way 9/11 affected the world‖ (Pogrebin 2005b, E27).
The international framing of IFC is also reflective of its founders‘ belief that
―Freedom is essentially a universal quest,‖ and the museum ―ought to be representative of
the struggle of mankind [sic] rather than of one particular nation‖ (Pogrebin 2005a, E1).
IFC proponents assert that 9/11 is one such struggle, pitting the U.S. against the threat of
Islamic Fundamental terrorists. The proposed museum, then, can be considered a
legitimate and appropriate way to commemorate September 11th as well as promote
international freedom as the antithesis of global terrorism and other forms of tyranny and
injustice. As Bernstein explained, ―historically, if you look at the response to tyranny—in
our view, terror being a modern variant—the only response, and the necessary response,
and the crucial response is the reaffirmation of the values [i.e. freedom] that are under
assault‖ (Dunlap 2005c, M37). Consequently, the IFC was designed to engage visitors in
a museum experience that would galvanize them to develop or renew their commitment
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to the ideal of freedom specifically as a means to oppose ―tyranny, terror, and injustice‖
(IFC 2005, 4).
Only Reverence is Unnecessarily Limiting
IFC supporters did not refute the TBM‘s stance that reverence is a ―natural‖
affective response to experiencing this site. Rather, they argued visitors‘ experiences at
the WTC site need not be limited to reverence alone, this place can be open to other
affects, feelings, and emotions and it should be. Most people‘s experience of 9/11 was
not restricted to sensations of reverence, so our commemoration to September 11th should
be reflective of the breadth of this incident. Visitors may feel relief that 9/11 is in the
past, fear that it may again, sadness at the enormity of this loss, but also an appreciation
for life when faced of tragic death, love for the people they hold dear, curiosity about the
historical and global conditions that led to the attacks, inspired to make positive change
in their lives and the world, and even hope that it things can get better. If the experience
of being at Ground Zero has the potential to provoke all of these different affects,
feelings, and emotions, why should reverence be considered the only legitimate and
appropriate emotion to have there?
As a site of public memory, there is no reason to constrain the experience of the
WTC site to ―please a vocal group of people whose genuine grief has already taken on a
sharply political edge‖ (―Keeping‖ 2005, 20). Commemorating 9/11 at Ground Zero is a
collective endeavor and although the victims‘ families and friends were those most
immediately effected and affected by this tragedy, their experience alone should not
dictate how the public can feel while at this public memory site. For IFC supporters, this
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controversy is ―a battle to determine whether the area where the World Trade Center
towers once stood will become a vibrant tribute to the American spirit or a place of grief
only, a public cemetery with no possibility of renewal or regeneration and no vital
connection to the city around it‖ (―The Governor‘s‖ 2005, A14). Bernstein, one of the
IFC founders, believed that the museum could invigorate Ground Zero by creating an
experience that would be ―thought-provoking and produces a greater sense of reflection,
rather than something that creates a sense of veneration‖ (Pogrebin 2005a, E1).
Restricting visitors‘ experience to reverence alone chances losing an opportunity to turn
the WTC site into a place of global hope, inspiration, and curiosity.
When developing the proposal for the IFC, Bernstein explained, ―I had in my
mind‘s eye an institution like the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. I had seen
how profoundly it affected the people who visited it (Dunlap 2005c, M37). Together
Bernstein and his partner, Peter Kunhardt, designed the IFC with the explicit goal of
creating an intensely affective museum to engage its visitors in feelings of hope—a
sensation of desire for a specific, typically positive, outcome. They wanted ―the
International Freedom Center [to] help bring hope and resolve to a place of tragedy and
grief‖ (IFC 2005, 5). By presenting freedom as a narrative of hope, Bernstein and
Kunhardt believed visitors would feel inspired to join current struggles for social justice
and analytical curiosity about the social, cultural, and political conditions that lead to acts
of terrorism, tyranny, and oppression. To provoke these feelings, the IFC (2005) planned
to include ―exhibits [that] encourage an understanding of freedom, connect the events of
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September 11 to world history, and…show how, time and again, individuals have been
crucial to freedom‘s advance, and that the contributions of ordinary people matter‖ (7).
The Pedagogical Potential of the WTC Site
Envisioned as a pedagogical museum, the IFC would offer visitors insights into
current and historical struggles for freedom from oppression as well as celebrate the types
of freedom that underwrite democratic life. However, Bernstein explained, the IFC would
―emphasize questions rather than answers,‖ since ―[o]ur ambition is not to tell you what
to think, it‘s to make you think‖ (Pogrebin 2005b, E27). Visitors would be challenged to
critically reflect on the conditions that have lead to acts of injustice, oppression, and
terrorism. Doing so, IFC supporters believed, would help ―inspire an end to hatred,
ignorance and intolerance‖ via intercultural understanding (―Memo‖ 2005, 28). IFC
proponents argued that this museum would show honor and respect to America, New
York, freedom, and the 9/11 victims, by engaging visitors in a critical and reflective
experience that may help prevent future attacks. Lessons on heroism and survival do not
expand our understanding of the 9/11 attacks, they just reinforce a wound culture based
in feelings of victimhood. Rather, taking on a global orientation to September 11th would
offer visitors a means to widen and deepen their perspective on this tragedy that does not
solely focus on victimization. The IFC‘s stance suggests an attunement to and
appreciation for the conditions of other‘s struggles and oppression, not just the 9/11
victims alone. Visitors would learn from the commonality and differences between
current and historical plights of victimized individuals throughout the world. Surveying
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9/11 from this perspective may yield insights into the inner workings of injustice and
provide a means to aid in its reduction or, ideally, prevention.
The IFC‘s creators and board wanted visitors to learn from 9/11 not just learn
about it. As one proponent explained, ―We believe that the power of that site should be
used to consider what happened that day and to see what lessons we can derive from it,
not only to mourn the dead‖ (―Keeping‖ 2005, 20). Limiting the lessons learned from
September 11th to ideals of heroism and survival would make the WTC site a stagnant
place filled with well-worn lessons. Richard Tofel, president and CEO of the proposed
museum, believed that:
Short-term political correctness [should not snuff] out long-term vision. Instead of
a memorial site that ―stands the test of time‖ and offers a continuing meditation
on freedom's oft-threatened lifeline, [TBM supporters want] a 9/11 dead zone
with 9/11 in perpetual focus. Reverent, yes. Forever Relevant? [I suspect] not.
(Finn 2005, M2)
Supporters of the IFC believed they had the long-term vision necessary to keep Ground
Zero a vibrant and civically significant place. However, this opinion was not shared by
many and, in the end, the IFC would not be able to prove its potential relevance.
Framing the LMDC’s Deliberative Democratic Process as Incommensurate
During the IFC controversy, Mayor Bloomberg‘s stance was considered, by the
TBM supporters, as incommensurate with the conflict. As New York Times reporter
David Dunlap (2005b) noted, whenever Bloomberg was asked to comment on the
conflict over the IFC he always ―recalled the importance of the planning process‖ (A1).
Bloomberg believed that the deliberative democratic process that the LMDC had put in
place would produce the most reasonable decision regarding whether or not the IFC
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would be respectful enough for the WTC site. For Bloomberg, the decision of what
should or should not be housed at the WTC site should be the result of a deliberative
democratic process rather than decided by any one group of people or politicians. As a
site of a national trauma, Bloomberg asserted that the redevelopment of this site should
be guided by a collective democratic procedure.
For instance, after Pataki‘s warning to the IFC founders and board (which the
TBM urged), the LMDC requested a revamped report of the IFC‘s proposed
programming that would describe how the museum would not denigrate America, New
York, freedom, and the 9/11 victims. Instead of simply taking Pataki‘s vague warning as
a sign to oust the IFC, the LMDC wanted to give the museums‘ creators an opportunity to
explain how they could create an engaging museum experience and also guarantee the
center would not devolve into denigrating debates. On September 23, 2005, the creators
of the IFC presented the LMDC with a 49 page ―Content and Governance‖ report
outlining how they planned to create a museum experience that would provoke respectful
conduct in its visitors.
The legitimacy and propriety of this plan was to be deliberated on during the
LMDC‘s September 28th and 29th meetings. To assure the procedural fairness of these
deliberations, the LMDC released guidelines for public participation and hired Peter
Woodin, an attorney and former Deputy Special Master for the federal September 11th
Victims Compensation Fund, to mediate these meetings. As Bloomberg explained, he
personally found the IFC‘s placement problematic but ―It‘s up to the LMDC, in the end.
[Although] I would urge them, and I‘m certainly urging my members on the LMDC to
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read that report carefully and then discuss it and see if you can‘t come to some
resolution‖ (Gaskell 2005, M2). Unfortunately, the LMDC was never given the
opportunity to hold their deliberations.
The TBM refused to take part in the deliberations and felt that the addition of a
mediator was a ruse. They argued that:
. . . individual and collective members of the 9/11 family groups, along with
citizens from the Lower Manhattan community and other interested parties, have
been meeting in good faith at LMDC-sponsored forums for more than three
years…If anything, the LMDC has once again demonstrated that it does not
understand the difference between having meetings and actually listening to the
public. (TBM 2005b)
Frustrated about deliberation process, the TBM did not believe their concerns were being
listened to, implying a deep anxiety that the LMDC‘s deliberation process would result in
the IFC‘s creation at the WTC site. In an attempt to circumvent the LMDC‘s decisionmaking authority, the TBM campaign continually called upon Pataki to step in and police
this situation. This call was a rhetorical strategy to reposition Pataki as the ―real‖
authority, who needed to put an end to the LMDC‘s deliberative processes before they
could decide on the IFC‘s fate. For the TBM, it was time for Pataki to do the right thing
by evicting the IFC from the WTC site.
Pataki’s Decision
On September 28th Pataki did just that when he announced that he would not
allow the IFC to be housed at Ground Zero. This decision came just a few hours before
the LMDC‘s planned deliberations and consequently rendered their entire deliberative
democratic process a waste of government time and money. Former NY Senator Hillary
Rodham Clinton, former NY Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and NY Representatives Vito J.
126

Fossella, Peter T. King and John E. Sweeney all supported Pataki‘s decision. In a
statement, Pataki released these remarks:
Freedom should unify us. This center has not. Today there remains too much
opposition, too much controversy over the programming of the IFC and we must
move forward with our first priority, the creation of an inspiring memorial to pay
tribute to our lost loved ones and tell their stories to the world. (Colford 2005, 4)
Pataki had made it clear; the experience the IFC would create for visitors to embody
would provoke feelings and possible conduct that is illegitimate and inappropriate at the
WTC site because it breaches the dominant norms and conventions of respect at sacred
sites. Simply put, the IFC had no place at the WTC site.
When asked for his reaction to the IFC‘s eviction, Bloomberg explained,
―Although I understand Governor Pataki's decision, ‗I am disappointed that we were not
able to find a way to reconcile the freedoms we hold so dear with the sanctity of the site‘‖
(Dunlap 2005b, A1). Even though the LMDC offered their assistance in finding a new
space for the proposed museum, within forty-two minutes of Pataki‘s statement the IFC
founders responded by stating they would not move forward with the project. The TBM
supporters were elated; their emotion-based claim of reverence had prevailed ensuring
that ―all Americans who will be coming to the WTC [site]‖ will experience ―the story of
9/11 and that story only‖ which is an ―uplifting story of decency triumphing over
depravity‖ (Dunlap 2005b, A1). The success of the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of
reverence as an attempt to narrowly regulate how visitors should feel and conduct
themselves at Ground Zero is indicative in both Pataki‘s eventual eviction of the IFC and
the general lack of public backlash. The TBM had gotten their wish—the IFC was
deemed unworthy of a place at the Ground Zero, but what are the implications?
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Conclusion
In the IFC social controversy, the effectiveness of the TBM‘s emotion-based
claim of reverence could be attributed, in part, to their claims for the reaffirmation of
dominant norms rather than the subversion of them. The TBM‘s stance on reverence was
aligned with the dominant, and very rigid, norms of respect that guide the public
memorialization of sacred events and individuals. They called upon the public and
specifically former Governor Pataki to reinforce these norms, which support the
veneration of victims at sites of tragedy, by evicting the IFC from the WTC site. As
Deem (2010) explains, ―respect is performed and emerges in acts of public arguments . . .
[however,] We do not understand how it becomes defined, contested, and reclaimed‖
(62). This analysis has offered some insight into how this occurred in the IFC social
controversy. During this conflict, the public designation of Ground Zero as sacrosanct led
to the active policing of visitors‘ experience via the reinforcement of the rigid norms of
respect for and at sacred places.
When a tragic event becomes sacred, Fritch et al. (2006) found, ―The victims
must remain pure to keep the nation pure; they must remain innocent to keep the attacks
horrible‖ (201). Just the possibility that visitor may question how U.S.‘s politics and
policy could have contributed to the conditions leading to 9/11, rather than solely feeling
reverent and venerating America and the deceased, was believed to jeopardize the
cohesion of American society at a place that should create unity. Simply proposing an
experience that could potentially result in critical debate about September 11th made the
IFC and its supporters a risk, and, in turn, the museum was deemed unworthy of Ground
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Zero and in violation of the norms of respect. This disciplinary function rejects critical
thinking out of ―respect for the sacred‖ and thus, aids in the solidification of the past by
deeming it illegitimate and inappropriate to even potentially problematize 9/11 here.
When ―we confront something that is disrespect;‖ Deem (2010) asserts, ―we fail to see
that its meaning and effectivity must be understood in a larger context‖ (62). In this
controversy, the value of the IFC‘s mission and programming could not be appreciated by
TBM members and supporters due to IFC‘s narrow focus on 9/11 alone. The lack of
political and public support for the IFC suggests a lack of appreciation for international
conditions of oppression and injustice. Individuals did not want to be attuned to and
current and historical struggles for freedom here, implying that others‘ oppression is
unimportant when (re)collecting September 11th.
Considering the clarity and cohesiveness of the TBM‘s claim of reverence, the
IFC‘s lack of an equally salient and unified emotion-based claim to counter the campaign
made their case weaker and vulnerable to criticism. Although the IFC‘s creators wanted
to create an affective experience that would provoke feelings of hope, inspiration, and
curiosity, doing so would also created the opportunity for visitors to question and
possibly critique American politics and policy. Since the norms about sacred sites are so
well established, IFC supporters were at a disadvantage because they had to refute the
TBM‘s appeals for the reaffirmation of an already dominant norm as well as forward an
overarching emotion-based claim that would not subvert these norms. Furthermore, given
that the majority of the TBM‘s public supporters were the victims‘ families, friends, and
colleagues, there is an affective force to their claim of reverence that adds a sense of
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legitimacy their stance. During times of national tragedy the loss of life as well as the
pain and suffering of one‘s fellow citizens is made public, witnessing this can establish
feelings of empathy for the victim‘s loved ones and a desire to help ease their pain.
During this social controversy, the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of reverence and
the IFC supporters‘ refutations of it were embedded within different forms of attunement
and appreciation. For instance, support for Pataki‘s resolution of this conflict is indicative
of a stronger affective attunement to the TBM‘s claim of reverence based in an
appreciation for the conditions of familial grief and the blameless suffering of 9/11
victims. It is possible that the mediated coverage of the trauma of 9/11 oriented
individuals‘ to the 9/11 victims‘ families conditions of grief and galvanized their
attunement to and appreciation of the TBM‘s stance.36 In this way, the affectively
intensive and force of the 9/11 coverage may have led to a type of felt evidence that
supported the TBM‘s claim. As Meek (2010) states, when mediated (re)presentations of
(an)other‘s pain and suffering are powerfully salient and affecting, views can feel as if
they are virtually ―participating in [this] traumatic experience‖ (173). Views can
―participate‖ in this trauma by bearing witness to the other‘s pain which is not simply
watching or seeing, as Rentschler (2004) asserts, ―it is also a form of bodily and political
participation,‖ an affective engagement with the other‘s pain and suffering based on a
relation of empathetic imagining (298). Bearing witness to 9/11 creates an affect-based
civic relationship between the victims, their families, and friends and the larger U.S. and
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This suggests that affective attunement and appreciation is related to acts of judgment.
Judgment of a claim is influenced by how attuned one is to the conditions that undergird the argument and
rhetor as well as the extent to which he/she appreciates these conditions as evidence of the claim‘s validity.
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global viewing audience because we vicariously experienced their pain and felt their
suffering. With regard to this controversy, the empathy-driven connection created when
bearing witness orients the public to the affective conditions victims‘ families and could
enabling individuals to imagine how they would feel if someone wanted to address their
deceased loved ones in a critical manner at the site of their tragic death. The TBM‘s
emotion-based claim of reverence, then, gains a type of felt validity for people who bore
witness to September 11th.
The findings of this analysis, therefore, suggest that the success of the TBM‘s
affective objection and critique of the IFC was aided by the public‘s witnessing of the
events of 9/11. In the IFC social controversy, the empathetic imagining inherent in the act
of bearing witness may have galvanized individuals to support the TBM resulting in the
rigid regulation of the public‘s conduct and discourse at the WTC site. Bearing witness,
in this case, encouraged the creation of conservative norms and public policy, not just
progressive political change. Recognizing the potential issues this may cause, Rentschler
(2004) explains:
When citizens pay witness to acts of mass violence ‗against our own,‘ it also
helps define a national community of victims. The concept of witnessing as a
mass mediated, commemorative experience of others‘ suffering presumes on a
certain level that people should identify with victims and their suffering, and that
media representations should ideally capture images and narrative of suffering.
With victim-identified witnessing, there is no burden to understand the source of
violence and how to alleviate them. In fact, often the injunction to witness others‘
suffering, whether within or outside one‘s imagined community of citizens, can
be used to increase another group‘s suffering. (301)
Deeming reverence and the veneration of America and the deceased as the legitimate and
appropriate way to respectfully feel and act at Ground Zero commemorates more than the
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events of 9/11; it also memorializes the U.S.‘s collective victimhood. This is not to say
that empathetic imagining, inherent in the act of bearing witness, make it an insidious act;
an emotion that enables one to envision the pain of others and response in a
compassionate manner should not be condemned. However if acts of citizenship are
performed based on one‘s ability to empathically imagine another‘s pain and suffering,
what happens when we cannot or simply do not want to bear witness to the affective
conditions of (an)other‘s traumatic experience? Can we be attuned to or have the ability
to appreciate an individual‘s emotion-based claims and/or affective states—enough to
publically support him/her—when we do not empathetically experience the affective
conditions of the claim or state? If political decisions are influenced, even partially, by
one‘s ability to bear witness to the trauma of (an)other, than the relationship between
affect, witnessing trauma, and the norms of citizenship need to be explored in more
detail.
Lastly, even though dominant emotional scripts and norms were reaffirmed
during the IFC social controversy resulting in the strict regulation of public conduct, this
conflict should not be considered a false, or disingenuous, controversy. During false
controversies, Fritch et al. (2006) explain, ―the parameters of public discussion are
reinforced rather than redrawn‖ (194). They further state that false controversy ―does not
facilitate the open exchange of ideas, even in the face of uncertain outcomes, but, rather,
calcifies beliefs and practices and stifles alternate perspectives‖ (Fritch et al. 2006, 201).
The IFC social controversy, on the contrary, was an active public debate that did not
stifle dissent or discussion; rather it engaged citizens in a lively discourse regarding how
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visitors should collectively remember 9/11 at the WTC site. Unfortunately, the outcome
of this conflict was the enforcement of rigid restriction on public discourse and conduct
rather than the creation of more open, inclusive, and, most importantly, democratic norms
of respect and respectful behavior. That does not make the IFC social controversy false; it
makes it, in my opinion, disheartening.
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CHAPTER 4
THE LOI N* 2004-228 SOCIAL CONTROVERSY AND CENNET DOǦANY‘S
AFFECTIVE STATE OF DEFIANT COMPLIANCE
“To ask for recognition, or to offer it, is precisely not to ask for recognition for what one
already is. It is to solicit a becoming, to instigate a transformation, to petition the future
always in relation to the Other.” (Butler 2004, 44)
Introduction
The Islamic veil and hijab, the Islamic practice of modest dress, is deeply
imbricated in political debates and social controversies surrounding gender, culture,
religion, and citizenship (Ahmad 1992, 2005a, 2005b; Grace 2004; Lewis 1996;
Macdonald 2006; Mernissi 1991, 1992; Vivian 1999; Yeğenoğlu 1998).37 One such
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In this article, I use the terms ―veil,‖ ―headscarf,‖ and ―hijab,‖ interchangeablely. In France, the
equivalent term is foulard or voile; however since we considered this an ―American‖ analysis we have
chosen the former terms which are more dominant stateside. By these terms, I are referring to a type of
head covering that goes on top of one‘s head, hair, ears and neck but not necessarily an individual‘s face.
However, the term ―hijab,‖ is Arabic for Islamic modest dress, which ranges from simple head coverings as
mentioned above to face and full body coverage depending on region and religious sect. For an extensive
discussion on Islamic modest dress, including tips on purchasing and wearing all forms of hijab, see Saraji
Umm Zaid‘s website, How to Hijab: Your Comprehensive Guide to the Islamic Dress Code for Women and
Men, http://www.modernmuslima.com/hijabhow.htm. Zaid not only offers descriptions of each type of
covering (head, face, and body), she also identifies and explains the extensive variations in coverings
across regions and sects. For instance, another form of hijab, in addition to the veil, is the niqab, or face
veil, which covers the entire face with a small opening for the eyes. There is a type of face veil, the
boushiya, which also covers the eyes. Also, there is full body outer covering, which leaves various amounts
of flesh exposed, can include loose fitting dresses, sari-like wraps, skirts, tunics, and pants. Since
September 11th, the two types of head to toe coverings most frequently featured in U.S. media are the
chador (worn in Iran and Iraq) and the burq‘a (worn in Afghanistan and Pakistan). Also, Zaid describes the
often overlooked forms of modest dress for Islamic men.
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conflict ensued over the 2004 French law banning conspicuous religious attire in public
schools. On March 15, 2004, former President Jacques Chirac approved Article L141-5-1
of Loi n* 2004-228 for inclusion in the national Code de l’éducation. This law states, ―In
public school, colleges and universities, the wearing of signs or behaviors by which
pupils express openly a religious membership is prohibited‖ (Croucher 2008, 200).
Included in this national ban are Islamic veils and hijab, Sihk turbans, Jewish kippa (or
skull caps), and oversized Catholic crosses. More discreet symbols of one‘s conviction
such as ―small crosses, Muslim Hands of Fatima and Stars of David‖ are allowed
(Siemon-Neto 2003, n.p.). It only took just over three months for this controversial law to
be overwhelmingly passed by both houses of the French Parliament and approved by
Chirac.38
The longstanding social controversy regarding the legitimacy and propriety of
veiling in French public schools, specifically the creation and approval of the 2004 law,
have garnered substantial and insightful academic analysis (Allwood and Wadia 2009;
Bowen 2007; Choudhury 2007; Croucher 2006, 2008, 2009; Joppke 2009; Keaton 2006;
Volpp 2007; Winter 2008). This research has assessed proponents‘ stances on
interconnecting issues regarding the norms of laïcité, French Islamophobia, and the
conceptualizations of French citizenship that underwrite the controversy. Given the
thoroughness of this scholarship as well as the passionate tone of the conflict, it is
surprising the affective dimensions of the 2004 social controversy have been overlooked.
Therefore, this chapter offers an analysis of these dimensions by focusing on the
38

In France‘s lower house of Parliament this bill was passed by a margin of 494 to 36 with only
31 abstentions. Then, it was passed by the French Senate by another overwhelming margin, 274 to 20.
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oppositional affective states that infused the conflict; the proponents‘ stance is imbued
with fear and risk, whereas the opponents‘ stance is saturated with indignation.
Examination of these affective states, which underwrite the logic of the controversy,
offers insight into how proponents‘ fear of the potential risk hijab posed to the French
republic was ultimately justified despite the oppressed conditions the law creates for
veiled French-Islamic girls.
To capture the full range of the affective dimensions of the controversy, this
chapter will also include an examination of an incommensurate discourse offered by
Cennet Doǧanay‘s, a veiled French-Islamic student, which is irreducible to the pro/anti
dichotomous logic of this conflict. Cennet wanted to obey the law and observe hijab
rather than choose to acquiesce to or completely defy the law. In this section, her
affective state of defiant compliance will be analyzed as an embodied experiential
argument that attests to the harrowing felt conditions the law created for her as a veiled
French-Islamic girl. Frustrated yet determined to reconcile her Islamic belief in hijab with
the law, Cennet made the painful decision to shave her head as a means to unveil (so she
could stay at her school) but still not show her hair, which she believed was the spirit of
hijab. On October 1, 2004 when Cennet arrived at school and publicly unveiled her shorn
head, her affective state of defiant compliance became salient and made the doubly
oppressive experience and sensate-visceral impact this law can have on young, veiled
French-Islamic girls apprehendable. Audiences were invited to engage in this state as a
means to apprehend the intricacies of Cennet‘s affective experience and judge the
legitimacy and propriety of Loi n* 2004-228 from within it.
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The social controversy regarding Loi n* 2004-228 and Cennet‘s affective state of
defiant compliance as an irreducible response to it is a significant case study to analyze
how incommensurate stances function in relation of commensurate ones. Cennet‘s state
of defiant compliance poses questions regarding the options available to French-Islamic
girls who do not want to choose between their education and their veil and invites
audiences to apprehend the felt conditions of her experience to appreciate the skewed
―moral economy‖ which she lives within (Hauser 2000, 140). The extent to which the
conditions of Cennet‘s defiant compliance are apprehended can aid in the cultivation an
appreciation for the felt oppression of her lived experience under this ban and recognize it
as a manifestation of injustice which puts the legitimacy and propriety of the law into
question.
Since Cennet‘s objection was a more insulated incident, a number of diverse texts
were used to (re)create and analyze her affective state of defiant compliance. These texts
include 19 French, Turkish, and English newspaper, newswire, television transcripts and
magazine articles that feature stories about Cennet from October 1, 2004 to October 1,
2005, complied from a search on Lexis Nexis Academic. Cennet is of French and Turkish
descent; hence the focus on French and Turkish articles and these articles were translated
to English using Google Translate software. Additionally, institutional reports about
Cennet made by the Muslim Writers Alliance, the Islamic Human Rights Commission,
and AKDER Women‘s Rights Association Against Discrimination were also analyzed as
well as the website Islam Online which featured extensive coverage and interviews with
her.
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This critical reading of the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social
controversy and Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance begins, first, with some
background on the conditions that led to the controversy. Next, the affective dimensions
of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy is assessed, followed by a discussion of
Cennet‘s dilemma due to the law‘s implementation. Then, her affective state of defiant
compliance is analyzed as an embodied experiential argument regarding the oppressive
conditions of her experience that invites audiences to apprehend the moral economy of
her situation. Lastly, a brief examination of the public reports and responses to Cennet is
examined to address how the dichotomous stances of the controversy can obscure the
public‘s apprehension of her state as one of defiant compliance.
Conditions of the Controversy: Affairs, Malaise, and Laïcité
Prior to the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy and Cennet‘s affective response to
it, there had been a longstanding conflict regarding the legitimacy and propriety of
veiling in public schools. Goodnight (2005) asserts that long-term sustained social
controversies ―do not so much die out as become dormant, only to reappear in more
virulent form later‖ (27). New reiterations of longstanding conflicts do not simply consist
of the same claims repeated over again; rather stances can mutate over time since ―[t]he
focal issues of a period may shift‖ (Goodnight 2005, 27). Historically speaking, the
controversy surrounding the creation and approval of Loi n* 2004-228 is a reiteration of
the conflicts prompted by l’affaires du voile or headscarf affairs, in relation to the norms
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of laïcité.39 L’affaires du voile are individual cases of French-Islamic girls refusing
school officials‘ orders to unveil, typically resulting in court battles over their liberty of
conviction and the parameters of French citizenship. Each affair and court battle
prompted a new bout of this longstanding social controversy; thus, long before Cennet‘s
affective state of defiant compliance functioned as an embodied experiential argument
regarding her oppressed condition under this law, her body was intricately wound up
within this sustained conflict.
Prior to this legislation, the State Council‘s 1996 ruling declared that an outright
ban of religious attire in public schools was forbidden unless religious dress interfered
with a school‘s pedagogical mission either because it was used as a reason for
absenteeism, class disruption or as an act of ―pressure, provocation, propaganda or
proselytism‖ (Saas 2001, 454).40 This decree was enforced at the institutional level;
hence, each school‘s officials had the authority and flexibility to interpret, implement,
and discipline students in accordance to it at their discretion. This ruling remained intact
until a bevy of circumstances gradually led to a fundamental change in public opinion. In
2003, public and school officials argued that hijab in public schools is a ―basic challenge
to the State Council‖ because now, simply donning the veil was believed to be an act of
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Bowen (2007) gives thorough historical account of the original and subsequent ―headscarf
affairs‖ in his book Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves. The book is an investigation into the origins
of the seemingly fundamental disconnect between French culture and the Islamic practice of hijab.
40

Earlier attempts to ban veils in French public schools occurred in 1989, 1992 and 1996. Each of
these instances was prompted by headscarf affairs; however, until the current law the State Council 1996
ruling that ―the principle of secularism forbids any discrimination in access to education against pupils on
the basis of their religious convictions‖ remained law (Saas 2001, 453).
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proselytism (Bowen 2004, 96). Bowen (2007) argues that two recent l’affaires du voile,41
the 9/11 attacks, and, most importantly, a general feeling of malaise—sensations of
discomfort and unease—about the economic, social, and political state of the French
republic were all major factors that led to this change in public opinion and the proposed
of law.
Within public opinion, concerns over France‘s economic and political prowess
were tied to a perceived decline in the republican ideal of laïcité.42 Based in notions of
secularism and neutrality, laïcité refers to the need for a formal separation between
religion and politics to help ensure that state legislation and judicial rulings are based on
public order and not private conviction.43 ―In principle,‖ Croucher (2008) explains, ―this
concept insures the neutrality of the State towards religious affairs, and the neutrality of
the church in political/economic affairs‖ (26). As a ―bedrock principle‖ of French
citizenship and cultural identity, strict adherence to the norms of laïcité is considered
41

In 2002-2003, there were two high profile headscarf affairs that added to public and school
officials‘ insistence that a national ban needed to be created. These were: the 2002 teachers strike at Lycée
La Martinière Duchère in protest of a student‘s refusal to unveil and the 2003 expulsion of Lila and Alma
Levy. See Allwood and Wadia (2009) for a good overview of both cases.
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In response to the perceived adulteration of laïcité, former President Chirac created The
Independent Commission of Reflection on the Application of the Principle of Laïcité in the Republic to
assess the French public‘s views on laïcité and he appointed former education minister Bernard Staci
commission head; hence the nickname the Staci Commission. Even though the commission ―compiled its
report [from] the testimonies of some 120 people, including veiled women, heads of French parties, human
rights organization representatives, intellectuals, and writers,‖ none of its members were advocates of
veiling or could speak to the experience of veiled Islamic women (Yahmid 2003). The closest connection
the commission had to Islam was Muhammed Arkoun. Yet, another commission member later explained,
―It was unfortunate that there was no one with sensitivity about Islam. René Rémond had that for
Catholicism and Patrick Weil for Judaism; Muhammed Arkoun has no real ties with the Muslim
community, things have moved well beyond him‖ (Bowen 116).
43

The origin of the term laïcité dates back to the French Revolution of 1789 but it gained national
importance with the 1905 law ―mandating the separation between Church and State‖ which declares ―The
Republic neither recognizes, nor salaries, nor subsidizes any religion‖ (Croucher 2008, 28). See Croucher‘s
(2008) book Looking Beyond the Hijab for a thorough historical account of laïcité origins in France.
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―essential for a cohesive society,‖ and, consequently, national discord and weakness was
thought to be a sign of a decline in the enactment and public enforcement of it (Coq 2004,
25). Laïcité was also a driving force in the creation of a public education system as the
purveyor of both academic instruction and civic cultivation. To ensure the perpetuation of
the norms of laïcité, public schools were to teach students the central role this principle
plays in French society and citizenship.
Within mediated and political discourse, the connection between the adulation of
laïcité and veiling became fetishized whereas other possible causes, as well as solutions,
to the affective state of malaise such as issues of discrimination, poverty and the
substandard quality of urban schools, were quickly glossed over (Bowen 2007;
Choudhury 2007). Public schools where pinpointed as the first place adherence to the
principle, and the norms of laïcité were compromised and needed to be reaffirmed. As
Laurence and Vaisse (2005) explain, ―Schools lie at the very heart of French political
identity, and they are the first line of defense of laïcité‖ (164). Public and school officials
argued that a law completely banning hijab in public schools was needed at the national
level to ensure students were free from proselytism and France‘s young citizenry could
learn the value and norms of laïcité undiluted by religion.44 Former President Chirac
agreed and on December 11, 2003, he proposed a law not only banning Islamic veils and
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The discourse surrounding this law to ban conspicuous religious attire in French public schools
hegemonically constrains Muslims simply because they differ from dominant Christian religion. As
Moruzzi (1994) explains, ―When French intellectuals mount a defense of secular values, they are refusing
to acknowledge that their version of secularism allows for freedom of religious practice for one hegemonic
group-who go with their heads uncovered outside of a sacred space and pursue their community devotions
on Sunday-but not for others-who may believe that the head should always be covered and that the Sabbath
falls on Friday or Saturday. For members of those religious and cultural communities, French secularism
becomes an unequal religious prohibition, and hence a deeply felt political problem‖ (p. 665).
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hijab, but also other ―conspicuous‖ religious attire such as turbans, kippas, and oversized
crucifixes, in all public schools, universities and colleges (Croucher 2008).45
Even in its earliest conception the focus of this law has been hijab since veiled
French-Islamic girls were the largest population affected by this proposed legislation.46
Ironically, there was a discrepancy between the actual amount of French-Islamic girls
that were veiled and the perceived risk their presence in public schools posed to the
continuity of laïcité. Even though the 1996 Council‘s ruling supported students‘ choice to
display their religious and cultural affiliations, fewer and fewer students were actually
veiling after it was passed. According to the Ministry of the Interior, in 2003, only 1,254
Muslim girls attended public school veiled (Laurence and Vaisse 2005). This is a
significant decrease from the 2,000 veiled students reported in 1994 and only represents
less than 1% of all French-Muslim women (Laurence and Vaisse 2005). Keaton (2006)
found that:
Even more striking are the results of a survey reported by the newspaper Le
Monde which showed that 91 percent of teachers that they polled had never been
confronted by a ―veiled‖ student in the schools where they teach, while a reported
45

This law was adapted by the report given by the Staci Commission with suggestions on how to
(re)affirm the norms of laïcité in the republic. The ban was not the only suggestion made by the
commission, in fact, a total of twenty actions were offered; however, it was the only one that was made into
a law. For example, the commission also recommended that French public schools should observe some
Jewish and Muslim religious holidays and recommended that companies should adopt the same policy.
These recommendations were attempts to even out the structural inequality experienced by religious
minorities since the majority of France‘s public holidays are based on Roman Catholic celebration days.
The commission also recommended that ―the history of slavery, colonialism and de-colonialism,
immigration and religion be included in the curriculum‖ as well as programs to make it ―easier for children
to learn their parents‘ languages, such as Arabic and Kurdish‖ (Broughton, 2003). Yet, only one week after
this report was presented to former President Chirac on December 11, 2003, a bill was drafted which only
included the ban on conspicuous religious attire in French public schools. The other recommendations were
left behind and have not yet been revisited.
46

In France, the Muslim community is one of the largest minority populations over five million
strong; making Islam the second largest religious sect, Catholicism being the first.
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65 percent had never seen a ―veiled‖ girl in their class in their career. And yet, 76
percent of teachers polled favored the law banning ―ostensible‖ religious symbols.
(181)
While public and education officials asserted there was an intense need for a national ban
on veils and other conspicuous religious attire in public schools, the actual magnitude of
the issue (i.e., the number of students observing hijab) was continually decreasing.
Overview of the Affective Dimensions of the Social Controversy
The proposed law reignited the longstanding social controversy about veiling
once again. Oppositional, dichotomous stances on the law were taken and participants
from both sides appealed to differing norms of laïcité that informed their conflicting
conceptions of French citizenship and civic conduct. Laïcité, Joppke (2009) explains, ―is
marked by a tension between being a principle of rights and religious liberties and being
a principle of national unity and integration: both the defense and the rejection of the
Islamic headscarf could be done (and historically have been done) in [its] name‖ (33).
Pro-law supporters asserted the conceptualization of laïcité based in national unity and
integration; whereas their opponents argued that laïcité could and should support
citizens‘ rights and liberties by promoting public neutrality rather than secularity. Each
side asserted the legitimacy and propriety of their conceptualization of laïcité based on
claims saturated with conflicting affective states. During this controversy, the law
proponents‘ state of fear infuses their stance regarding the risk that veiling poses in
public schools and the law‘s opponents state of indignation grounds their stance that the
law is unjust. These states underwrite the argumentative logic of the controversy positing
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two different orientations towards hijab which are attuned to and appreciate different
form of French citizenship.
Pro-Law Stance
During the social controversy regarding Loi n* 2004-228, pro-law supporters
argued that veiling in public school posed an immediate and potential risk to France and
its citizenry which individuals should be fearful of. Banning the veil and other
conspicuous religious attire from school was necessary to preserve French national
identity and culture as well as keep its citizenry safe. Fear, as an affective state, is
experienced as sensations of anxiety which course through the body as one‘s senses
become more alert, breathing accelerates, and limbs are retracted; preparing the body to
(re)act when confronted by what is perceived as an imminent danger, risk, or threat.
When experiencing this affective state, the mind focuses sharply on what it considered
the source or object of fear to help attenuate one‘s physical and mental distress. The
emotion of fear ―is felt as an unpleasant form of intensity,‖ which Ahmed (2004)
explains, has a ―temporal dimension‖ because it is experienced in ―anticipation of hurt or
injury‖ not immediate pain (Ahmed 2004, 65). Fear prompts (re)actions based in the
impulse for self-preservation; to save oneself from that which poses a potential risk of
harm and/or pain.
The affective experience of risk, on the other hand, is the felt sensation of
vulnerability which provokes anxiety when exposed to instances of possible injury and
pain. Similar to fear, risk also has a temporal component; the affective state of risk is a
sensate-visceral experience infused with anxiety over what one imagines are potential
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dangers his/her is physically, mentally, and affectively left open to (Slovic 2010). Thus,
there is an interrelated relationship between the affective states of fear and risk.
Experiences of risk expose one to the possibility of pain which provokes states of fear;
feeling fear, in turn, can lead to a desire to remove oneself from the experience of risk as
a relief from the anxiety it provokes (Altheide 2010; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Lerner
et al. 2005; Staples 2000). From a national study on fear and risk, Lerner et al. (2011)
found that feelings of fear can lead to more pessimistic judgments about the force and
intensity of the experience of risk one is open to, especially in relation to potential acts of
terrorism. Furthermore, when the emotion of fear is either intentionally or naturally
primed in an individual, it can intensify existing feelings of being at risk and provoke
individuals to imaginatively expand upon the realm of potential dangers one is vulnerable
to. This priming of feat also can create a greater sensation of pressure galvanizing
individuals to relieve the feeling of risk.
Affective states of fear and risk can be experienced as diffuse moods at the
collective, not just individual, level which can be evoked in public discourse. Collective
states of fear, Ahmed (2004) explains, are ―concerned with the preservation not simply of
‗me,‘ but also ‗us,‘ or ‗what is,‘ or ‗life as we know it,‘ or even ‗life itself‘‖ (64). As a
galvanizing force of national preservation or security, rhetorical fear appeals can and
have been used to mobilize audiences into action as a means of protection. Altheide
(2010) argues, ―The prevalence of fear in public discourse can contribute to stances and
reactive social policies that promote state control and surveillance. Fear is a key element
in creating ‗the risk‘ society,‘ organized around communication oriented to policing,
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control, and prevention of risks‖ (261). Political action that is created and implemented in
(re)action to fear makes the affective economy, or politics, of fear more salient (Ahmed
2004). The affective economy of fear ―works to contain the bodies of others‖ as a means
to restrain or prevent the experience of risk (Ahmed 2004, 67). In other words, the object
of fear is rationalized as a national danger or risk which justifies actions to restrict,
contain, and/or control it. As Ahmed (2004) asserts, ―fear functions as a technology of
governance: the sovereign power either uses fear to make others consent to that power, or
civil society promises protection, and the elimination of fear, to ensure consent‖ (72).
Allowing French-Muslim girls to veil in public schools, proponents asserted,
would create an atmosphere of risk by jeopardizing: students‘ integration into French
culture, national cohesion and unity, student safety, and gender equality. Supporters of
the ban argued that donning the veil, as an icon of Islam, is a form of proselytism and a
sign of French-Islamists‘ girls unwillingness to embrace the Republic which subverts the
dominant norms of laïcité that promote integration within public schools (Appiah 2004;
Bowen 2007; Choudhury 2007; Thomas 2006; Vivian 1999). As former President Chirac
stated when proposing the ban, ―Wearing a veil, whether we want it or not, is a sort of
aggression that is difficult for us to accept‖ (quoted in Choudhury 2007, 199). For Chirac
and other law supporters, the sensate-visceral experience of veiling was so intense that
simply donning the hijab would create a state of aggression and act as a claim of hostility
toward French culture making the veil inherently anti-French. Thus, banning this
―aggression‖ within public school was for the ―greater good‖ of France to promote
national unity and integration via religious and cultural exclusion.
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Pro-law proponents argued that the ―French tradition explicitly rejects pluralism
as a public good‖ because it put the nation‘s cohesion and strength at risk (Carle 2004,
67). Dominant norms of laïcité, they assert, ―can ensure the separation of public and
private only by refraining from recognizing distinctive cultural and religious identities
within the public sphere‖ (Wievioka 2004, 29).47 From this integration perspective of
laïcité, citizenship and national identity is intimately bound to French culture; performing
one‘s citizenship depends, in part, on his/her willingness to both accept and enact French
as the national culture above all other cultural, ethnic and religious affiliations. The
experience of unity, then, was dependent on the sense of sight—all citizens had to ―look‖
French and publicly enact French customs giving the appearance of a unified nation. The
more multicultural and religiously diverse French identity appeared to be, law supporters
argued, the weaker and more vulnerable the nation became. Ahmed (2004) explains,
―Fear involves reading such [multicultural] openings as dangerous; the openness of the
[national] body to the world involves a sense of danger, which is anticipated as a future
pain or injury‖ (69). Hijab in public school, then, put national unity and security at risk
by making veiled students‘ Islamic identity more visually salient than their French
identity signifying their intentional resistance to the dominant norms of laïcité and
aggression towards the French government.

47

An important critique of laïcité proponents is that strict adherence to this ideal privileges
Christianity. Of the four types of religious attire addressed by the ban—the hijab, the turban, the kippa and
the crucifix—all are considered mandatory by their associated religious faith except the crucifix. As JeanArnold Clermont, president of the Protestant Federation of France explains, "people no longer wear huge
crosses so it is kind of hypocrisy to say that, of course, we are not against Jews or Muslims but against all
'conspicuous' signs" (Carle, 2004, p. 65). Therefore, Catholics are not truly affected by this law even
though this law purports to subordinate all religions to the republican value of secularism.
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School officials felt they had to mentally and physically protect ―pupils from the
pressures‖ of veiling since French public schools were considered ―the cradle of
democratic unity‖ (Bowen 2007, 96-7). As Weil (2004), a member of the Staci
Commission which researched the decline of laïcité and a pro-law supporter, explains:
It has become clear that in schools where some Muslim girls do wear the
headscarf and others do not, there is strong pressure on the latter to ―conform.‖
This daily pressure takes different forms, from insults to violence. In the view of
the (mostly male) aggressors, these girls are ‗bad Muslims,‘ ‗whores,‘ who should
follow the example of their sisters who respect Koranic prescriptions . . .
Furthermore, in the increasing number of schools where girls wear the [veil], a
clear majority of Muslim girls who do not wear the headscarf called for legal
protection and asked the commission to ban all public displays of religious belief.
(n.p.)
From this perspective, unveiled French-Muslim girls are innocent victims that are
consistently exposed to experiences of risk via the felt pressure to veil for religious and
safety reasons. Law proponents asserted that this pressure was so intense that simply the
presence of veiled girls put unveiled girls in danger of proselytism and verbal/physical
violence. Hijab wearing girls and Islamic boys were oppressors that French-Muslim girls
were pleading for protection from; pro-law supporters believed it was their duty to keep
these students safe and reduce their fear and risk of being bullied. Yet, French-Muslim
girls are not the only ones in danger; rather the entire French citizenry is at risk and the
public school system was the material site of this danger.
―[T]he defense of laïcité in public institutions, particularly in schools,‖ according
to Allwood and Wadia (2009), ―was presented by many pro-ban supporters as a means of
protecting French democracy against fanatical ideologies, namely Islamic
fundamentalism‖ (165). As Weil (2004) explains, ―The reason [for the ban] was plain:
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the wearing of a headscarf or the imposition of it on others is much more than an issue of
individual freedom: it has become a France-wide strategy pursued by fundamentalist
groups who use public schools as their battleground.‖ Framing ―public school‖ as a
―battleground‖ implies that there is a war between Islamic fundamentalism and French
national identity. A fear of what ―fundamentalists‖ would do to the larger French
citizenry, if they could terrorize young French-Muslim girls, implies a sense of moral and
mortal urgency. French citizens would be endangering themselves if they allowed girls to
continue veiling in public schools, since hijab was a ―France-wide strategy‖ used by
Islamic Fundamentalists plotting to infiltrate and occupy France.
From this perspective, veiling was not only an icon of Islamism; it also was an
embodiment of an intense and radically devout form of Islam that is closely connected to
fundamentalist sects. As one public school teacher explained, ―In its task of teaching
general rules, the secular school cannot tolerate having some adolescents voluntarily or
fearfully bending themselves to the fundamentalism of a community‖ (Graff et al. 2004,
37). To this teacher, and many others, hijab is not a sign of faith or cultural tradition, but
rather a political insignia of fundamentalism and a form of patriarchal oppression that
French-Muslim girls needed to be protected from. Former National Assembly speaker,
Jean-Louis Debre explained that ―what is at issue here is the clear affirmation that public
school is a place for learning and not militant activity‖ (―France Votes‖ 2004). The best
way to reaffirm this distinction, according to pro-law advocates, is pass a national law
prohibition hijab in public schools; otherwise, students as well as the entire French
citizenry will be exposed to the danger posed by Islamic Fundamentalists.
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Anti-Law Stance
Opponents of the law, not surprisingly, argued that this proposed legislation was a
blatant act of Islamophobia; a form of fear specifically oriented towards Islam. The
disproportionate effect the ban would have on veiled French-Islamic girls was ―proof of
barely concealed anti-Arab/Muslim racism‖ that ran rampant throughout France
(Allwood and Wadia 2009, 173). This stance is infused with an affective state of
indignation in (re)action to the fear that underwrites the law and in its supporters‘ stance.
The opposition‘s indignation was experienced in (re)action to three perceived injustices.
First, the law, as an act of Islamophobia, was unjust and would harm French-Islamic
women and girls. Second, imposition of this ban was an act of forced assimilation which
infringes students‘ liberty of conviction. Third, it is culturally insensitive and morally
wrong to assert that hijab is solely a sign of female oppression and patriarchal
dominance.
The affective state of indignation is experienced as a type of anger; a coursing
heat that surges through the body culminating in a sense of restlessness and intense focus
on what is cognitively recognized as a morally unjust act committed against oneself
(Dubreuil 2010). Feeling indignant typically provokes an urge to retaliate in response to
this perceived injustice. As an emotion, Hattam and Atkinson (2006) explain, indignation
is a righteous anger that is oriented ―towards the dominant forces that generate, inform,
and shape discrimination, dehumanization, and human misery‖ (697). For instance, one
reason critics of the law felt indignant was because public and school officials fixated on
―simplistic accounts of liberation and emancipation‖ to explain hijab which promotes a
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colonialist mentality and overlooks the rich array of cultural and religious reasons women
have for veiling (Moorti and Ross 2002, 267). Since indignation is felt in response to
perceived acts of injustice, the experience of indignation implies a belief in the legitimacy
and propriety of one‘s anger as the appropriate response to human and civil rights
violations (Macedo 2004). Prinz (2007) asserts that one generally feels indignation when
he/she bears witness to public officials‘ failure ―to take care of‖ their citizenry which is a
violation of societal norms of justice (69).
Opponents of the law argued that the intentional infringement of young citizen‘s
liberty of conviction in public schools was simply a means to attenuate the public‘s fear
of Fundamentalist Islam regardless of the pain and suffering the ban would clearly caused
veiled French-Islamic women and girls. Choudhury (2007) explains, ―opponents contest
the ban itself as an act of discrimination against a marginalized minority and as a law that
hurts the very people it claims to protect‖ (206). The law‘s opponents felt indignant about
the government‘s proposal for a national ban that violates the civil rights of its own
citizenry and scoffed at the claim that this unjust restriction would create a greater sense
of national unity. They argued that the ―law will stigmatize French Muslims and
exacerbate already fragile relations between religious and ethnic communities‖ (AbuRabia 2006, 101). A national ban would be an act of forced assimilation, not the seamless
integration of the Islamic population into the general population (Croucher 2008).
Creating a situation in which a minority is even further ostracized within the public
sphere would not lead to a more cohesive society but rather greater separation,
resentment, and an even more fractured citizenry.
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The law‘s opponents argued, ―[t]he French value of individual religious liberty
has . . . been superseded by the perceived threat to national sovereignty and the French
way of life‖ (Laurence and Vaisse 2005, 167). The injustice of this normative violation of
citizens‘ liberty of conviction evoked an affective state of indignation in critics‘ which
galvanized them to propose a change to the dominant norms of laïcité. Critics of the law,
Keaton (2006) explains, ―support an interpretation of laïcité as the school‘s neutrality
toward religious beliefs (therefore its equal respect for their expression)‖ and challenged
the legitimacy and propriety of a law that would add to the material and mental
oppression of its own citizens (177). Interpreting laïcité as a principle of individual rights
suggests a form of French citizenship that appreciates liberty, diversity, and social unity
based in tolerance. Whereas, supporting norms of laïcité based on integration justify the
denial of students‘ right to a public education and force them to sacrifice their conviction
in order to receive one.48
The anti-law stance asserted that ―French republicanism‘s emphasis on individual
liberty,‖ underwrites French-Muslim girls‘ right to choose whether or not they want to
veil in public schools; thus, choosing to veil is an enactment of, not an aggression
towards, French citizenship and culture (Beller 2004, 597). In other words, a girl‘s choice
to hijab (not the imposition of it) is ―a French thing to do‖ and consequently, supporting
that choice ―would [also] be a French thing to do‖ (Beller 2004, 597). On January 17,
2004, in cities across France over 20,000 Muslim women did just that as they protested
the law chanting ―Not our father, not our husbands, we chose the headscarf!‖ During

48

This is a fairly ―Americanized‖ understanding of citizenship considering that freedom is one of
our founding principles.
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these rallies, protesters‘ indignation was palpable as they ―embraced their simultaneous
identity as Muslims and French citizens by signing the Marseillaise, wearing headscarves
featuring the French tricolor, and waving their national identity cards‖ (Choudhury 2007,
204). For these women, being a French citizen entitled girls their liberty of conviction
and supported their right to veil, if they choose to do so. Denial of this right would be a
blatant manifestation of social injustice, making the law an illegitimate and inappropriate
piece of legislation.
Critics also argued that hijab is not a definitive sign of female oppression and the
proposed law glosses over the multitude of reasons women have for donning the veil. For
instance, it did not matter if girls veiled as: a refusal to be subjected to the male gaze,
liberation from westernized standards of beauty, an act of political resistance to
acculturation, an embodiment of religious beliefs in modesty, a sign of cultural pride and
tradition, or simply a fashion preference. According to the logic of the proposed law, all
that mattered was whether or not French-Muslim girls unveiled because they were a
threat to national unity and the public‘s safety. The anger and frustration caused by this
intentional reduction in meaning prompted one supporter to assert, ―It is absurd to expect
a Muslim girl to form a secularized, public identity at school and yet maintain an
unencumbered Muslim identity at home‖ (Carle 2004, 68). The law not only severs the
act of veiling from the intricate web of personal, political, cultural and religious reasons
women hijab, but, critics argued, it also forces a deep separation between their French
and Islamic identities. Simply put, opponents of the law believed there was no justifiable
reason to subject French-Islamic girls to this physically, mentally, and civilly oppressive
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ban. Recognition of this injustice provoked their affective state of indignation which
undergirded their oppositional stance. Yet, the majority of citizens and public officials
believed the oppression of this small group of students was justifiable because it was for
the greater good of the French republic. In this way, Ahmed (2004) explains, ―fear
work[ed] to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others” (69).
Epilogue to the Controversy
Despite the controversial nature of this proposed law, it was approved by both
houses of the French Parliament and former President Chirac in only three months.
Indeed, the law has been deemed legitimate, appropriate, and, ultimately, justified. The
dominant norms of laïcité as a principle of national secularism promoting national unity
was reified and allowed the government to deny students a public education if they
enacted their religious and cultural beliefs by wearing ―conspicuous‖ religious attire in
schools. This law rigidly regulated the public conduct of French-Islamic girls, FrenchSikh boys, and French-Jewish boys by completely banning veils, turbans, and kippa,
implying that donning these symbols signified their refusal to integrate into French
culture.
The approval of this law politically and affectively marks veiled French-Islamic
women and girls as ―fearsome‖ because they are ―a danger not only to one‘s self, but to‖
the French way of life which ―justif[ies] violence against‖ them (Ahmed 2004, 64). To be
appreciated as French citizens, these students would have to publicly sacrifice their
religious and cultural adherence to these beliefs and customs due to the potential risk they
posed. The approval of this law suggests that the injustice and harm to those immediately
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affected simply does not matter in the larger scheme of things; their oppression is a type
of collateral damage experienced for the greater good of the French republic. Veiled
French-Islamic girls, as the largest population impacted, have disproportionately felt the
brunt of this law. As Keaton (2006) explains:
. . . these girls are penalized for the politics of others, people who would sacrifice
the girls‘ education to their own beliefs, thereby reducing the girls‘ life chances in
a credential-driven society. Already, those in the outer cities receive a woefully
inadequate education, and it is only further compromised by this law. Moreover,
the law contributes to their stigmatization and social exclusion. (183)
The further material and social oppression of veiled French-Islamic girls is justified by
this law; legalizing the creation of oppressive conditions which they must live within in
their own country. Given that veiled schoolgirls are the individuals must immediately
affected by this law, it is surprising that during the controversy they did not have a strong
public voice in the conflict.
Both Tévanian (2005) as well as Allwood and Wadia (2009) found that during
this controversy the majority of the public discourse was produced by academics, writers,
politicians, and journalists whereas veiled students themselves as well as their families,
friends, and teachers received little to no media coverage or public representation.
Furthermore, the pro-law stance received a larger amount of print and airtime than the
law‘s opponents; 46% to 38% respectively (Allwood and Wadia 2009, 162). Concerns
over the affective conditions of veiled French-Islamic girls‘ experiences under this law
were largely ignored during the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy. Consequently,
Allwood and Wadia (2009) assert, ―questions about how schoolgirls affected by the ban
coped with isolation from their friends or with the difficulties of following distance155

learning courses, about how their classmates felt, or about the educational future of all
those affected directly or indirectly by the ban met with deafening silence‖ (162).
However, Cennet Doǧanay‘s affective state of defiance compliance can be
understood as a ―new reiteration‖ of this longstanding social controversy because it
―unsettle(s) the balances of [these] well-known paths of argument‖ by offering an
incommensurate, irreducible discourse as an alternative to the dominant pro/anti
framework (Goodnight 2005, 27). As an embodied experiential argument, Cennet‘s
affective state of defiant compliance makes the plight of veiled French-Islamic girls
apprehendable and recognizable as an experience of oppression which enabled audiences
to appreciate their conditions under this law as a manifestation of social injustice. The
conditions leading to this state offer insight into how Cennet‘s experience of this new law
galvanized her to shave her had as an embodiment of her feelings of defiant compliant.
Conditions of Cennet’s Shorn Response
The law first went into effect on September 2, 2004 and Cennet Doǧanay was a
15 year-old sophomore at the Lycee Louis-Pasteur de Strasbourg, a high school in a
northeast suburb of Paris. The ban posed a challenge for Cennet. She began veiling in
sixth grade out of her own conviction and desperately wanted to continue observing the
Islamic tradition she loved but she also wanted to remain at her school. ―This new law
broke my heart,‖ she explained, ―I was asked to choose between my religion and my
studies, between being myself and having a future. Why would the government do that‖
(Fouquet 2006, n.p.)? If she simply followed French law and unveiled, Cennet would
abandon part of her religious and cultural identity. As she stated, ―[m]y headscarf is my
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dignity, not just a piece of fabric. It‘s me‖ (Fouquet 2006, n.p.). Conversely, if Cennet
remained veiled she would have to leave her school and either go to school abroad, which
was financially impractical, or attend a publicly subsidized private, most likely Catholic,
school since in 2004 only one private Islamic school existed in all of France even though
two others were being developed (Bennhold 2008, A6). Cennet could not easily choose
one situation over another without either compromising her deeply held religious and
cultural beliefs or, at fifteen, changing schools and possibly moving away from her
family and friends.
Uncertain what to do, Cennet as well as approximately 639 French-Islamic girls,
arrived at their public schools veiled (Laurence and Vaisse 2005, 170). These girls were
not allowed to attend classes; instead veiled students began a mandated, individual
dialogue processes which ―precede[d] the enforcement of all disciplinary procedure‖
(Kramer 2004, 58). However, as the former education minister explained, ―this phase
[was] not, the rules make plain, a time for negotiation‖ (―A Hot‖ 2004, 43). These
―dialogues‖ were merely a means to facilitate the decision to either: unveil and stay; or
veil and make other schooling plans. By the end of the year out of the approximate 639
students that arrived veiled, 48 girls were expelled for hijab, 143 students ―voluntarily‖
left the national education system to be home schooled, and the rest, including Cennet,
unveiled (Laurence and Vaisse 2005, 171).
Cennet remained in dialogues for about one month and become desperate for a
resolution since, in her words, ―there was no time‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). She had wasted
an entire month, languishing alone in detention and she wanted to return to her classes.
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As her mother explained, Cennet was determined to find a way ―to go to school like
everyone else‖ (―Une lycéenne‖ 2004, n.p.; google translation). Reluctantly, Cennet did
what she felt she had to in order to continue her education at her school as well as honor
her country, her religion and her culture—she shaved her head. Cennet felt she had ―no
choice than what I did‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.); the sensate-visceral pressure imposed on
her by these doubly constricting conditions provoked an array of feelings—sadness,
frustration, desperation, anger, and resignation—which galvanized her to do the only
thing she believed appeased both French and Islamic law.
Cennet’s Affective State of Defiant Compliance
For Cennet, shaving her head was a means of survival; the only option available
to her given the rigid behavioral regulations established by the new law that narrowly
confined her lived experience to two undesirable choices. The oppressive sensations of
these conditions provoked a sense of defiance—the sensate-visceral experience of
frustration and contempt felt in response to imposed restrictions provoking intentional
and blatant resistive actions. Her defiance was oriented towards the French government
for imposing these harsh restrictions on her. But, she also felt compliant—the sensatevisceral experience of yielding to the felt pressure of an imposed restriction—given her
desire to stay at home and in her school. These combined conflicting sensations created
an affective state based on the conditions of an embodied contentious struggle; Cennet
gave her body over to the felt pressure imposed on her by the law while concurrently
resisting this pressure by refusing to fully concede to these restrictions.
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Affective States as Experiential Claims
On October 1, 2004, when Cennet publicly unveiled her shorn head, the intensity
of this experience made her affective state of defiant compliance salient and the
oppressive conditions of her situation apprehendable. As Cennet stated prior to unveiling,
―I will respect both French law and Muslim law by taking off what I have on my head
and not showing my hair‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). In the context of the controversy,
Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance functions as an experiential argument; it
raises questions regarding the legitimacy and propriety of the law given the distressing
and oppressive experience it created for her which lead to her disparaging decision to
shave her had as an act of ―survival.‖
When explicating how her affective state functions as an experiential claim, the
form this state culminates in effects the way the argument operates. In Cennet‘s case, her
defiant compliance is most salient as it culminates in her embodied act of publicly
unveiling her shorn head. The body can be a compelling conduit for affective states;
bringing to life the sensate-visceral experience of one‘s mood through the flesh while
placing it on display upon the surface of the skins (Butterworth 2008; DeLuca 1999;
Dolmage 2009; Hauser 1997, 1999, 2000, 2006; Hawhee 2006; McNaughton 2007;
Palczewski 1998, 2002; Pezzullo 2003; Ray 2007). As embodied experiential claims,
affective states act as a type of testimony based in an individual‘s sensate-visceral
enactment of his/her affective state which can illuminate the ―moral economy‖ this
experience is based within (Hauser 2000, 140).
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Affective states, as embodied experiential arguments, have a demonstrative
element to them; they create a bodily display of one‘s affective state as a sensate-visceral
enactment of the felt conditions that provoked this experience. In other words, one‘s
affective state both testifies to one‘s sensate-visceral experience and, simultaneous, is
evidence of the felt conditions that provoked it. If the conditions leading to an affective
state are to be apprehended, ―one needs to mount a convincing claim‖ testifying to the
sensual experience of it (McNaughton 2007, 142). Thus, the relationship between
embodied states and testimony is unique. Palczewski (2002) explains, ―A person‘s
testimony is not the same if repeated by another, and in the very testifying, speakers are
asking for others to assent not only to the claims, but also to their existence‖ (16).
Affective states as testimony attests not only to an individual‘s sensate-visceral
experience but also claims that there is political significance embedded within the
conditions of this experience which needs public recognition.
Like body rhetoric, embodied experiential claims are unconventional forms of
argument which tend to be used by marginalized individuals and groups that do not have
a strong public voice/presence (Fabj 1993; Delicath and DeLuca 2003; DeLuca 1999;
Hauser 1999, 2000; McNaughton 2007; Olson and Goodnight 1994). As testimony to the
oppressive conditions of one‘s experience, the public display of an affective state can
illuminate the ―moral economy‖ this unjust experience is based within (Hauser 2000,
140). Barker (2006) explains that a moral economy is ―a set of ethical assumptions
underpinning‖ acts of resistance towards dominant norms, law, and governing bodies
(21). Moral economies are ―negotiated, relational, dialogical, constructed, and
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reconstructed as part of an ongoing interaction between power and powerlessness‖
(Barker 2006, 21). For instance, Hauser (1997) argues that during hunger strikes:
The fasting body cannot force the authority to cave in, but [the] public display of
helplessness before a superior power presents itself as paradigmatic for the
society's moral economy. The strike focuses attention on seemingly misguided
values that would allow a person to perish rather than negotiate the complaint . . .
As the physical body diminishes its rhetorical incarnation grows until it is
massive, touching the conscience of ever enlarging circles of society . . .
demand[ing] the authority must act. (251)
Apprehension of one‘s affective state as indicative of a skewed moral economy, assumes
that audiences would deem this embodied experiential claim of injustice legitimate and
appropriate given the society‘s ethical assumptions and norms of justice. Farrell (2006)
explains that ―the anticipated response‖ to the moral economy of one‘s affective state
―required a ‗right appreciation‘ for the suffering‖ that is experienced (81). Empathetic
engagement in a rhetor‘s affective state can help cultivate the ―right‖ appreciation for it
as indicative of a skewed moral economy. From within these states, audiences judge
whether or not an experience is just based upon the force and intensity of risk, blame, and
oppression felt. In other words, these judgments take into consideration how severe the
risk felt, how culpable the victim was for this experience, and how intense the oppression
felt.
Cennet’s Defiant Compliance as an Embodied Experiential Claim
At first, Cennet, like several girls, attempted to appease both French and Islamic
law by wearing a large beret instead of her veil. She explained, ―I felt like I was
dishonoring my religion, but it seemed to be a good compromise‖ (Fouquet 2006, n.p.).
For Cennet, wearing a beret was a form of unveiling because it is not a traditional or
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religiously sanctioned form of hijab. She hoped wearing a beret instead of her veil would
be an acceptable enactment of the law since technically she unveiled. Unfortunately,
berets and other head-coverings were deemed illegitimate and inappropriate behavior for
French-Islamic girls; yet, non-Muslim students were allowed to wear them (IHRC 2005).
For school officials, wearing a non-Islamic style headcovering (i.e. beret, bandanna, etc.)
was not appreciated as an experience of compromise for girls of Muslim heritage because
covering one‘s Muslim head is only recognized as a sensate-visceral enactment of hijab,
even though from an Islamic perspective it was not.
This situation left Cennet feeling discouraged and desperate. She could not cover
her head at all since any piece of clothing would be interpreted as hijab. This left her only
one option if she wanted to comply with the law and still observe hijab—shaving her
head. French law imposed restrictions on her behavior pressuring her to unveil and her
own conviction in Islam obligated her to refrain from publicly displaying her hair; being
bald was the only rational way she could fulfill her duties as a French citizen and an
Islamist. As Cennet explained, ―Hijab for me is a religious obligation; it‘s a dress of
honor and dignity‖ Cennet explains, ―If I have shaved my head as I did, that was I do not
have any other solution to go to my school. I prefer to shave my head than to commit a
sin‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). For Cennet, shaving her head was the only practical answer to
her quandary; it was not what she wanted but rather something she felt she had to do
given the restrictions forcibly put upon her behavior and experience via the law and selfimposed as part of her faith.

162

Cennet‘s defiant compliance does not easily fit within the oppositional logic of
the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy; she does not simply acquiesce to law
proponents‘ fear of hijab, nor does she fully defy the law out of indignation. As she
stated, ―[w]hat I did was not to protest the hijab ban but to look for a quick solution to go
to the school‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). Being bald was not intended to be a sensate-visceral
enactment of an affective state of indignant protest but rather defiant compliance which
galvanized her to shave her hair as an act of mental and physical survival given the
increasing disparate conditions of her experience after the law was implemented. Cennet
believed, ―In Islam, your actions depend on your intentions I, myself, would like to ask a
question: Is it permissible in Islam, for a girl, to show her hair?!! I have no choice than
what I did‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). For Cennet, a sensate-visceral enactment of indignant
protest would have galvanized her to remaining veiled until she was expelled but she did
not do this. On the other hand, complete acquiescence would have culminated in her
unveiling without shaving her hair. Instead, publicly unveiling her shorn head is as an
enactment of her defiant compliance functions as a form of uncivil obedience. She
adheres to the legal restrictions imposed upon her conduct by unveiling, but she does so
in manner that subverts the dominant norms of French civility inherent within the act of
publicly displaying her female shorn head.
In France, the female shorn head carries multiple traces of punishment and
suffering from World War II. Shortly after the German occupation of France, women
who were thought to have politically or sexually corroborated with German troops were
publicly shorn as punishment (Virgili 2002). The public display of Cennet‘s female shorn
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head, then, is reminiscent of this sexed form of punishment and inscribes her sensatevisceral enactment of defiant compliance with a historical context of civil norms of
conduct regarding insubordination. Simply put, French women behave uncivilly when
they corroborate with dangerous enemies that pose a risk to the nation. During WWII,
this meant providing intelligence to or having sex with German soldiers. In Cennet‘s
case, it meant being unwilling to completely acquiesce to the ban for the greater good of
the French republic. Indicative of her sexed punishment for uncivil behavior, Cennet‘s
shorn female head signifies her insubordination but also is a sensate-visceral enactment
of the punishment she feels she is being made to live through.
The Skewed Moral Economy of the Law
Empathetically engaging in or positively (re)acting to Cennet affective state of
defiant compliance illuminates the skewed moral economy created by the new law and
cultivates an appreciation for her experience as a form of social injustice. Cennet was
―severely sad‖ as her ―tresses fell in the ground,‖ but she also felt numb having ―prepared
[her]self, for this moment‖ (Doǧanay 2004, n.p.). Regardless of how heartbroken she felt,
she believed this was the correct decision for her. Cennet explained that, ―Shaving my
head was the most powerful thing I‘ve ever done. It was like transforming myself. I felt I
grew up more on that day than I had in all the years before‖ (Fouquet 2006, n.p.). Cutting
off her hair was a profoundly affective experience for Cennet. This was not the rebellious
whim of a fifteen year old, this was deeply significant act. As a sign of femininity and
sexuality, a woman‘s hair can be used to both gain and resist power (Weitz 2001). Cennet
understood that shaving her head was literally and figuratively a sign of the intensity of
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her resolve to appease both French and Islamic law and relieve the pressure imposed
upon her by both.
By embodying the limited space left open between French and Islamic law,
Cennet sensate-visceral enactment of defiant compliance displayed the respect she
afforded French government while concurrently showing how the state did not appreciate
her distressing position. As she unveiled, the affective state of Cennet‘s felt experience—
the internal and external struggles she fought due to this law—became as salient as her
bald head. Her face was resigned but earnest, her eyes sad but no tears, her tone intense
but not aggressive. A mixture of shock, sadness, anger, disgust, and indifference
collectively pervaded the scene. Empathetic engagement could evoke sadness or anger in
response this vicarious experience of her defiant compliance. The felt experience of
Cennet‘s affective state could make her oppressive conditions under this law
apprehendable; the injustice of her situation could be felt and judged accordingly. The
defiant compliance Cennet experienced while publicly unveiling her shorn head
illuminated the skewed moral economy this law creates by valuing one group‘s fear of a
potential risk, more than the immediate oppression and injustice of others. In the
polarizing struggle of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, Cennet‘s affective state of
defiant compliance exists between the fear and indignation that underwrite the conflict.
Within this moral economy Cennet, as a veiled French-Islamic girl, had to sacrifice
something, in this case her hair, if she wanted to enjoy the benefits of French citizenship
without also forsaking her Islamic convictions.
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Although Cennet‘s parents empathetically engaged in her affective experience,
they did not share her resolve; they experienced shock and horror in (re)action to
Cennet‘s act of defiant compliance, and anger at the government for creating the unjust
conditions their daughter had to live within. They could not stand watching their daughter
suffer like this. As Cennet explains, ―I wandered into the kitchen with my head halfshaved and asked my mother for help. She burst into surprised tears and couldn‘t. My dad
came to help. I could tell it was painful for him to see what I‘d done‖ (Fouquet 2006,
n.p.). Cennet‘s mother, Meryem, found her ―shaved hair . . . horrible,‖ and her father was
outraged but the situation (Ternisien, 2004, n.p.). Her parents were well aware of the
stigma of female baldness as ―unsightly and shameful,‖ indicative of an extreme rejection
of the feminine norms of beauty and unstable behavior (Weitz 2004, 136). For Meryem,
Cennet‘s shorn head also reminded her of another group of people persecuted for their
religious and cultural convictions.
The iconography of the oppressed shaven head also carries traces of Jewish
concentration camps where men and women were shorn upon arrival. Her (re)collection
of shorn Jewish prisoners plagued Meryem, who feared how others would treat Cennet.
Meryem explained, ―I did not prevent Cennet . . . but later my heart broke when I
remembered how the Nazis treated the bare-headed women, Jewish women and others
during the World War II‖ (Yahmid 2004, n.p.). Like these Jewish ―bare-headed women,‖
Cennet baldness also signifies distress caused by her religious and cultural convictions.
Her shaven head bears the trace of shorn concentration camp survivors and Holocaust
victims whose suffering is, in many ways, an exemplar of injustice and suffering.
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Indelible connotation of innocence, risk, and oppression are embedded within the image
of the shaven heads and ravaged bodies of these victims and survivors. In this way,
Cennet‘s shorn head is a sign of a horribly askew moral economy in which she is an
innocent victim of a national power that has oppressed French-Islam girls by making
them vulnerable to the mentally and physically distressing conditions of the new law.
Cennet‘s father, Hikmet Doǧanay, on the other hand, felt anger and indignation as
a (re)action to Cennet‘s affective experience. Consequently, he contacted the media and
informed them of his daughter‘s actions and her plan to publicly unveil at school on
October 1st. Hikmet wanted the public to recognize what Cennet was ―compelled to do to
be able to study‖ (Galpi 2004, n.p.). Hikmet appreciated Cennet‘s experience as the result
of unjust oppressive conditions that should be recognized as such by the government and
the public. Empathetically engaging in Cennet‘s defiant compliance, Hikmet
apprehended the intense pressure she felt that galvanized her actions. He appreciated
Cennet‘s shorn head as an act of survive within a skewed moral economy that knowingly
makes young girls suffer simply out of fear of the perceived risk they pose to the
republic.
Publicly Apprehending and Perceiving Cennet
In Cennet Doǧany‘s case, her shorn response to the law did not overturn the ban
but her affective state of defiant compliance did offer some insight into France‘s skewed
moral economy that makes French-Islamic girls choose between public education and
hijab, between French and Islamic culture. The experience of Cennet‘s affective state was
empathetically engaged by some. Her story was featured by the Muslim Writers Alliance
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in their series ―Muslim Women Making History,‖ the Islamic Human Rights
Commission, and AKDER Women‘s Rights Association Against Discrimination. Cennet
also spoke on behalf of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and shared her struggles
with the law as a veiled French-Islamic girl. Yet, the framing of Cennet‘s affective state
within the public discourse highlights how her unveiled shorn head ―seen‖ through the
dichotomous lens of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy. This forecloses one‘s ability
to apprehend the conditions of Cennet‘s defiant compliance and the recognition of the act
of shaving her head as an act of survival and sensate-visceral testament to her oppressive
experience under the law.
There have been several attempts to reframe Cennet‘s actions as protest (i.e.
indignant resistance of the ban), as well as manipulation at the hand of Islamic extremists.
These two interpretations suggest that Cennet‘s defiant compliance is ―seen‖ within the
dichotomy of acquiescence/resistance to the law rather than understood as a sensatevisceral enactment of survival under it. Several Muslim newspapers, websites, and
newswires including the Iran Daily, Islam Online, HaberVitrini.com, Haber 7, and the
Ihlas News Agency, depicted Cennet‘s actions as an act of protest indicative of her
resistance of the law (―Cennet‖ 2005, Dökümü 2004, ―Fransa‖ 2005, ―French Muslim‖
2004). This framing implies that the image of publicly unveiling a shorn head has the
appearance of indignation signifying one‘s act of resistance to the law. However, this
interpretation overlooks how her actions ultimately comply with the French law and
brush over her desire to reconcile her French citizenship with her Islamic religion.
Although this framing appreciates her experience as a testament to the unjust conditions
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imposed upon veiled French-Islamic girls, it does not apprehend how the immediate risk
of her situation makes her shorn head an act of survival not just resistance.
Conversely, on the French TV show Let’s Be Direct, the host Emmanuel Chain
concluded Cennet had been manipulated by Dr. Milcent, a fundamentalist Islamic leader,
to shave her head in protest. The combination of Cennet‘s words and action were
perceived as evidence of devious manipulation that the public should be fearful of. Chain
argued that no fifteen year old girl could have thought of this on her own, and thus, she
must have been manipulated by a radical fundamentalist to do it (Galpi 2004, n.p.). Two
days later this same conclusion was reached on another TV show, Arret Dur Images.
Interestingly, this framing implies that Cennet‘s discursive claim about respect in
conjunction with her logical decision to shave her head is a sophisticated objection to the
law. In fact, the appearance of her action is so advanced that it created an experience of
cognitive dissonance for law supporters and the only logical explanation, within the
context of the Loi n* 2004-2008 social controversy, is that Cennet was a pawn in the
maleficent plan of a radical fundamentalist. To consider her claim from any other
perspective, especially the apprehension of her felt oppressive experience as a means to
appease both French and Islamic law, would jeopardize the affective logic of the pro-law
stance and the justification for the law, offering no relief from the intense sensations of
risk law supporters felt. Rather, perceiving Cennet‘s shorn solution as indicative of
radical manipulation adds further justification for the law and the restrictions on hijab as
a means to contain the experience of risk created by the perceived threat of Islamic
Fundamentalism. In these situations, the conditions of Cennet‘s defiant compliance are
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not apprehended or appreciated as she experienced them, rather she is perceived within
the confines of the controversy‘s logic of indignation and fear.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social
controversy and Cennet Doǧanay‘s affective response to it. During this controversy the
oppositional stances of ―pro‖ and ―anti‖ the law were infused by the affective states of
fear of the potential risk veiling in public schools posed to the French citizenry and
republic and, conversely, indignation at the blatant injustice of this law. The affective
states imbued in these stances underwrote the argumentative logic of the controversy.
Ultimately, the law was passed justifying the law proponent‘s fear and legitimating the
immediate oppression of veiled French-Islamic girls as an appropriate way to ensure
public unity and safety. This was not, however, the end of the longstanding social
controversy regarding veiling in public schools. Cennet‘s affective state of defiant
compliance was analyzed as a new reiteration of this controversy that asserted an
incommensurate stance to the logic of fear and indignation.
Within this controversy, Cennet‘s defiant compliance which was made salient in
her act of publicly unveiling her shorn head functioned as an embodied experiential
argument that attested to the unjust conditions the law imposed upon her. Apprehension
of the state and the conditions that provoked it could enable audiences to appreciate
Cennet‘s shorn head as act of survival given this harsh experience. Empathetically
engaging this state illuminates the skewed moral economy created by this law which
values citizens‘ attenuation of fear and risk more than the veiled schoolgirls‘ liberty of
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conviction and freedom from oppression. Unfortunately, the unjust conditions that
provoked Cennet‘s state of defiant compliance were not always apprehended. Public
responses to Cennet‘s shorn head signal the perception, not apprehension, of her affective
state which mirrors the oppositional stances taken during the controversy.
In these cases, the act of shaving her head was either indicative of Cennet‘s
indignant protest as a means to resist the law or devious manipulation that the public
should be fearful of. Thus, even though this chapter celebrates the possibility of political
transformation rooted in affective states as embodied experiential arguments, it also
recognizes the ease with which the apprehension and appreciation of these states can be
constrained by dominant, overarching oppositional stances especially when the rhetor‘s
body is inscribed within longstanding social controversies. Regardless of how
immediately effective, rhetorically and affectively compelling, and politically significant
Cennet‘s response was—she was able to return to her classes, her story was circulated
worldwide by major news outlets, and she became a spokeswoman for Islamic human
rights and religious tolerance—the ban remains intact. Seven years later, veiled FrenchIslamic girls still face the same oppressive conditions they did in 2004.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AFFECT, CONDUCT, RISK, AND CITIZENSHIP
Introduction
During social controversy, the norms guiding public life can be negotiated,
reaffirmed, negated, and/or transformed. This can lead to progressive political, cultural,
and/or social change in some instances, while establishing or reifying conservative and
even oppressive norms, practices, and laws in others. In an attempt to understand how
and why this happened, Olson and Goodnight (1994) developed a theory of social
controversy that focuses on political, cultural, and ideological aspects of conflict to
address differences in the oppositional stances of participants. This critical analysis of
social controversy highlights the argumentative practices and techniques that are used
when individuals object to dominant norms and conventions via appeals to normative
standards of legitimacy and propriety as well as when they propose alternatives to
existing norms. Examination of these conflicts offers insight into how public discourse is
regulated and what implications this has for issues of inclusion and exclusion in germane
publics.
Building upon this conceptual foundation, this dissertation argues that scholars
should analyze the role affect plays in social controversy as a means to address how these
conflicts impact the regulation of public conduct as well as discourse. In this project, the
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rhetorical and argumentative significance of the affective dimensions of social
controversy have been conceptualized and analyzed via an examination of emotion-based
claims and affective states that have become salient, discernable and/or apprehendable
during specific public disagreements. Such a conceptualization demonstrates that critical
insights can be gained by focusing on the controversy‘s affective dimensions. To
highlight the importance of the study of affect in social controversy as well as better
understand the larger critical significance affect theory has for rhetorical and
argumentation studies, this final chapter addresses three overarching insights and findings
from this dissertation that have implications for future work in the field of controversy.
This dissertation posed two overarching research questions guiding the
development of the theoretical and methodological framework used for this project as
well as the analysis of each case study. The first question aimed to answer how
considering affect extends and contributes to our understanding of the nature and
significance of social controversy. Specifically, this project analyzed how the affective
dimensions of social controversies emerge and what findings critical analysis of these
dimensions would offer with regard to the presumptions underwriting dominant norms
and conventions that regulate public life. The discussion about the regulation of public
conduct as well as risk and vulnerability are explicated in response to this question.
The second research question driving this dissertation asked what an analysis of
these dimensions tells us about relationship between affect and citizenship. In other
words, how is citizenship increasingly being shaped by norms and conventions of affect
and what are the implications of doing so? Specifically, what figures of the citizen are
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articulated in affective states and emotion-based claims and how do these dimensions
serve as sites of ethico-political pedagogy? The final section on affect, citizenship, and
empathetic engagement addresses this second research question.
The Regulation of Public Conduct
The first major insight from this project is that an analysis of the affective
dimensions of social controversy addresses the regulation of public conduct as well as
public discourse. As mentioned in chapter one, more traditional social controversy
criticism enables scholars to assess the procedural aspects of public discourse and results
in findings about the identities, locution, substance, and forums that are deemed
legitimate and appropriate throughout the process. As Wilson (1995) explains, analysis of
social controversy reveals ―a culture‘s rules and presumptions on who gets to talk, what
counts as proof, whose language is authoritative, and what norms . . . govern decisions‖
(204). Examining the affective dimensions of social controversy offers insight into these
regulatory parameters and also allows researchers to analyze how aspects of participants‘
affects, feelings, emotions, and conduct are managed, controlled, and privileged during
these conflicts.
Emotion-based claims and affective states pose arguments regarding the
legitimacy and propriety of one‘s experience of affects, feelings, and emotions at given
sites and in specific scenarios as well as the types of conduct this experience should
produce. Analysis of these arguments take into account their force, intensity, and logic
enabling scholars to identify whom and what these claims orient audiences towards,
attune them to, and help them appreciate. Hence, examination of the affective dimensions
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of social controversy allow critics to assess the relationship between affect and the
dominant communicative norms and conventions that are at issue in the conflict to
analyze how its resolution impacts the regulation of public conduct within given
situations.
For instance, these norms address how we should feel and conduct ourselves at
public sites; what types of cultural and religious conduct should be allowed in public
schools; how we should or should not feel in relation to certain controversial actions and
events. Assessment of the affective dimensions of social controversy enables critics to
identify whose affective experiences are privileged when judging a claim. Additionally,
this analysis offers insights into what affective and emotional logics underwrite
controversies and what impact these logics have when attempting to apprehend affective
experiences considered illegitimate, inappropriate, or irreducible to dichotomous stances.
Analysis of the affective dimensions of the Abu Ghraib social controversy
focused on claims regarding what the legitimate and appropriate felt response to the
leaked photos should be. Affective objections, such as Sontag‘s and Previtera‘s, not only
focused on the abuse and torture depicted in the Abu Ghraib images but also the soldiers‘
affective state of pleasure at causing their prisoners‘ pain which is captured in the photos.
For instance, Sontag‘s emotion-based claim of shame asserts that these images are
indicative of America‘s ―culture of shamelessness‖ which she believes underwrites the
soldiers‘ actions and provoked them to visually document it. Sontag is dismayed by the
affective conditions that brought about the soldiers‘ experience of pleasure when
torturing and abusing their Arab prisoners as well as the creation of the photos as trophy
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pieces, evidencing the soldiers‘ pride at what they had accomplished (i.e., the prisoners
pain and suffering). Simply put, the soldiers‘ shamelessness and the actions it enabled are
not anomalies—they are affectively cultivated by U.S. culture.
For Sontag, the fact that the images were intentionally taken and circulated to
soldiers‘ families and friends cannot, and should not, be separated from the horrific acts
they depicted. Her objection is an appeal to the norms of liberal democracy—it is
illegitimate and inappropriate for democratic citizens to experience shamelessness at
feeling pleasure by causing our prisoners‘ pain. Those that affectively objected to the
photos believe there should be stronger regulations on public conduct imposed by both
the self and the U.S. government. In other words, the norms of democracy should dictate
that individuals and the State feel shame at the soldiers‘ actions, take responsibility for
the culture that bred them, and change the U.S. governmental policies that helped
cultivate the soldiers‘ behavior. Feeling shame at the soldiers‘ joyful acts of abuse and
torture and the images that capture it is what U.S. democratic citizens should experience
when bearing witness to the photos and our governmental actions should reflect that by
outlawing this behavior, not provoking or permitting it.
The eventual court marshal and conviction of eleven soldiers, the majority of
whom were the low ranking officers depicted in the images, does suggest that these
affective objections were partially upheld. These soldiers‘ actions were deemed
illegitimate, inappropriate, and illegal but there were no major changes to the U.S.
policies that enabled this behavior. Thus, the convicted soldiers were depicted as a ―few
rotten apples‖ that did not accurately reflect US policy and forces in Iraqi. This suggests
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that these individuals were rogue soldiers—morally monstrous, sexually deviant, and
viciously depraved—whose corrupt actions were completely their own.
This is surprising considering that ―the Pentagon's own probes have
acknowledged that military commanders, civilian contractors, the CIA and government
policymakers all bear some responsibility for the abuses‖ (―Introduction‖ 2006, n.p.). The
highest ranking officer to face criminal charges in connection to the Abu Graib
controversy was Lieutenant Colonel [LTC] Steven Jordan, supervising Military
Intelligence (MI) officer at Abu Ghraib. Other higher ranking officers implicated, such as
former Brigadier General Janis Karpinski and former Brigadier Commander Thomas
Pappas who were in charge of Military Police (MP) and MIs respectively, were officially
reprimanded, released from duty, demoted, fined, but not criminally charged.
Furthermore, even though some minimal changes were made to America‘s
official stance on legitimate and appropriate interrogation tactics, the rationale for the use
of numerous ―harsh‖ tactics remained intact for the duration of former President Bush‘s
term. On March 8, 2008, Bush even vetoed a bill that would have banned multiple tactics
used at Abu Ghraib such as beating, electrocuting, stripping, hooding, and waterboarding.
In his official statement, Bush explained that ―The bill Congress sent me would take
away one of the most valuable tools in the war on terror, so today I vetoed it. . . . This is
no time for Congress to abandon practices that have a proven track record of keeping
America safe‖ (―Bush‖ 2008, n.p.). All in all, while affective objections to Abu Ghraib
did help instigate some tighter regulations on public conduct, they did not result in the
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rigid governmental change needed to fully transform the affective conditions that
provoked the soldiers‘ feelings of pleasure at causing their prisoners pain.
Analysis of the affective dimensions of the IFC social controversy yielded
insights into: how norms of respect guide public conduct at sacred site; what affects,
feelings, emotions, and behaviors are considered legitimate and appropriate in relation to
these norms; and how a rhetor‘s affective experience can afford her/him a type of
privilege when arguing for or against these regulations. Norms of respect help establish
the parameters of acceptable and justifiable conduct and behaviors in public spaces and
places. These norms differ in relation to the history, affective atmosphere, purpose, and
use of a given site and can be challenged, negotiated, reified, or reformed during social
controversy. During the conflict over the IFC, the norms of respect were guided by the
history and atmosphere of Ground Zero as a site of collective trauma, its purpose as a
place of public memory, and its conflicting uses as a means to commemorate 9/11 as well
as a space to culturally and economically revitalize lower downtown Manhattan. In other
words, the norms of respect that regulate public conduct at the WTC site are influenced
by the force and intensity of the tragedy that occurred there and the melancholy
atmosphere created by its remains and ruins as well as Ground Zero‘s significance as a
commemorative site of collective remembrance, and, lastly, its need for public approval
in order to draw visitors and generate revenue.
After months of relentless campaigning, the TBM‘s emotion-based claim of
reverence was taken up by former Governor Pataki‘s who evicted the IFC from the WTC
site. By doing so, Pataki reinforced the dominant norms of respect at sacred sites by
178

establishing strict regulations on public conduct which assert that feeling reverent and
engaging in acts of veneration are the legitimate and appropriate ways to affectively
engage in the experience of Ground Zero. According to these norms, the affective
experience of analytic curiosity and the act of questioning U.S. politics and policy are
illegitimate and inappropriate conduct at Ground Zero. Rather, respectful conduct is
driven by feelings of reverence for the mortal and material loss incurred at this site which
can provoke a cathartic experience when publicly (re)collecting the events of 9/11 there.
Interestingly, this narrow regulation on public conduct at Ground Zero subverts
the dominant norms of contemporary memorial sites. As Blair and Michel (1999) explain,
―Rather than telling us what to think,‖ contemporary public memorials ―invite us to think,
to pose questions, to interrogate our experiences and ourselves in relation to the
memorial‘s discourse‖ (37). Although a dominant norm of memorial conduct, this type of
critical behavior is inappropriate and illegitimate because it is considered disrespectful to
the sacredness of the WTC site. This suggests that commemorative spaces of national
trauma are bound by stricter norms and conventions that establish rigid regulations on
visitors‘ conduct prohibiting the same sense of analytic curiosity normally cultivated at
contemporary sites of public memory.
The strict regulations imposed upon individuals‘ conduct at the WTC site also
reveals the privilege allotted to the victims‘ families, friends, and colleagues as
authorities on the affective experience Ground Zero ―naturally‖ provokes. It is assumed
that these individuals have a more immediate connection to the trauma of 9/11 via their
affective proximity to the loss and the intensity of their grief. In other words, if anyone
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knows how individuals should feel when (re)collecting 9/11 at the site of the trauma, it is
those who were the most immediately affected by it. This afforded the TBM‘s emotionbased claim of reverence a type of privilege which positioned victims‘ families as
authorities on the affective experience of Ground Zero. This implies that anyone without
the same type of immediate connection to the 9/11 victims should not have the authority
to decide what affective experiences WTC visitors engage in. Hence, the TBM‘s
successful circumvention of the LMDC‘s authority to judge the legitimacy and propriety
of the IFC at the WTC site. The privilege afforded to the TBM as affective authorities
also implies that the academics and activists are not as knowledgeable about what
visitors‘ affective experience at Ground Zero should be for lack of an immediate
connection to the attacks. Thus, IFC supporters do not know the ―right‖ way to
commemorate 9/11 there. As TBM (2005d) proponents asserted, ―The IFC represents the
wrong people telling the wrong story‖ (n.p.).
Analysis of the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy,
provides insights into: how norms of laïcité not only regulate students‘ conduct but also
create oppressive affective experiences for veiled French-Islamic girls; what affective
states underwrite the creation of these regulations; and how the conditions of some
individuals‘ affective states are privileged over others in the creation of these regulations.
The principle of laïcité is a central tenant of French citizenship and is considered a
lynchpin of national unity. This principle has been interpreted in two conflicting manner
which imply divergent norms of behavior. Laïcité can either value integration and
national secularism as a means to promote national unity through the equal exclusion of
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religious attire in public schools or value tolerance and national neutrality as a means to
promote national unity through the equal inclusion of this type of attire.
The approval of a national ban on conspicuous religious attire in public schools
imposed strict regulations on veiled French-Islamic schoolgirls‘ conduct as legitimate,
appropriate, and, thus, justified in relation to the integration-based norms of laïcité.
Consideration of the affective dimensions of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy
highlights how regulations on veiled schoolgirls‘ public conduct created affectively
arduous conditions these girls have been forced to live within. Banning the practice of
hijab from public schools puts veiled schoolgirls in a position to decide between
unveiling or leaving public school which can trigger intense sensations of pressure to
choose between their religious and cultural beliefs and their desire for a public education.
The conditions of this sensate-visceral experience is saturated with conflicting feelings
and emotions such as sadness, anger, worry, confusion, melancholy, indignation, and
resignation, which veiled girls must negotiate in order to make the decision and even
then, their decision may not fully relieve the intensity of the affective conditions they are
now forced to within. Thus, legalizing regulations on public conduct which reaffirm
integration-based norms of laïcité justify the creation of oppressive affective conditions
veiled French-Islamic girls are subjected to.
From the integration-based perspective of laïcité, veiling was considered an
intentional rejection of and an implicit aggression towards French culture that
jeopardized the unity of France‘s citizenry and the public‘s safety. During the Loi n*
2004-228 social controversy, the emotion of fear underwrote this stance justifying the
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ban on hijab in public schools as a means to attenuate the sensate-visceral experience of
risk that veiling posed to the French republic and the feelings of vulnerability that
accompanied it. This fear has a colonist tenor; it is a fear of the physical danger the veiled
Other (re)presents as a symbol of Fundamental Islam as well as a fear of the dilution of
French national identity caused by this Other‘s presence in public schools. Since the prolaw stance is grounded in a politics of fear, this affective state is meant to orient
audiences away from the felt conditions of veiled schoolgirls and, instead, attune them to
the larger public as well as French-Muslim girls who felt pressure to veil. The decision to
legalize a national public school ban on conspicuous religious attire highlights how the
desire to relieve feelings of fear and reduce the experience of risk are valued and
privileged more than alleviating opponents‘ feelings of indignation and attenuating the
oppressive conditions imposed upon veiled French-Islamic schoolgirls.
In order for veiled French-Islamic girls‘ experience to be valued, they must
choose to openly sacrifice their belief in and adherence to religious law and cultural
customs that are not deemed inherently ―French‖ while at public school. If girls want to
enjoy the benefits of public education their French citizenship entitles them to, they must
renounce hijab while at school regardless of how affectively painful and difficult this
decision would be. In other words, the experience of sacrificing one‘s ―Other‖ identity is
necessary to assuage the fear and risk associated with hijab; whereas choosing to remain
veiled reifies the affective state of fear and is perceived as a blatant act of opposition to
the French state. The rigidity of this affective logic and the privilege afforded feelings of
fear and the desire to alleviate experiences of risk can make it difficult to apprehend
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and/or discern experiences that are irreducible to the logic of acquiescence and/or
resistance. Cennet Doǧanay‘s affective state of defiance compliance which became
salient during her act of publicly unveiling her shorn head is an example of this difficulty.
The relationship between affect and the regulation of conduct suggests that there
is a connection between the affective dimensions of social controversy and theories of
governementality, which can have implications for future argumentation scholarship.
Originally conceived by Foucault (2001) as the ―conduct of conduct,‖ theories of
governmentality address liberal and neoliberal forms of governance which function as a
diffuse form of power ―structur[ing] the possible field of action of others‖ (341).
Govermentality, according to Collier (2009), is a form of political rationality ―that shapes
the ‗conditions of possibility‘ for thinking and acting in a certain way‖ (96). In other
words, governmentality studies address how collectives problematize and rationalize
issues and situations facing society to make them knowable and, thus, manageable. Once
rationalized, political technologies (i.e., means of regulating a populations‘ field of
possible actions) can be used to manage difficult issues and situations by ―shaping and
reshaping‖ public conduct into ―regimes of practice‖ (Dean 1999, 18).
These regimes normalize individual and collective actions—impacting
individuals‘ felt conditions—which enables the government of public life by both the self
and the state. Within the governmentality field, Campbell (2010) argues these theories
should incorporate an examination of the ―emotional life of governmental power,‖ since
the politics of affects, feelings, and emotions aid in the mobilization of political
technologies and normalization of regimes of practice (37). For instance, in order for the
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French ban on conspicuous religious attire to be approved, hijab had to be rationalized as
a threat that created the conditions of risk to both national unity and security. The law,
then, is a political technology employed to help the French republic govern this
problematic situation by creating a ―racialised [sic] emotional regime [of practice]‖ that
makes the affective conditions of one part of the population more hospitable, while
creating oppressive conditions for another (Johnson 2010, 499).
As a public debate regarding the legitimacy and propriety of actions, events,
texts, and claims, criticism of social controversy gives a unique look into the governing
practices of a society. During social controversies, the argumentative rationale of
oppositional stances become salient, enabling critics to analyze forms of reasoning that
ground public sentiments regarding the reform, creation, perpetuation, and/or
transformation of the norms and conventions (i.e. regimes of practice) a population
collectively lives by. These norms and conventions establish the regulatory processes that
guide public discourse and the analysis of the affective dimensions of social controversy
offer insights into the affective and emotional rationality that supports the regulation of
public conduct. Extending social controversy research to incorporate theories of
governmentality would enable critics to further conceptualize this type of argumentative
practice as a political technology that is used to justify the establishment of rigid
restrictions on one‘s own and other‘s conduct as legitimate and appropriate responses to a
given set of the political, cultural, ideological, economic, and affective conditions.
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Risk and Vulnerability
In the Abu Ghraib, IFC, and Loi n* 2004-228 social controversies, analysis of
their affective dimensions illuminated how the rationale for tighter regulations on
citizens‘ public conduct was rationalized as necessary due to the potential risks and the
vulnerabilities these actions, or inactions, would create and/or perpetuate. In these case
studies, when norms or laws restricting the citizenry‘s conduct were proposed, they were
asserted as a means to create national unity and civility by foreclosing on sensate-visceral
experiences of risk that provoke feelings of vulnerability. In other words, the experiences
of risk are seemingly too intense to be publicly permitted without jeopardizing a nation‘s
cohesion and safety. The affective state of risk engages individuals in a sensate-visceral
experience of embodied exposure to what is cognitively recognized as a danger or threat,
provoking sensations of vulnerability. An examination into what participants claimed
created experiences of risk offers insights into what and who are considered dangerous to
a public and what implications this has.
In the Abu Ghraib social controversy, some affective objections were
underwritten by feelings of fear over the perceived risk the public circulation of the
images created. In these cases, individuals feared that upon seeing these images, the
―Arab Other‖ would retaliate. As stated by school teacher, Rosalind Gittings, ―The Arabs
already hate us, and now we're giving them even more reason to hate us and get revenge .
. . it reminds me of images you see from the Holocaust . . . It makes me embarrassed to
be an American‖ (Jacobs 2004, A1). Gittings‘s felt (re)action of disgust at the soldiers‘
pleasure while causing their prisoners pain is evidenced by her statement of
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embarrassment. She personally does not approve of their feelings and conduct. However,
her objection to the photos is not solely a moral stance; it is underwritten by both disgust
and fear. Gittings believed that the public circulation of these photos would create the
affective conditions necessary to provoke vengeful acts. In other words, the force and
intensity of the affective state the Abu Ghraib images capture is enough to incite feelings
of hatred, anger, and desire to cause Americans pain for the suffering we inflicted. This
implies that some pleas for tighter regulations on public and State conduct are driven by a
need for a sense of security, not solely out of ethical or ideological obligation.
In the IFC social controversy, TBM supporters‘ objection and critique of the IFC
was based on their assertion that the proposed museum could potentially engage visitors
in critical thinking regarding U.S. politics and policy from a historical and international
perspective. According to TBM supporters, provoking critical thinking posed a risk that
made visitors vulnerable to conflict and division at the very place the nation should feel
unified via the collective act of publicly commemorating 9/11. This type of critical
experience was considered, by TBM supporters, to be disrespectful of both the U.S. and
the 9/11 victims at the site both were attacked because it would undermine the affective
state of reverence visitors‘ ought to feel while there. Positioned as the opposite of
reverence, the experience of critical thinking at Ground Zero is a subversion of the norms
of respect at sacred sites and, therefore, jeopardized the conditions for national unity
visitors should engage in there.
The threat of the IFC is based in its potential to engage visitors in sensations of
analytical curiosity that can challenge and problematize their existing beliefs and feelings
186

regarding U.S. politics and policy, specifically in relation to 9/11. TBM proponents
believed that experiencing critical thinking about historical and international struggles for
freedom would galvanize individuals‘ to question and debate the legitimacy and propriety
of U.S. governmental action. This experience of critical thinking is what Natanson (1965)
deems an act of argumentation which puts participants‘ subjectivities (i.e., their sense of
self) at risk. During moments of argumentation, Natanson (1965) explains, ―[r]isk is
established when the affective world of the person is disrupted, and this disruption means
that his [sic] immediate life of feeling and sensibility is challenged and made open to
challenge‖ (19). Thus, the IFC is threatening because it creates a ―risky‖ situation for
visitors‘ during which their political beliefs become vulnerable to questions and
challenges which can provoke individuals to negotiate, reaffirm, and/or transform them.
For TBM proponents, the potential risk the critical experience of the IFC could
pose was too dangerous for the proposed museum to be built at Ground Zero. Feelings of
reverence and acts of veneration were valued as a means to achieve national unity;
whereas the experience of the IFC would only cause discordance (regardless of its
potential to provoke political change). National unity, then, is achieved by (re)presenting
9/11 from an overtly positive, nationalistic manner that does not historically or
internationally contextualize the attacks. In order to create the conditions for national
unity at the WTC site, visitors could not be allowed to engage in an experience of critical
thinking because it would jeopardize our collective cohesion.
The IFC co-creators and board did aspire to create the type of critical experience
of risk and vulnerability the TBM supporters feared. However, IFC proponents believed
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creating this type of ―risky‖ experience was not an act of disrespect to America or the
9/11 victims. Rather, they believed building a museum that would engage visitors in this
type of critical experience would be the most respectful way to pay tribute to September
11th. For its supporters, the IFC adhered to the norms of respect because it could
potentially lead visitors to understand September 11th from a different historical and
international perspective in hopes of ending the ―hatred, ignorance and intolerance‖ they
believed underwrote the attacks, helping to prevent future ones (―Memo‖ 2005, 28).
Thus, there is value (not danger) in problematizing U.S. governmental actions which
could enable visitors to empathetically engage with the oppressed conditions individuals
and groups have historically and still continue to struggle against all over the world. For
IFC supporters, this risk could not happen if public conduct at the WTC site is strictly
limited to feelings of reverence and acts of veneration.
In the end, the IFC‘s eviction from Ground Zero signals the decision to promote
national unity through reverence and veneration, implying that critically engaging 9/11 at
the WTC site was simply too much of a risk. Pataki‘s decision to remove the IFC can be
understood as a form of risk prevention; a means to remove individuals from experiences
that present a potential risk to the affective state citizens should have at this sacred site.
As risk prevention, evicting the IFC creates a sense of public security from the division
critical thinking can cause ensuring a stronger sense of national unity through reverence
and veneration.
During the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, the approval of the national ban
was rationalized as a necessary means to attenuate the intensity of the risk experienced by
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the law‘s supporters who believed hijab posed a threat to the unity and security of the
French republic. As a visible sign of Islam, the law‘s proponents argued that donning the
veil made women and girls‘ faith in Islamic religion and culture more salient than their
embodiment of French culture signifying a division amongst France‘s citizenry. This
division was considered a major cause of the affective state of malaise that seemed to
plague France, weakening the republic‘s political, cultural, and economic power.
Wearing the veil, then, threatened the republic‘s unity and strength and perpetuated the
public‘s feeling of malaise. For some proponents, hijab did not just signify Islam; rather,
it was considered an iconic symbol of Islamic Fundamentalism. This stance implies that
hijab is an extreme practice which only the most zealous believers would engage in. In
other words, the depth and intensity of faith one must have to either choose the veil or
impose it upon someone else was considered emblematic of the most radically devote
sect of Islam—fundamentalism. Perceived as representative of Islamic Fundamentalism,
hijab provoked a sense of fear at what someone with such radical beliefs potentially could
do. Considering this, banning hijab in public schools can be understood as a preventative
measure; a way to stop the progression, or spread, of Islamic Fundamentalism by
reducing the experience of risk veiling creates. Doing so, would help keep the republic
unified and safe.
Within the wider context of hijab in European nations, Fortier (2008) argues that
positing veiling as visually symbolic of Islamic Fundamentalism is ―part of an ongoing
process of organization and systemitization of a disciplining gaze that constructs
distinctions between the moderate and the fanatic, and between citizens who are willing
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and those who are unwilling to reassure fellow nationals‖ (96). Appreciation for or
simple consideration of the oppressive material and affective conditions this law puts
veiled French-Islamic girls in is secondary to the need to ―reassure‖ individuals who
perceive the hijab as indicative of an Islamic Fundamentalist threat they are fearful of. As
Weil (2004) stated, ―I admit that the law passed by the French parliament has one
unfortunate consequence: the right of Muslim girls who freely want to wear the scarf in
public schools, without pressuring anyone else, is denied‖ (n.p.). Yet, he makes no
attempt to apologize or empathize with the oppressive condition this creates to veiled
schools. Instead, Weil (2004) explains that the law was a necessary measure because
―The historical success of the French model of secularisation, laïcité, rests on its
guarantee to individuals of state protection against pressure from any religious group‖
(n.p.).
Imposing strict regulations on veiled French-Islamic schoolgirls‘ behavior as a
preventative measure is meant to lessen individuals‘ exposure to the sensate-visceral
experience of the risk posed by hijab. Reducing the possibility of this experience is an
affect-based form of security; it is an attempt to decrease the number of conditions in
which this risk, and the fear associated with can be provoked. Simply put, it lessens the
chances individuals have to feel risk and fear in relation to hijab. The preventative aspect
of this law is also denoted by the specific group of people most affected by the law—
veiled schoolgirls. Restrictions on veiling were imposed upon children and young adults
at public institutions where both academic and civic lessons were to be learned. As a
form of risk prevention, there is an assumption that the combined experience of unveiling
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and being taught French civic lessons may prompt an affective change in these girls and
young women, galvanizing them to stop practicing hijab altogether.
Cennet‘s Doǧanay‘s affective state of defiant compliance, as an embodied
experiential argument, is also an experience of risk that becomes salient in the Loi n*
2004-228 social controversy. When she publicly unveils her shorn head, Cennet‘s state of
defiant compliance testifies to the felt conditions that provoked this experience. As such,
Cennet‘s defiant compliance is a risky endeavor; she makes herself publicly vulnerable
which can orient and attune the public to the oppressive conditions the law creates for her
as a veiled French-Islamic girl. Thus, Cennet‘s affective state is similar to Natanson‘s
(1965) conceptualization of argumentation as a moment of risk and embodied
vulnerability. As Natanson (1965) explains, ―The self is not risked through arguments or
even through willingness to argue seriously; only when the full range and depth of the
affective life is shocked into openness is a true risk attempted‖ (17). Cennet becomes
vulnerable—physically by unveiling her shorn head and affectively by the saliency of her
affective state salient—as a means to survive. If audiences can apprehend and appreciate
the felt conditions of Cennet‘s defiant compliance, it may prompt them to question the
legitimacy and propriety of the law.
Examination of the affective dimensions of social controversy reveal how the
desire to attenuate experiences of risk and the feelings of vulnerability that accompany
them were motivating factors in the creation, implementation, and justification of strict
regulations on public conduct. In these cases, anger and fear over the potential risks
posed by the IFC and hijab, respectively, underwrote concerns over national unity and
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safety. Since these controversies resulted in governmental actions (i.e., eviction of the
IFC and creation of the national ban), they can be understood and analyzed as acts of risk
prevention and a form of governmental security. The outcomes of these controversies
exemplify attempts to weaken and/or reduce a collective‘s exposure to conditions of risk
as a means to quell their fears, dull their feelings of vulnerability, and, consequently,
provoke experiences and sensations of safety.
Future scholarship on the affective dimensions of social controversy that result in
restrictions of public conduct, therefore, can benefit from research on risk and national
insecurity. As Magnusson (2001) explains, ―In the context of democracy, insecurity
arises from the fear that the norms, institutions, and rules of the regime are incapable of
protecting individuals, groups, society, institutions, or the democracy itself from those
imperfectly socialized into either the normative value or the operational functioning of
the regime‖ (213). Within this scholarship, some researchers focus on how fear, risk, and
vulnerability can be politically mobilized as a means to rationalize and justify the
oppressive use of governmental power with the consent of portions of the public
(Altheide 2010; Beck 1992, 2009; Beck and Sznaider 2006; Berlant 2005; Bigo 2002;
Fortier 2008; Hudson 2003; Slovic 2010; Walklate and Mythen 2006, 2010). This work
can help scholars of affect and social controversy to further theorize the connections
between moments of public conflict and governmental acts of regulation to analyze the
affective logics that underwrite forms of governing power that enable the creation of
oppressive conditions for portions of a citizenry while benefitting from a general sense of
public support (i.e., population and state sponsored forms of discrimination).
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Affect, Citizenship, and the Act of Empathetic Engagement
The last major insight from this dissertation deals with the relationship between
affect, citizenship, and the act of empathetic engagement. Throughout this project, the
connection between affect and citizenship has become salient in two ways. First, given
that the affective dimensions of social controversy deal with the regulation of public
conduct, the outcomes of these conflicts help illuminate the normative parameters of
citizen conduct highlighting the relationship between, what Johnson (2010) calls, ―public
emotions and the construction of the ‗good‘ citizen‖ (500). These parameters imply that
there are affective dimensions to citizenship that address how citizens should feel and
conduct themselves in relation to each other and within specific situations. Second,
empathetic engagement with specific emotion-based claims and affective states establish
a civic relationship of recognition between audiences and rhetors that is akin to the act of
bearing witness—both are ―[t]he vicarious experience‖ of (an)other that assume
recognition is the first step towards civic support and action (Rentschler 2004, 298).
In the Abu Ghraib social controversy, the affective objections made were appeals
to the norms of liberal democracy which dealt specifically with issues of citizenship.
These objections address what feelings and conduct are legitimate and appropriate for
U.S. soldiers to enact as well as what American citizens should experience in response to
the leaked photos. For Sontag and Previtera, the norms of liberal democracy suggest that
U.S. citizens should feel shame at the blatant enjoyment our soldiers experienced while
causing their prisoners pain and suffering. This stance is based in the belief that liberal
democratic citizens should not enjoy harming those we have power over, specifically our
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prisoners. In other words, joyfully inflicting pain on individuals within our legal custody
subverts Americans‘ fundamental liberal democratic beliefs and is more indicative of the
type of state tyranny the U.S. has historically opposed. Thus, the soldiers‘ pleasure is
inherently undemocratic behavior and not feeling shame in response to its capture in the
Abu Ghraib photos suggests that Americans have abandoned their liberal democratic
values. Affective objections to these images are an attempt to reaffirm the norms of
liberal democracy and prompt the self and state regulation of U.S. citizens‘ conduct and
governmental policy, respectively.
Pataki‘s decision to oust the IFC from the WTC site establishes civic parameters
of public conduct by asserting that U.S. citizens should feel reverence at sacred sites of
national trauma. These parameters of citizen conduct suggest that ―the good citizen both
feels and performs particular emotions‖ within a given set of conditions (Johnson 2010,
501). In other words, as an enactment of American citizenship, individuals should engage
in a sensate-visceral experience of awe and melancholy over the 9/11 attacks that
provoke a sense of profound respect while at Ground Zero. This felt experience should
galvanize individuals to perform acts of veneration as a type of devote homage to the
victims of 9/11—the deceased and the U.S. Although not a ―law,‖ reverence and
veneration become the normative emotional scripts visitors to the WTC site are
compelled to embody as ‗good‘ U.S. citizens.
Positing reverence and veneration at this place of public memory as indicative of
‗good‘ citizenship conduct implies that Americans should be oriented towards the pain
and suffering their fellow citizens experienced on 9/11 as well as acts of heroism in the
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midst of tragedy when collectively remembering September 11th at Ground Zero. As
‗good‘ U.S. citizens, individuals should empathetically engage in this suffering and
heroism by vicariously experience this pain and courage victims felt on September 11th.
This act prompts individuals to recognize the U.S. and the deceased as blameless victims
of the 9/11 attacks. When commemorative experiences empathetically engage visitors in
this manner, they functions as a political form of witnessing. As Rentschler (2004)
explains, ―To commemorate usually means ‗to feel‘ in common with others, for the
purpose of remembering a past event, but it can also be the means through which political
actions are mobilized under the cover of ‗remembering‘‖ (299). By evicting the IFC,
Pataki politically normalized this empathetic engagement with American pain and
suffering as the proper form of U.S. conduct when (re)collecting national trauma.
Production of this normative conduct, therefore, formally situates the critical
experience proposed by the IFC as not just disrespectful but also inherently un-American
conduct at sites of national trauma. Designating experiences of critical thinking as
illegitimate and inappropriate conduct for U.S. citizens, suggests that Americans should
not question their government‘s actions at Ground Zero. In this way, ―critique itself [is]
censored, as if any reflexive criticism can only and always be construed as weakness and
fallibility‖ (Butler 2004, 42). Although September 11th was a horrible trauma,
intentionally foreclosing critical experiences at Ground Zero and suggesting ‗good‘
Americans should not critique U.S. politics and policy seems unnecessarily severe and
disconcerting. As Butler (2004) explains, engaging in critical thinking was once a
―democratic value‖ (42). However, now at Ground Zero it is positioned as un-American
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conduct. Considering that sites of public memory, such as the WTC site, are significant
spaces of civic pedagogy that affectively engage visitors in permanent lessons about how
we, as American citizens, should feel about specific historical events and individuals,
normalizing reverence as ‗good‘ conduct and critique as ‗bad‘ can have consequences for
future generations. This affective lesson will be set in concrete and stone on our national
landscape to ensure it is passed along from generation to generation which begs the
question—is this the affective lesson we want to bequeath to future generations about
September 11th? ‗Good‘ citizens revere America‘s loss and venerate victims‘ suffering
and heroism; whereas ‗bad‘ ones question if U.S.‘s politics and policy could have
contributed to the conditions leading to it.
As a result of the Loi n* 2004-228 social controversy, French citizens are now
legally required to abstain from wearing conspicuous religious attire in public schools as
a means to ensure integration-based norms of laïcité are upheld there. As mentioned in
chapter four, these norms assert that while in public spaces, individuals should display
their French citizenship above all other religious, cultural, and political identities and
affiliations. This law, therefore, posits that as ‗good‘ citizens, students should feel and
enact their loyalty—as an experience of faithful allegiance—to France (and France alone)
while in the national education system. Given this emphasis on public displays of loyalty,
the national ban creates a visual regime of privilege; it accords privilege based on the
invisibility of an individual‘s religious conviction and/or belief. For instance,
Christianity, which is still considered the unofficial religion of Europe, remains
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privileged under this law since its followers are not required to wear conspicuous
religious symbols as enactments of their faith (Moruzzi 1994).
This law assumes that the more invisible one‘s religious conviction is, the more
loyal that citizen appears to feel and be; whereas, visible symbols of one‘s faith signify a
citizen‘s disloyalty to the French republic. As a systematic measure to delineate the visual
parameters of ‗good‘ citizen conduct in France, the law puts veiled French-Islamic
students in a harrowing position. They must either unveil—enacting the conduct of a
‗good‘ French citizen—or remain veiled—appearing to intentionally reject this ‗good‘
conduct. This choice implies that hijab is ‗bad‘ citizen conduct which needs to be
reformed. As Johnson (2010) explains, ―People who are suspected of not having the
correct feelings, including those accused of making a point of their difference (for
example, by wearing a veil, or even preferring to speak a foreign language), are
problematised [sic] and identified as legitimate subjects for critique, fear or suspicion‖
(501). Consequently, veiled French-Islamic students‘ painful feelings and experiences in
relation to this law are rendered unimportant since their conduct is considered wrong in
the first place. In this case, the only thing that matters is whether or not these girls decide
to unveil and publicly enact their loyalty as a ‗good‘ French citizen.
The implementation of this law suggests that the majority of the French public
empathetically engaged with the feelings of fear and risk that infused the pro-law stance.
Engagement with these affective states assumes an orientation towards and appreciation
of individuals that were fearful of hijab and experienced a sense of vulnerability in
response to the threat veiling posed to national security and unity. During the
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controversy, the majority of unveiled French-Muslim schoolgirls and their parents were
described as population steeped in fear of hijab who desperately wanted relief from the
pressure to veil. As Weil (2004) asserted:
. . . a large majority [of French-Muslims] do not want to impose the headscarf on
their daughters but are also discomfited by an suggestion of infidelity to their
religious tradition. It is members of this . . . group, hitherto vulnerable to pressure
from friends, neighbors or family members who want to impose the headscarf on
their daughters, who can now reply: ―I was ready to follow your advice, but now
it is impossible: I cannot disobey the law!‖ (n.p.)
Empathizing with this population could help attenuate any guilt individuals might feel for
supporting a law that would intentionally put some young women in a terrible situation.
As mentioned in chapter four, veiled French-Islamic girls did not have a strong public
voice, making it difficult to create similar types of empathetic engagements with their
affective situations.
However, Cennet‘s affective state of defiant compliance as it culminated in the
act of publicly unveiling her shorn head was a salient and intense testament to the
oppressive conditions the law creates. Empathetic engagement with and apprehension of
Cennet‘s defiant compliance had the potential to problematize individuals‘ appreciation
of the fear and risk infused stance of pro-law advocates. As indicative of her attempt to
survive given the conditions of the law, Cennet‘s state is a form of ‗good‘ citizen conduct
since she does unveil but her unwillingness to show her hair is an indication of the
injustice of the national ban and its legalized infringement on veiled schoolgirls‘ civic
rights.
The findings of this dissertation suggest that there is a significant connection
between affect and citizenship. Analyzing the affective dimensions of social controversy
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can reveal how these conflicts help establish the collective parameters of citizen conduct
by establishing specific affects, feelings, and emotions that a ‗good‘ citizen should feel
and act upon within given situations. This project also highlights how affective states and
emotion-based claims can empathetically engage individuals. This engagement orients
individuals to the affective conditions of specific individuals and groups enabling them to
apprehend and appreciate the particulars of (an)other‘s experience.
This relationship between affect and citizenship has recently been conceptualized
by Mookherjee (2005), Fortier (2008, 2010), and Johnson (2010) as ―affective
citizenship‖. According to Fortier (2010): ―Studies of ‗affective citizenship‘ for their part
have revealed how intimate and familial relationships are the basis of differential
conceptions of citizenship . . . or how governments and politicians draw on the register of
emotions to define good citizenship – as loyalty and attachment to the nation . . . or as
compassionate or empathetic to others‖ (19).49 This work can be greatly beneficial for the
further development of the relationship between affect, social controversy, and
citizenship. Although many of these works celebrate the transformative potential inherent
within the relationship between affect and citizenship, the ease with which affect has
been mobilized to legitimate oppressive and violent acts has also been recognized.
For instance, while Mookherjee (2005) asserts that ―affective citizenship‖ is a
critical, transformative approach to civic engagement that presumes ―citizens‘ structural
autonomy is formed not through just one set of affective bonds, but rather through
commitments to multiple, intersecting communities‖ all of which they are responsible to
(37). Johnson (2010) concludes her study of Tony Blair and Barak Obama‘s political
49

The citations in this quote were omitted.
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rhetoric by explaining, that advocating more empathy based civic relations ―offers no
simple solutions‖ and, thus, scholars need ―to pay attention to who is seen as the
legitimate object of empathy as well as who is seen as the legitimate object of fear‖
(Johnson 2010, 506). This project offers similar findings. Analysis of the affective
dimensions of social controversy can enable scholars to identify not only whom has
become the ―legitimate object of empathy‖ but also examine the argumentative rationale
used to justify this and the opposing line of reasoning used to counter it.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation has proposed and implemented an affect-based
form of social controversy criticism as a means to address the affective dimensions of this
type of conflict. Thus, this project exemplifies how argumentation theory can benefit
from the inclusion of affect theory. Social controversy is a passionate endeavor; it orients
and galvanizes individuals to engage in debate over issues that have implications for our
collective public life. This project is a just a small example of the argumentative
significance affect has and it is my sincere hope it offers insights the integral role affects,
feelings, and emotions can play in social controversy.
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